Shisha-Shtagal to'g'risidagi qonunning rad etilishi - Decline of the Glass–Steagall Act

Ushbu maqolada bir nechta muammolar mavjud. Iltimos yordam bering uni yaxshilang yoki ushbu masalalarni muhokama qiling munozara sahifasi. (Ushbu shablon xabarlarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) The betaraflik ushbu maqolaning bahsli. Tegishli munozarani munozara sahifasi. Iltimos, ushbu xabarni o'chirmang buning uchun shartlar bajariladi. (Iyun 2018) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) Ushbu maqoladagi misollar va istiqbol mumkin emas barcha muhim nuqtai nazarlarni o'z ichiga oladi. Iltimos maqolani takomillashtirish yoki masalani muhokama qiling. (Iyun 2018) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) Bu maqola kabi yozilgan shaxsiy mulohaza, shaxsiy insho yoki bahsli insho Vikipediya tahrirlovchisining shaxsiy his-tuyg'ularini bayon qiladigan yoki mavzu bo'yicha asl dalillarni keltiradigan. Iltimos uni yaxshilashga yordam bering uni qayta yozish orqali entsiklopedik uslub. (2017 yil iyun) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling)

Ushbu maqola Glass-Steagall ta'sirining pasayishi haqida: qonunchilik, cheklovlar va bo'shliqlar.

Shisha-Stigal qonuni uning bir qismi edi 1933 yilgi bank to'g'risidagi qonun. Tijorat banklari va investitsiya banklari (yoki boshqa qimmatli qog'ozlar firmalari) amalga oshirishi mumkin bo'lgan faoliyatga cheklovlar qo'ydi. U ushbu faoliyatni samarali ravishda ajratib turdi, shuning uchun iste'molchining pulini spekulyativ foydalanishdan himoya qilish uchun biznesning ikki turi aralashib keta olmadi. The 1935 yilgi bank to'g'risidagi qonun aniqlangan va boshqa tarzda o'zgartirilgan Glass-Steagall.

Vaqt o'tishi bilan xususiy firmalar va ularning nazorat organlari qonunchilikda ko'zda tutilgan to'siqlarni zaiflashtirishning yangi usullarini topdilar. Oxir-oqibat, himoya vositalari juda zaiflashdi.

Boshidanoq ko'plab cheklovlarni samarali deb topmagan va ularni butunlay yo'q qilishni istagan iqtisodchilar, ishbilarmonlar va siyosatchilar ko'p edi. Bu taxminan 66 yil davom etdi, ammo oxir-oqibat qonunchilik butunlay bekor qilindi. Keyingi moliyaviy inqirozlar qonunchilikni qayta tiklashga urinishlarga olib keldi va hattoki uni dastlab ko'zda tutilganidan kuchliroq qildi.

1935 yildan 1991 yilgacha bo'lgan Glass-Steagall taraqqiyoti

Tijorat banklari 1930 yillarning boshlarida depressiyaga tushgan qimmatli qog'ozlar bozoridan, Glass-Steagall tomonidan qimmatli qog'ozlar anderrayteri va muomalasiga qo'yilgan taqiqlar kuchga kirgunga qadar ham chiqib ketishdi.^[1] Biroq, bu taqiqlar ziddiyatli edi. 20-asrning 20-yillarida tijorat banklari filiallari anderraytingi bo'yicha 1934 yilda olib borilgan tadqiqotlar shuni aniqladiki, bunday anderrayting banklar bilan bog'liq bo'lmagan firmalarning anderraytingidan yaxshiroq emas. Ushbu tadqiqot tijorat banklarining ishtirokini taqiqlash bilan qimmatli qog'ozlar bozorlariga zarar etkazilgan deb taxmin qilgan Glass-Steagall tanqidchilarining bahsiga sabab bo'ldi.^[2] 1942 yildagi bir tadqiqot shuni ham ko'rsatdiki, tijorat banklari filiallari anderraytingi bank bo'lmagan sheriklik anderraytingiga qaraganda yaxshiroq emas (yoki yomonroq), ammo bu shuni anglatadiki, bu "afsona" tijorat bankining qimmatli qog'ozlar filiallari bank mijozlarining "foydasiz qimmatli qog'ozlar" ni sotishidan foydalangan.^[3]

Senator Glassning "bekor qilish" harakati

1935 yilda Senator oynasi tijorat banklariga korporativ qimmatli qog'ozlarni anderrayter qilish bo'yicha Glass-Steagall taqiqini bekor qilishga urindi. Glass, Glass-Steagall tijorat bankining korporativ qimmatli qog'ozlarini anderrayter qilishini taqiqlab, qimmatli qog'ozlar bozoriga noo'rin zarar etkazganligini ta'kidladi.^[4] Birinchi Senat 1935 yildagi Banklar to'g'risidagi qonunning qabul qilingan versiyasiga Glass-ning qayta ko'rib chiqilishini "Glass-Steagall" qonunining 16-bo'limiga kiritilgan bo'lib, cheklovlar va qoidalarga rioya qilgan holda korporativ qimmatli qog'ozlarga anderrayterlik qilishga bankka ruxsat berdi.^[5]

Prezident Ruzvelt 16-bo'limning ushbu qayta ko'rib chiqilishiga qarshi chiqdi va Glassga "agar anderrayting har qanday shaklda, shaklda yoki shaklda tiklansa, eski huquqbuzarliklar qaytib keladi" deb yozgan. In konferentsiya qo'mitasi Uy va Senat o'rtasidagi kelishmovchiliklarni 1935 yildagi "Banklar to'g'risida" gi qonunning qabul qilingan versiyalari qabul qilganligi sababli, Glassning 16-bo'limiga o'zgartirishlar kiritilgan tili olib tashlandi.^[6]

Nazoratchi Saksonning Shisha-Stigal talqini

Prezident Jon F. Kennedi sifatida tayinlangan Valyuta nazorati, Jeyms J. Sakson, Glass-Steagallning taqiqlariga jiddiy e'tiroz bildirgan navbatdagi davlat arbobi edi. Sakson milliy banklarning regulyatori sifatida tijorat banklarining raqobatbardosh mavqei bilan shug'ullangan. 1950 yilda tijorat banklari AQSh moliya institutlari aktivlarining 52 foizini egallagan. 1960 yilga kelib bu ulush 38 foizgacha kamaydi. Sakson milliy banklarning vakolatlarini kengaytirmoqchi edi.^[7]

1963 yilda saksonlar boshchiligida Valyuta nazorati idorasi (OCC) milliy banklarga chakana mijozlarga oddiy aktsiyalar va boshqa qimmatli qog'ozlarga ega bo'lgan "muomaladagi hisobvaraqlar" ni taklif qilishga ruxsat beruvchi me'yoriy hujjat chiqardi.^[8] Bu banklarga chakana mijozlarga o'zaro mablag'larni taklif qilishga ruxsat berish miqdorini tashkil etdi.^[9] Sakson, shuningdek, milliy banklar munitsipal daromad zayomlarini yozishi mumkinligi to'g'risida qaror chiqardi.^[10] Sudlar ushbu ikkala harakat ham Glass-Steagall-ni buzgan deb topdilar.^[11]

O'zaro mablag'lar kabi ishlaydigan hisobvaraqlarning bank tomonidan sotilishini rad etishda, Oliy sud tushuntirdi Investitsiya kompaniyalari instituti lagerga qarshi agar OCC bunday savdo qanday qilib manfaatlar to'qnashuvidan va boshqa "nozik xavf-xatarlardan" saqlanishini tushuntirgan bo'lsa, OCC qaroriga "hurmat" ko'rsatgan bo'lar edi, bu Glass-Steagall oldini olishga harakat qilgan va bu bank qimmatli qog'ozlar mahsulotini taklif qilganda paydo bo'lishi mumkin. uning chakana mijozlari.^[12] Keyinchalik sudlar ushbu jihatni qo'lladilar Lager federal bank nazorati organlari tomonidan Glass-Steagall talqinlarini qo'llab-quvvatlash to'g'risidagi qaror.^[13] Kabi Lager bank regulyatorlari tomonidan berilgan ushbu izohlarga o'zaro fondlar sanoati tomonidan muntazam ravishda e'tiroz bildirilgan Investitsiya kompaniyasi instituti yoki orqali qimmatli qog'ozlar sanoati Qimmatli qog'ozlar sanoat assotsiatsiyasi chunki ular tijorat banklari raqobatining oldini olishga harakat qildilar.^[14]

1966 yildan 1980 yilgacha rivojlanish

Tijorat banklari uchun raqobat bosimini kuchaytirish

Nizom Q 1933 yilgi bank qonuni bilan tasdiqlangan tijorat banklaridagi muddatli depozitlar bo'yicha foiz stavkalarining cheklovlari, birinchi marta 1966 yilda bozor foiz stavkalari ushbu chegaralardan oshib ketganda "kuchga kirdi".^[15] Bu 1960-yillarning oxiri va 70-yillar davomida bir nechta "kredit tanqisliklari" ning birinchisini keltirib chiqardi, chunki omonatchilar yuqori foizli stavkalarda qayta investitsiya qilish uchun banklardan mablag'larni olib chiqishdi.^[16] Ushbu "distermediatsiya" banklarning barcha korporativ mijozlarining qarz olish talablarini qondirish imkoniyatini cheklaganida, ba'zi tijorat banklari o'zlarining "eng yaxshi mijozlariga" tijorat qog'ozlarini chiqarish orqali to'g'ridan-to'g'ri "kapital bozorlaridan" qarz olish dasturlarini yaratishda yordam berishdi.^[17] Vaqt o'tishi bilan tijorat banklari borgan sari ko'proq kredit sifati pasayib ketishdi, yoki to'g'ridan-to'g'ri qarz ololmaydigan spekulyativ, korporativ qarzdorlar ".kapital bozorlari."^[18]

Oxir oqibat, hatto kredit sifati past bo'lgan korporatsiyalar va (bilvosita "orqali)sekuritizatsiya ") iste'molchilar kapital bozorlaridan qarz olishga qodir edilar, chunki aloqa va axborot texnologiyalarining yaxshilanishi investorlarga qarz oluvchilarning keng doirasini baholash va investitsiya qilish imkoniyatini yaratdi.^[19] Banklar uy-joy ipotekasini sekuritizatsiyalash yo'li bilan 70-yillarning oxirida moliyalashtira boshladilar.^[20] 1980-yillar davomida banklar va boshqa kreditorlar sekuritizatsiyadan foydalanish uchun "kapital bozorlari "ilgari bank kreditlari hisobidan moliyalashtirilgan ko'plab aktivlarni moliyalashtirish.^[21] "Kreditni uzaytirish bilan bog'liq ma'lumotlarni to'plash, qayta ishlash va tahlil qilish bo'yicha ekspert vositachilar sifatida ustun mavqeini" yo'qotishda banklar an'anaviy "omonatchilar" tomonidan bank kreditlari o'rnini bosadigan qimmatli qog'ozlarga sarmoya kiritganligi sababli tobora "chetlab o'tishdi".^[22]

1977 yilda Merrill Linch brokerlik mijozlariga a-dagi mablag'lar bo'yicha cheklarni yozish imkonini beradigan "naqd pulni boshqarish hisobvarag'i" ni joriy qildi pul bozori hisobvarag'i yoki "dan olingankredit liniyasi "Merrill taqdim etdi.^[23] The Qimmatli qog'ozlar va birja komissiyasi (SEC) bunga qaror qildi pul bozori fondlari fondlarda saqlanadigan qimmatli qog'ozlar qiymatining kunlik o'zgarishiga qaramay investor aktsiyalarini $ 1 barqaror "sof aktiv qiymati" bilan "sotib olishi" mumkin. Bu pul bozoridagi mablag'larning "yaqin pul" ga aylanishiga imkon berdi, chunki "sarmoyadorlar" tijorat banklari tomonidan taqdim etilgan an'anaviy chek hisobvaraqlariga chek qo'yganlari kabi, "sarmoyadorlar" ushbu hisobvaraqlarga cheklar ("qaytarib olish to'g'risida buyruqlar") yozdilar.^[24]

Shuningdek, 1970-yillarda Glass-Steagall tomonidan 21-bo'limdan tashqari cheklanmagan jamg'arma va kreditlar,^[25] taklif qilishga ruxsat berildi "hisob-kitoblarni olib chiqib ketish tartibi "(HOZIR hisob raqamlari). Pul bozoridagi hisob-kitoblarda bo'lgani kabi, bu hisob-kitoblar ham omonatchiga" jamg'arma hisobvarag'i "dan to'lovlarni buyurtma qilishga ruxsat berishda hisoblarni tekshirish kabi ishlaydi.^[26]

Xelen Garten 1933 yilgi banklar to'g'risidagi qonunda belgilangan tijorat banklarining "an'anaviy tartibga solinishi", shu jumladan Glass-Steagall, bank bo'lmagan firmalar va "kapital bozorlari" bank kreditlari va depozitlari o'rnini bosishni ta'minlab, natijada rentabellikni pasaytirdi. tijorat banki.^[27] Richard Vietor an'anaviy bank reglamenti tijorat banklarini bankdan tashqari raqobatdan himoya qila olmasligiga rozi bo'ldi. Biroq, uning ta'kidlashicha, sezilarli iqtisodiy va moliyaviy beqarorlik 1960 yillarning o'rtalarida boshlangan. Bu iqtisodiy o'sishni va jamg'armalarni sekinlashtirdi, bu esa kreditga talab va taklifni kamaytirdi; shuningdek, tijorat banklariga putur etkazadigan moliyaviy yangiliklarni keltirib chiqardi.^[28]

Ximan Minskiy kelishilgan moliyaviy beqarorlik 1966 yilda qaytgan va faqat keyingi 15 yil ichida Federal Rezerv Kengashi tomonidan ishlab chiqilgan inflyatsiyaga qarshi kurashish uchun "kredit inqirozlari" orqali cheklangan edi.oxirgi chora uchun qarz beruvchi "Yangi inflyatsiyani keltirib chiqargan aktivlar narxlarini qutqarish. Minskiy inflyatsiyaning tobora yomonlashib borayotgan davrlarini ta'riflab berdi, keyinchalik ishsizlik ortidan kreditlar qisqarishi ortidan qutqarish tsikli takrorlandi.^[16] Ammo Minskiy an'anaviy bank reglamentini qo'llab-quvvatladi^[29] va "to'g'ridan-to'g'ri moliyalashtirishga ko'proq og'irlik beradigan kichikroq va sodda tashkilotlarni targ'ib qilish" uchun moliya ustidan keyingi nazoratni qo'llab-quvvatladi.^[30] Shunga o'xshash narsadan yozish "neokeynscha istiqbol " Yan Kregel Ikkinchi Jahon urushidan so'ng, tartibga solinmagan moliyaviy kompaniyalar, tartibga soluvchi harakatlar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanib, bank mahsulotlarini ("likvidlik va qarz berish joylari") tijorat banklariga qaraganda "kapital bozorlari" orqali arzonroq etkazib berish vositalarini ishlab chiqdilar.^[31] Kregelning ta'kidlashicha, bu bank regulyatorlari Glass-Steagall cheklovlarini bekor qilib, FDIC sug'urtalangan tijorat banklari va investitsiya banklari faoliyatida deyarli farq bo'lmaguncha, banklarga "kapital bozorlaridan foydalangan holda" ushbu tuzilmalarni nusxalashga ruxsat berishlari mumkin.^[32]

1960 yillarning boshlarida tijorat banklarining raqobatbardosh hayotiy imkoniyatlaridan qo'rqishgan.^[7] 1970-yillardagi "kapital bozorlari" ning rivojlanishi tijorat banklarining bank bo'lmagan raqobatchilar oldida zaifligini oshirdi. Quyida tavsiflanganidek, ushbu raqobat 1980-yillarda kuchayib boraveradi.^[33]

Cheklangan kongress va tartibga soluvchi o'zgarishlar

1967 yilda Senat Senat tomonidan qabul qilingan bir nechta qonun loyihalaridan birinchisini qabul qildi, u 16-bo'limni qayta ko'rib chiqishni ko'zda tutadi Shisha-Stagal 16-bo'lim banklarga kommunal daromad zayomlarini yozishga ruxsat berish uchun.^[34] 1974 yilda OCC milliy banklarga "avtomatik investitsiya xizmatlari" ni taqdim etdi, bu esa bank mijozlariga aniqlangan qimmatli qog'ozlarni sotib olish uchun depozit hisobvarag'idan muntazam ravishda olib qo'yishga ruxsat berishga imkon berdi.^[35] 1977 yilda Federal Rezerv Kengashi xodimlari Glass-Steagall tomonidan banklarga ruxsat berildi maxsus joy tijorat qog'ozi. 1978 yilda Bankers Trust bunday joylashtirishni boshladi.^[36] Quyida tavsiflanganidek, 1978 yilda OCC milliy bankka uy-joy ipotekasini sotish uchun chiqarilgan qimmatli qog'ozlarni xususiy joylashtirish huquqini berdi. sekuritizatsiya^[37]

Biroq tijorat banklari Glass-Steagall va boshqa bank qonunlari tomonidan joriy etilayotgan cheklovlardan norozi bo'lishdi.^[38] Saksonning Comptroller-ning milliy banklarga katta vakolatlarni berish to'g'risidagi ko'plab qarorlari sudlar tomonidan e'tirozga uchragan yoki bekor qilinganidan so'ng, tijorat banklari o'zlarining qimmatli qog'ozlardan tashqari faoliyatini "bitta bank xolding kompaniyasi" orqali kengaytirishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi.^[39] Chunki Bank xolding kompaniyasi to'g'risidagi qonun faqat ikki yoki undan ortiq tijorat banklariga egalik qilgan kompaniyalarning cheklangan bank bo'lmagan faoliyati, "bitta bank xolding kompaniyalari" Glass-Steagall 20-bo'limiga kiruvchi qimmatli qog'ozlar firmalaridan tashqari har qanday turdagi kompaniyalar manfaatlariga ega bo'lishi mumkin. Bank xolding kompaniyasi to'g'risidagi qonunda "bo'shliq" mavjud. tijorat bankiga egalik qilgan har qanday kompaniyaga nisbatan qo'llash to'g'risidagi 1970 yildagi tuzatish bilan yopildi.^[40] Tijorat bank firmasining katta vakolatlarga bo'lgan doimiy intilishi qachon qo'llab-quvvatlandi Ronald Reygan Prezident bo'ldi va "moliya sanoatini tartibga solishga munosabat" bilan o'rtoqlashadigan bank regulyatorlarini tayinladi.^[41]

Reygan ma'muriyatining rivojlanishi

Davlatga a'zo bo'lmagan bank va bankka tegishli bo'lmagan "bo'shliqlar"

1982 yilda raisligida Uilyam Ishoq, FDIC "siyosat bayonoti" ni e'lon qildi, bu davlatning nizomga olingan Federal rezervga a'zo bo'lmagan banklari qimmatli qog'ozlarni yozish va ular bilan muomala qilish uchun filiallar tashkil qilishi mumkin. Shuningdek, 1982 yilda OCC, Comptroller ostida C. Todd Konover, o'zaro fond kompaniyasi tomonidan tasdiqlangan Dreyfus korporatsiyasi va chakana sotuvchi Sears Bank xolding kompaniyasi to'g'risidagi qonunda nazarda tutilmagan "bank bo'lmagan" filiallarni tashkil etish. Federal zaxira kengashi, rais boshchiligida Pol Volker, Kongressdan FDIC va OCC harakatlarini yangi qonunlar orqali bekor qilishni so'radi.^[42]

FDICning harakati shuni tasdiqladiki, Glass-Steagall shtatdagi nizomga olingan Federal rezerv tizimiga a'zo bo'lmagan bank va qimmatli qog'ozlar kompaniyalari o'rtasidagi aloqalarni cheklamagan, hatto bank FDIC sug'urtalangan bo'lsa ham.^[43] Shtat qonunlari banklar va qimmatli qog'ozlar firmalari o'rtasidagi aloqalarni qanday tartibga solganliklari bilan farq qilar edi.^[44] 1970-yillarda chet el banklari bundan foydalangan holda, bunday birlashmalarga ruxsat beruvchi shtatlarda o'z filiallarini ochishgan.^[45] 1978 yilgi Xalqaro bank qonunchiligi AQShda yangi tashkil etilgan xorijiy banklarning filiallarini Glass-Steagall tasarrufiga kiritgan bo'lsa-da, AQShda mavjud bo'lgan filiallari bo'lgan xorijiy banklar "bobokalon" bo'lishgan va mavjud investitsiyalarni saqlashga ruxsat berishgan. Ushbu "bo'shliq" orqali Credit Suisse aktsiyadorlik sub'ektlariga egalik qila oldi Birinchi Boston, AQShning etakchi qimmatli qog'ozlar firmasi.^[46]

FDIC harakatlaridan so'ng sharhlovchilar yirik tijorat banklari Federal rezerv tizimidan chiqib ketishadi (agar ular milliy banklar bo'lsa, avval davlat nizomiga o'tganidan keyin) o'zlarini Glass-Steagall-ga qo'shilish cheklovlaridan ozod qilish uchun xavotirga tushishdi, chunki yirik tijorat banklari davlatlarga tijorat uchun ruxsat berishni lobbi qilganlar. bank investitsiya bank faoliyati.^[47]

OCC aktsiyasi "Bank xolding kompaniyalari to'g'risidagi" qonunda (BHCA) "bo'shliq" ga asoslanib, agar kompaniya faqat "tijorat kreditlari" beradigan "bank" ga egalik qilsa, Federal Rezerv Kengashi tomonidan nazorat qilinadigan "bank xolding kompaniyasi" ga aylanadi ( ya'ni biznesga beriladigan kreditlar) va taqdim etilgan "talab qilingan depozitlar" (ya'ni, hisobvaraqlarni tekshirish). Tekshiruv hisobvaraqlarini (ammo tijorat kreditlarini emas) yoki tijorat kreditlarini (lekin hisobvaraqlarini tekshirmasdan) ta'minlash uchun "bank bo'lmagan bank" tashkil etilishi mumkin. Bank bo'lmagan bankka egalik qiluvchi kompaniya "bank faoliyati bilan chambarchas bog'liq" faoliyat bilan cheklangan bank xoldingi bo'lmaydi. Bunga ruxsat berilgan Sears, GE va boshqa tijorat kompaniyalari "bank bo'lmagan banklarga" egalik qilishlari mumkin.^[48]

Bank-bank milliy bank yoki Federal rezerv tizimining a'zosi bo'lgan taqdirda, Glass-Steagall-ga qo'shilish cheklovlari qo'llaniladi. OCC-ning Dreyfusga milliy nizomga ega bo'lgan "bank bo'lmagan bank" ga egalik qilishi uchun ruxsat berishiga OCC-ning Dreyfus o'zaro fond fondi kompaniyasi sifatida o'z daromadlarining ozgina miqdorini anderrayter qilish va o'zaro fondlardagi aktsiyalarni tarqatish orqali erishganligi haqidagi xulosasi asos bo'lgan. Boshqa ikkita qimmatli qog'ozlar firmasi, J. & W. Seligman & Co. va Ehtiyotkorlik bilan, a'zosi bo'lgan banklar va qimmatli qog'ozlar kompaniyalari o'rtasidagi bog'liqlik bo'yicha Glass-Steagall cheklovlarini oldini olish uchun davlat nizomidagi Federal zaxira tizimiga a'zo banklarni tashkil etdi.^[49]

Qonunchilik javobi

Pol Volker va Federal Rezerv Kengashi FDIC va OCC harakatlarini bekor qiluvchi qonunchilikni izlashlariga qaramay, ular bank filiallari qimmatli qog'ozlar vakolatiga ega bo'lishlari kerakligi to'g'risida kelishib oldilar. Ular Senatning Bank qo'mitasi raisi Jeyk Garn (R-UT) tomonidan homiylik qilingan barcha FDIC sug'urtalangan banklarini qamrab olish va bank filiallariga sheriklik fondlari, munitsipal daromad zayomlari, tijorat shartnomalari va bitimlarini tuzish uchun ruxsat berish uchun Glass-Steagall 20-bo'limiga o'zgartirishlar kiritgan qonun loyihasini qo'llab-quvvatladilar. qog'oz va ipoteka kreditlari bilan ta'minlangan qimmatli qog'ozlar. 1984 yil 13 sentyabrda Senat Garn qonun loyihasini 89-5 ovoz bilan qabul qildi, ammo Demokratik boshqariladigan Uy qonun loyihasi bo'yicha harakat qilmadi.^[50]

Ammo 1987 yilda Senat (yangi Demokratik partiyaning ko'pchiligi bilan) palataga qo'shilib, 1987 yilgi Raqobatdosh tenglik to'g'risidagi bank qonunini (CEBA) qabul qildi. Garchi birinchi navbatda jamg'arma va kredit inqirozi, CEBA 1988 yil 1 martga qadar bank yoki affillangan qimmatli qog'ozlar faoliyatini tasdiqlash bo'yicha bank regulyatori harakatlariga moratoriy o'rnatdi, 20 va 32 qismli Glass-Steagall bo'limlariga qo'shilish cheklovlarini barcha FDIC sug'urtalangan banklariga moratoriy paytida bekor qildi va "bank bo'lmagan" sanoat kredit kompaniyalari bundan mustasno, yangi FDIC sug'urtalangan banklar uchun (ular depozit olgan bo'lsalar ham yoki tijorat kreditlari olsalar ham) bank "bo'shligi. Amaldagi "bank bo'lmagan banklar", ular BHCA cheklovlariga duch kelmasdan ishlashni davom ettirishlari uchun "bobokalonlar" edi.^[51]

CEBA Kongressga (bank regulyatorlari o'rniga) bankning qimmatli qog'ozlar bilan ishlash bo'yicha Glass-Steagall masalalarini ko'rib chiqish va hal qilish uchun vaqt ajratishni maqsad qilgan. Senator Uilyam Proksmir (D-WI), Senatning Bank qo'mitasining yangi raisi, ushbu mavzuni 1987 yilda boshlagan.^[52]

Xalqaro raqobatbardoshlik muhokamasi

Volfgang Reynikening ta'kidlashicha, Glass-Steagall "bekor qilish" 1987 yilda Kongressning kutilmagan qo'llab-quvvatlashiga erishgan, chunki yirik banklar Glass-Steagall AQSh banklarini xalqaro miqyosda raqobatlashishiga to'sqinlik qilgan deb muvaffaqiyatli aytishgan.^[53] Ushbu dalil yirik tijorat banklarining rentabelligini saqlashdan AQSh (va AQSh iqtisodiyoti) banklarining "raqobatbardoshligini" saqlab qolishgacha o'zgarganligi sababli, senator Proxmire o'zining Glass-Steagall islohotiga qarshi ilgari qarshi bo'lgan fikrini bekor qildi.^[54] Proxmire, Glass-Steagall 20 va 32-bo'limlarini bekor qiladigan va ushbu taqiqlarning o'rniga bankning filiallari bo'lgan qimmatli qog'ozlar faoliyatini tartibga soluvchi (va ularning miqdorini cheklaydigan) tizim bilan almashtiradigan qonun loyihasini homiylik qildi.^[55] U Glass-Steagallni "protektsionistik dinozavr" deb e'lon qildi.^[56]

1985 yilga kelib tijorat banklari 1974 yildagi 59% bilan taqqoslaganda yirik korxonalarga 26% qisqa muddatli kreditlar ajratdilar. Banklar "tijorat banklarining pasayishini" ko'rsatish uchun bunday statistik ma'lumotlarni keltirgan bo'lsalar-da, Reynki Kongressda Glass-Steagall-ning bekor qilinishini qo'llab-quvvatlovchi eng ta'sirchan omil ekanligini ta'kidladi. "AQSh banklarining xalqaro reytinglarda pasayishi edi. 1960 yilda o'nta eng yirik banklarning oltitasi AQShda joylashgan edi, 1980 yilga kelib faqat ikkita AQSh banklari birinchi o'ntalikka kirgan, 1989 yilga kelib esa biron bir yigirma beshtalikka kirmagan.^[33]

1980-yillarning oxirlarida Buyuk Britaniya va Kanada tijorat va investitsiya banklarining tarixiy ajralishlarini tugatdilar.^[57] Glass-Steagall tanqidchilari faqat amerikaliklar tomonidan joriy qilingan yapon qonunchiligini shafqatsizlarcha ta'kidladilar Yaponiyaning ishg'oli ikki faoliyatni ajratishda AQShni yolg'iz qolishdan saqladi.^[58]

Yuqorida ta'kidlab o'tilganidek, hatto AQShda ham o'n yettita xorijiy bank bu Glass-Steagall cheklovidan xoli edi, chunki 1978 yilgi Xalqaro bank qonuni qabul qilingunga qadar ular davlatning ustav filiallarini tashkil qilgan edilar, chunki AQShning yangi tashkil etilgan xorijiy banklari Glass-Steagall tasarrufiga kiritilgunga qadar.^[46] Xuddi shunday, yirik xorijiy davlatlar investitsiya va tijorat banklarini ajratmaganligi sababli, AQSh tijorat banklari AQSh tashqarisidagi filiallari orqali qimmatli qog'ozlar yozishi va bitim tuzishi mumkin edi. Pol Volker, "keng ma'noda" aytganda, AQSh tijorat banklari Evropada qimmatli qog'ozlarni yozishi mumkinligi mantiqsiz, ammo Qo'shma Shtatlarda emas.^[59]

1987 yil Glass-Steagall munozarasi holati

1980-1990 yillar davomida olimlar tijorat bankining anerraytingi 20-asrning 20-yillarida banklar bilan bog'liq bo'lmagan qimmatli qog'ozlar firmalarining anderraytingidan ko'ra yomonroq emasligi yoki yaxshiroq bo'lganligi va tijorat banklari qimmatli qog'ozlar filiallari tomonidan zarar ko'rmaganligi, kuchaytirilganligi haqidagi tadqiqotlarni nashr etdilar.^[60] Umuman olganda, tadqiqotchilar 19-asrning 30-yillarida Buyuk Depressiya yoki AQSh bank tizimining qulashida "yaxlit moliyaviy xizmatlar ko'rsatuvchi firmalar" rol o'ynagan degan fikrga hujum qilishdi.^[61] Agar 1930-yillarda Glass-Steagall tomonidan oqlanganligi "munozarali" bo'lsa, 1960-yillardan beri tijorat va investitsiya banklari faoliyati o'rtasidagi farq "bozor taraqqiyoti" bilan xiralashgan paytda Glass-Steagall hech qanday qonuniy maqsadga xizmat qilmagan deb bahslashish osonroq edi.^[62]

BHCA cheklovlaridan "bank bo'lmagan" "bo'shliq" bilan birga, 1980-yillarda "unitar tejamkorlik" "bo'shliq" qimmatli qog'ozlar va tijorat firmalarining bank (yoki "bank yaqinida") mahsulotlarini taqdim etish vositasi sifatida taniqli bo'ldi.^[63] Jamg'arma va kredit xolding kompaniyasi to'g'risidagi qonun (SLHCA) har qanday kompaniyaga bitta jamg'arma va kreditga egalik qilishga ruxsat berdi. Ikki yoki undan ortiq jamg'arma va kreditga ega bo'lgan kompaniyalargina tejamkorlik bilan bog'liq korxonalar bilan cheklangan.^[64] 1973 yilda allaqachon Birinchi Chikago banki Searsni uning haqiqiy raqibi sifatida aniqlagan edi.^[65] Citicorp Bosh ijrochi direktor Uolter Vriston keyinchalik 70-yillarda xuddi shunday xulosaga keldi.^[66] 1982 yilga kelib, "unitar tejamkorlik" va "bank bo'lmagan bank" "bo'shliqlaridan" foydalanib, Sears "Sears Financial Network" ni qurdi, bu "Super NOW" hisob-kitoblari va ipoteka kreditlarini Kaliforniyadagi yirik omonat va kredit orqali birlashtirgan. Kartani kashf eting "bank bo'lmagan bank" tomonidan kredit karta sifatida chiqarilgan, qimmatli qog'ozlar vositachiligi Dekan Uitter Reynolds orqali, uy va avtoulov sug'urtasi Allstate, va orqali ko'chmas mulk vositachiligi Coldwell Banker.^[67] Ammo 1984 yilga kelib, Valter Vriston "kelajak banki allaqachon mavjud va u shunday nomlanadi" degan xulosaga keldi Merrill Linch."^[68] 1986 yilda yirik bank xolding kompaniyalari Sears va Merrill Linch tomonidan foydalanilgan "raqobatdosh ustunlik" ga erishish uchun tijorat banklarining faoliyatini to'xtatish bilan tahdid qilganda, FDIC raisi Uilyam Seydman "tartibsizlik" vujudga kelishi mumkinligi haqida ogohlantirdi.^[69]

1987 yil "son qisqacha" da Kongress tadqiqot xizmati (CRS) asosiy dalillarni "ayrimlarini" umumlashtirdi

Glass-Steagallni quyidagicha saqlash uchun:

1. Manfaatlar to'qnashuvi bir xil tashkilot tomonidan kredit berish (kredit berish) va kreditdan (investitsiya) foydalanishni tavsiflaydi, bu esa qonunni dastlab ishlab chiqargan huquqbuzarliklarga olib keldi.
2. Depozit muassasalari o'zgalarning pullarini boshqarish orqali ulkan moliyaviy kuchga ega; kreditlar yoki sarmoyalar bo'lsin, mablag 'uchun bozorda barqarorlikni va raqobatni ta'minlash uchun uning darajasi cheklangan bo'lishi kerak.
3. Qimmatli qog'ozlar bilan ishlash xavfli bo'lishi mumkin, bu esa katta yo'qotishlarga olib keladi. Bunday yo'qotishlar depozitlarning yaxlitligiga tahdid solishi mumkin. O'z navbatida, Hukumat depozitlarni sug'urtalaydi va agar depozit muassasalari qimmatli qog'ozlar yo'qotilishi natijasida qulab tushsa, katta miqdorda to'lashni talab qilishi mumkin.
4. Depozit muassasalari xavfni cheklash uchun boshqarilishi kerak. Shunday qilib, ularning menejerlari qimmatbaho qog'ozlar savdosi bilan shug'ullanadigan korxonalarda ehtiyotkorlik bilan ishlashlari shart emas. Bunga misol - halokat ko'chmas mulk investitsiyalari trestlari o'n yil oldin bank xolding kompaniyalari homiyligida.

va Glass-Steagallni quyidagicha saqlashga qarshi:

1. Endi depozit institutlari kreditlar, qimmatli qog'ozlar va depozitlar o'rtasidagi farqlar yaxshi belgilanmagan "tartibga solinmagan" moliyaviy bozorlarda ishlaydi. Ular bozordagi ulushlarini u qadar qattiq tartibga solinmagan qimmatli qog'ozlar firmalariga va Qonundan juda ko'p cheklovlarsiz ishlayotgan xorijiy moliya institutlariga yo'qotmoqdalar.
2. Manfaatlar to'qnashuvining oldini olish, ularga qarshi qonunchilikni kuchaytirish va moliya firmalarining alohida alohida sho'ba korxonalarini tuzish orqali kredit berish va kredit funktsiyalarini ajratish orqali amalga oshiriladi.
3. Depozit institutlari izlayotgan qimmatli qog'ozlar faoliyati o'zlarining mohiyatiga ko'ra past xavfli bo'lib, ularni taklif qiluvchi tashkilotlarning umumiy xavfini diversifikatsiya qilish yo'li bilan kamaytiradi.
4. Dunyoning aksariyat qismida depozit institutlari bir vaqtning o'zida va ham bank, ham qimmatli qog'ozlar bozorida muvaffaqiyatli ishlaydi. Ularning tajribasidan olingan saboqlarni milliy moliyaviy tuzilma va tartibga solishimizga tatbiq etish mumkin.^[70]

"Xalqaro raqobatbardoshlik" argumentining ahamiyatini aks ettirgan holda, CRS bo'yicha alohida hisobotda banklar "o'zlarining asosiy faoliyatining tarixiy bozor ulushlarini mahalliy va xorijiy raqobatchilarga kamroq cheklangan holda yo'qotayotgani" ta'kidlangan.^[71]

Alohida ravishda Bosh buxgalteriya idorasi (GAO) Vakillar palatasi qo'mitasiga "Glass-Steagall-ning bekor qilinishi" ning foydalari va xatarlari ko'rib chiqilgan hisobotni taqdim etdi. Hisobotda Kongress "bekor qilishni" tanlasa, "xolding kompaniyasining tashkiliy tuzilmasi" dan foydalangan holda "bosqichma-bosqich yondashish" tavsiya etilgan. Glass-Steagall "allaqachon yemirilgan va eroziya kelajakda ham davom etishi mumkin" deb ta'kidlab, GAO "Glass-Steagall" ni bekor qilish haqidagi savolga javob berishini tushuntirib berdi - bu me'yoriy-huquqiy tuzilishdagi o'zgarishlarni muntazam va oqilona hal qilish imkoniyatini anglatadi. bozor haqiqatini yaxshiroq hal qilish uchun zarur bo'lgan narsalar. " GAO Kongressning ishlamay qolishi "tijorat va sarmoyaviy bank faoliyatining notekis integratsiyasini davom ettirishga" imkon berish uchun "potentsial xavfli" deb ogohlantirdi.^[72]

Kongress 1988 yilda Moliyaviy modernizatsiyalash to'g'risidagi qonunni ko'rib chiqayotganda, Evropa jamoalari komissiyasi "Ikkinchi bank ko'rsatmasi" ni taklif qildi^[73] 1993 yil boshida kuchga kirgan va butun yil davomida tijorat va investitsiya banklarini birlashtirishni ta'minlagan Evropa iqtisodiy hamjamiyati.^[74] Qo'shma Shtatlar qonunchiligi banklarni qimmatli qog'ozlar faoliyatidan ajratib qo'yishga intilgan bo'lsa, Ikkinchi Direktiv bu vakolatlarni taqdim etdi Yevropa Ittifoqi Qimmatli qog'ozlar faoliyati bank risklarini diversifikatsiya qildi, banklarning daromadlari va barqarorligini mustahkamladi degan xulosaga keldi.^[75]

Senat 1988 yilgi moliyaviy yangilash to'g'risidagi Proksmire to'g'risidagi qonunni 94-2 ovoz bilan qabul qildi. Vakillar palatasi asosan Vakilning qarshiliklari tufayli shunga o'xshash qonun loyihasini qabul qilmadi Jon Dingell (D-MI), uyning savdo va energetika qo'mitasi raisi.^[76]

20-bo'lim filiallari

1987 yil aprel oyida Federal rezerv kengashi bank xolding kompaniyalarini tasdiqladi Bankirlarga ishonish, Citicorp va JP Morgan & Co. Underwriter va bitim tuzish uchun filiallarni ("20-bo'lim" filiallari) tashkil etish ipoteka kreditlari bilan ta'minlangan uy-joylar, shahar daromadli obligatsiyalar va tijorat qog'ozi. Glass-Steagall-ning 20-bo'limi bankning "asosan anderrayting va qimmatli qog'ozlar bilan shug'ullanadigan" firma bilan hamkorlik qilishini taqiqladi. Kengash qaroriga binoan, 20-bo'lim bank filialiga turli xil cheklovlar, shu jumladan "xavfsizlik devorlari" dan tashqari tijorat bankini ajratish uchun "bankka tegishli bo'lgan qimmatli qog'ozlar" bo'lmagan ushbu turdagi qimmatli qog'ozlarni anderrayting va muomaladan tushumining 5 foizini olishga imkon beradi degan ma'noni anglatadi. uning 20-bo'limidan.^[77] Uch oydan so'ng, Boshqarma 20-bo'limning yozishi mumkin bo'lgan "bankka tegishli bo'lmagan qimmatli qog'ozlar" ro'yxatiga kredit karta hisobvaraqlari yoki boshqa "iste'molchilar uchun moliyaviy aktivlar" havzalari bilan ta'minlangan "aktivlar bilan ta'minlangan qimmatli qog'ozlar" ni qo'shdi. Ushbu 20-bo'lim filiallariga to'g'ridan-to'g'ri tijorat banklari emas, balki bank xolding kompaniyalari egalik qildilar.^[78]

1978 yilda Federal Rezerv Kengashi bank xolding kompaniyalariga davlatning qimmatli qog'ozlari va boshqa banklarga tegishli bo'lgan qimmatli qog'ozlarni yozgan va ular bilan muomalada bo'lgan qimmatli qog'ozlar filiallarini tashkil etish vakolatiga ega edi.^[79] Federal rezervlar kengashi raisi Pol Volker Kongressni Glass-Steagall-ga bunday affillangan shaxslarga cheklangan miqdordagi bankka tegishli bo'lmagan qimmatli qog'ozlarni yozish va ular bilan muomala qilishga ruxsat berish uchun o'zgartirish kiritishni qo'llab-quvvatladi, ammo korporativ qimmatli qog'ozlar emas.^[80] 1987 yilda Volcker bu alohida ta'kidlagan (va natijani ma'qullagan), bu faqat yirik davlat qimmatli qog'ozlari faoliyati bilan shug'ullanadigan banklar "banklar tomonidan yaroqsiz bo'lgan qimmatli qog'ozlar" ning katta hajmini yozadigan va ular bilan shug'ullanadigan filiallarga ega bo'lishlari mumkin.^[81] Davlat qimmatli qog'ozlari bilan bog'liq katta miqdordagi daromadga ega bo'lgan 20-bo'limning filiali umumiy daromadning 5% dan ko'prog'iga ega bo'lmagan holda, "bankka yaroqsiz" daromadni sezilarli darajada olish imkoniyatiga ega bo'lar edi.^[82] Ammo Volkker, Kengash Shisha-Shtagal to'g'risidagi qonunga o'zgartirishlar kiritmasdan ruxsat berishga vakolatli ekaniga rozi emas edi. Volcker va Federal Rezerv Kengashi gubernatori Ueyn Angell 20-bo'limning sheriklik buyurtmalaridan norozi.^[83]

Senator Proxmire Federal Rezerv Kengashining 20-bo'limiga tegishli sheriklik buyurtmalarini Kongressning Glass-Steagall ustidan nazoratiga qarshi chiqmoqda deb tanqid qildi. Kengashning buyruqlari shuni anglatadiki, Glass-Steagall tijorat banklari anderrayting va "banklar tomonidan yaroqsiz bo'lgan qimmatli qog'ozlar" bilan ishlashga qodir bo'lgan qimmatli qog'ozlar firmalariga qo'shilishlariga to'sqinlik qilmaydilar, agar bu faoliyat "alohida sho''ba korxonada amalga oshirilgan va miqdori cheklangan bo'lsa".^[84]

1988 yildagi Proxmire Moliyaviy modernizatsiyalash to'g'risidagi qonuni qonun bo'lmagandan so'ng, senator Proxmire va bir guruh demokratlarning katta guruhi Uy banklari qo'mitasi a'zolari (shu jumladan kelajakdagi qo'mita reyting a'zosi Jon LaFalce (D-NY) va bo'lajak qo'mita raisi Barni Frank (D-MA)) Federal Rezerv Kengashi unga 20-bo'lim filiallarining anderrayterlik vakolatlarini kengaytirishni tavsiya qilgan.^[85] Ushbu vakilning his-tuyg'ularini ifoda etish Jeyms A. Leach (R-IA) 1996 yilda takrorlangan,^[86] Proxmire "Kongress bu vazifani bajara olmadi" va "[Fed] bunga kirishish vaqti keldi" deb e'lon qildi.^[87]

Senator Proxmire-ning xatidan so'ng, 1989 yilda Federal Rezerv Kengashi 20-bo'limning korporativ qarz qimmatli qog'ozlarini anderayterlik qilish bo'yicha filiallarini ma'qulladi va 20-bo'limning filiali "bankka yaroqsiz" faoliyatdan topishi mumkin bo'lgan daromad foizining 5% dan 10% gacha ko'tarildi. 1990 yilda Kengash ma'qulladi JP Morgan & Co. anderrayting korporativ aktsiyalari. Tijorat (J.P. Morgan & Co.) va investitsiyalar bilan (Morgan Stenli eski "Morgan uyi" ning bank qurollari, ham korporativ obligatsiyalar va ham aktsiyalarni anderrayterlik qilmoqda, Volfgang Raynki Federal rezerv kengashining buyrug'iga binoan ikkala firma ham "tijorat va investitsiya bank mahsulotlarini taklif qiluvchi yagona moliya bozorida" raqobatlashishini anglatadi, bu "Glass-- Steagall buni rad etishga intildi. " Reinicke buni "Glass-Steagall-ning amalda bekor qilinishi" deb ta'rifladi.^[88]

Morgan Stanley uchun ushbu "yagona moliyaviy bozor" ga kirish uchun Federal Rezerv Kengashining buyrug'i zarur emas edi. Glass-Steagall investitsiya banklariga faqat depozitlarni olishni taqiqlaydi, tijorat kreditlari berishdan va depozitlarni olish taqiqini "depozit ekvivalentlarini ishlab chiqish yo'li bilan chetlab o'tishgan", masalan pul bozori fondi.^[89] Glass-Steagall shuningdek, investitsiya banklarining bank bo'lmagan banklar bilan bog'lanishiga to'sqinlik qilmadi^[48] yoki jamg'arma va kreditlar.^[64][90] Ushbu raqobatbardosh "tengsizlikni" keltirib, Federal Rezerv Kengashi 20-bo'limning istalgan filiallarini tasdiqlashidan oldin, 20-bo'limning ma'qullashlarini olgan to'rtta yirik bank xoldingi (Chase, JP Morgan, Citicorp va Bankers Trust) o'zlarining bank nizomlaridan voz kechish bilan tahdid qilishgan edi. agar ularga qimmatli qog'ozlarga katta vakolatlar berilmagan bo'lsa.^[91] Federal Rezerv Kengashining 20-bo'lim filiallari tomonidan ma'qullanganidan so'ng, sharhlovchi tijorat banklari va "qimmatli qog'ozlar va investitsiya biznesi" o'rtasidagi "Shisha-Shteygl" "devorini" tijorat banklari uchun "g'ovakli" va "investitsiya bankirlari va boshqa bank bo'lmagan shaxslar uchun mavjud bo'lmagan" degan xulosaga keldi. "^[92]

Greenspan boshchiligidagi Federal rezerv kengashi

Alan Greinspan Proxmire 1988 yil Federal Rezerv Kengashiga 20-bo'lim filiallarining anderrayterlik vakolatlarini kengaytirishni tavsiya qilgan xatini yuborganida Pol Volkerni Federal Rezerv Kengashining raisi etib tayinlagan edi. Grinspan 1987 yil dekabrida Kongressga Federal Rezerv Kengashi Glass-Steagall-ning bekor qilinishini qo'llab-quvvatlaganligi to'g'risida guvohlik berdi.^[93] Pol Volker 1980-yillarda Glass-Steagall islohotiga nisbatan "o'z pozitsiyasini" sezilarli darajada "o'zgartirganiga qaramay, u hali ham" kengash a'zolari orasida konservativ hisoblanadi ". Greenspan raisi sifatida Federal Rezerv Kengashi FDIC va OCC-ga qo'shilishda Glass-Steagallni bekor qilishga chaqirishda "bir ovozdan gapirdi".^[94]

1987 yilga kelib Glass-Steagall-ning "bekor qilinishi" 20 va 32-bo'limlarni bekor qilishni anglatadi. Federal rezerv kengashi "Glass-Steagall" ning "bekor qilinishini" qo'llab-quvvatladi, chunki bu bank xolding kompaniyalarining qimmatli qog'ozlar anderraytingi va muomalasi bilan shug'ullanadigan firmalar bilan bog'lanishiga yo'l qo'ymaydi. faoliyat. "^[95] Kengash Glass Steagall-ning 16 yoki 21-bo'limlarini bekor qilishni taklif qilmadi. Bank xolding kompaniyalari to'g'ridan-to'g'ri tijorat banklari emas, balki alohida kapitallashgan sho'ba korxonalari orqali yangi qimmatli qog'ozlar vakolatlarini amalga oshiradilar.^[96]

Pol Volker 1987 yil 11 avgustda Federal rezerv kengashi raisi lavozimidan ketishdan oldin banklar va bank xolding kompaniyalari qimmatli qog'ozlar faoliyati bo'yicha muhim tartibga solish tasdiqlarini olishgan edi.^[97] Kengashning 20-bo'lim filiallari va bankning tijorat qog'ozlarini xususiy joylashtirish uchun ruxsatnomalaridan tashqari, 1987 yilgacha federal bank nazorati organlari (1) homiyga vakolatli banklar yoki ularning filiallariga ega bo'lishgan. closed end investment companies,^[98] (2) sponsor mutual funds sold to customers in individual pensiya hisobvaraqlari,^[99] (3) provide customers full service brokerage (i.e., advice and brokerage),^[100] and (4) sell bank assets through "securitizations."^[101]

1982 yilda E. Jerald Korrigan, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and a close Volcker colleague, published an influential essay titled "Are banks special?" in which he argued banks should be subject to special restrictions on affiliations because they enjoy special benefits (e.g., deposit insurance and Federal Reserve Bank loan facilities) and have special responsibilities (e.g., operating the payment system and influencing the money supply). The essay rejected the argument that it is "futile and unnecessary" to distinguish among the various types of companies in the "financial services industry."^[102]

While Paul Volcker's January 1984, testimony to Congress repeated that banks are "special" in performing "a unique and critical role in the financial system and the economy," he still testified in support of bank affiliates underwriting securities other than corporate bonds.^[80] In its 1986 Annual Report the Volcker led Federal Reserve Board recommended that Congress permit bank holding companies to underwrite municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities, commercial paper, and mutual funds and that Congress "undertake hearings or other studies in the area of corporate underwriting."^[103] As described above, in the 1930s Glass–Steagall advocates had alleged that bank affiliate underwriting of corporate bonds created "conflicts of interest."^[104]

In early 1987 E. Gerald Corrigan, then president of the Nyu-York Federal zaxira banki, recommended a legislative "overhaul" to permit "financial holding companies" that would "in time" provide banking, securities, and insurance services (as authorized by the GLBA 12 years later).^[105] In 1990 Corrigan testified to Congress that he rejected the "status quo" and recommended allowing banks into the "securities business" through financial service holding companies.^[106]

In 1991 Paul Volcker testified to Congress in support of the Bush Administration proposal to repeal Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32.^[107] Volcker rejected the Bush Administration proposal to permit affiliations between banks and commercial firms (i.e., non-financial firms) and added that legislation to allow banks greater insurance powers "could be put off until a later date."^[108]

1991 Congressional action and "firewalls"

Paul Volcker gave his 1991 testimony as Congress considered repealing Glass–Steagall sections 20 and 32 as part of a broader Bush ma'muriyati proposal to reform financial regulation.^[109]In reaction to "market developments" and regulatory and judicial decisions that had "homogenized" commercial and investment banking, Representative Edvard J. Markey (D-MA) had written a 1990 article arguing "Congress must amend Glass–Steagall."^[110] As chairman of a subcommittee of the House Commerce and Energy Committee, Markey had joined with Committee Chairman Dingell in opposing the 1988 Proxmire Financial Modernization Act. In 1990, however, Markey stated Glass–Steagall had "lost much of its effectiveness" through market, regulatory, and judicial developments that were "tantamount to an ill-coordinated, incremental repeal" of Glass–Steagall. To correct this "disharmony" Markey proposed replacing Glass–Steagall's "prohibitions" with "regulation."^[111]Keyin Uy banklari qo'mitasi approved a bill repealing Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32, Representative Dingell again stopped House action. He reached agreement with Banking Committee Chairman Genri B. Gonsales (D-TX) to insert into the bill "firewalls" that banks claimed would prevent real competition between banks and securities firms.^[112] The banking industry strongly opposed the bill in that form, and the House rejected it. The House debate revealed that Congress might agree on repealing Sections 20 and 32 while being divided on how bank affiliations with securities firms should be regulated.^[113]

1980s and 1990s bank product developments

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as Congress considered whether to "repeal" Glass–Steagall, commercial banks and their affiliates engaged in activities that commentators later linked to the 2007-2008 yillardagi moliyaviy inqiroz.^[114]

Securitization, CDOs, and "subprime" credit

1978 yilda Amerika banki birinchi chiqarildi uy-joy garovi bilan ta'minlangan xavfsizlik bu qimmatli qog'ozlar residential mortgages not guaranteed by a hukumat homiyligidagi korxona ("private label RMBS").^[20] Also in 1978, the OCC approved a national bank, such as Bank of America, issuing pass-through certificates representing interests in uy-joy ipotekasi and distributing such mortgage-backed securities to investors in a xususiy joylashtirish.^[37] In 1987 the OCC ruled that Xavfsizlik Tinch okeani banki could "sell" assets through "securitizations" that transferred "cash flows" from those assets to investors and also distribute in a registered public offering the residential mortgage-backed securities issued in the securitization.^[115] This permitted commercial banks to acquire assets for "sale" through securitizations under what later became termed the "originate to distribute" model of banking.^[116]

The OCC ruled that a national bank's power to sell its assets meant a national bank could sell a pool of assets in a securitization, and even distribute the securities that represented the sale, as part of the "business of banking."^[117] This meant national banks could underwrite and distribute securities representing such sales, even though Glass–Steagall would generally prohibit a national bank underwriting or distributing non-governmental securities (i.e., non-"bank-eligible" securities).^[118] The federal courts upheld the OCC's approval of Security Pacific's securitization activities, with the Oliy sud refusing in 1990 to review a 1989 Ikkinchi davr decision sustaining the OCC's action. In arguing that the GLBA's "repeal" of Glass–Steagall played no role in the financial crisis of 2007–2008, Melanie Fein notes courts had confirmed by 1990 the power of banks to securitize their assets under Glass–Steagall.^[119]

The Second Circuit stated banks had been securitizing their assets for "ten years" before the OCC's 1987 approval of Security Pacific's securitization.^[120] As noted above, the OCC had approved such activity in 1978.^[37] Jan Kregel argues that the OCC's interpretation of the "incidental powers" of national banks "ultimately eviscerated Glass–Steagall."^[82]

Continental Illinois Bank is often credited with issuing the first garovga qo'yilgan qarz majburiyati (CDO) when, in 1987, it issued securities representing interests in a pool of "leveraged loans."^[121]

By the late 1980s Citibank had become a major provider of "subprime" mortgages and credit cards.^[122] Arthur Wilmarth argued that the ability to securitize such credits encouraged banks to extend more "subprime" credit.^[123] Wilmarth reported that during the 1990s credit card loans increased at a faster pace for lower-income households than higher-income households and that subprime mortgage loan volume quadrupled from 1993–99, before the GLBA became effective in 2000.^[124] In 1995 Wilmarth noted that commercial bank mortgage lenders differed from nonbank lenders in retaining "a significant portion of their mortgage loans" rather than securitizing the entire exposure.^[125] Wilmarth also shared the bank regulator concern that commercial banks sold their "best assets" in securitizations and retained their riskiest assets.^[126]

ABCP conduits and SIVs

In the early 1980s commercial banks established asset backed commercial paper conduits (ABCP conduits) to finance corporate customer receivables. The ABCP conduit purchased receivables from the bank customer and issued aktivlar bilan ta'minlangan tijorat qog'ozi to finance that purchase. The bank "advising" the ABCP conduit provided loan commitments and "credit enhancements" that supported repayment of the commercial paper. Because the ABCP conduit was owned by a third party unrelated to the bank, it was not an affiliate of the bank.^[127] Through ABCP conduits banks could earn "fee income" and meet "customers' needs for credit" without "the need to maintain the amount of capital that would be required if loans were extended directly" to those customers.^[128]

By the late 1980s Citibank had established ABCP conduits to buy securities. Such conduits became known as tarkibiy investitsiya vositalari (SIVs).^[129] The SIV's "hakamlik sudi " opportunity was to earn the difference between the interest earned on the securities it purchased and the interest it paid on the ABCP and other securities it issued to fund those purchases.^[130]

OTC derivatives, including credit default swaps

In the early 1980s commercial banks began entering into interest rate and currency exchange "almashtirishlar " with customers. This "retseptsiz sotiladigan hosilalar " market grew dramatically throughout the 1980s and 1990s.^[131]

In 1996 the OCC issued "guidelines" for national bank use of "kredit svoplari " and other "kredit hosilalari." Banks entered into "credit default swaps" to protect against defaults on loans. Banks later entered into such swaps to protect against defaults on securities. Banks acted both as "dealers" in providing such protection (or speculative "exposure") to customers and as "hedgers" or "speculators" to cover (or create) their own exposures to such risks.^[132]

Commercial banks became the largest dealers in swaps and other over-the-counter derivatives. Banking regulators ruled that swaps (including credit default swaps) were part of the "business of banking," not "securities" under the Glass–Steagall Act.^[133]

Commercial banks entered into swaps that replicated part or all of the economics of actual securities. Regulators eventually ruled banks could even buy and sell equity securities to "hedge" this activity.^[133] Jan Kregel argues the OCC's approval of bank derivatives activities under bank "incidental powers" constituted a "complete reversal of the original intention of preventing banks from dealing in securities on their own account."^[82]

Glass–Steagall developments from 1995 to Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act

Leach and Rubin support for Glass–Steagall "repeal"; need to address "market realities"

On January 4, 1995, the new Chairman of the House Banking Committee, Representative James A. Leach (R-IA), introduced a bill to repeal Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32.^[134] After being confirmed as Moliya kotibi, Robert Rubin announced on February 28, 1995, that the Klinton ma'muriyati supported such Glass–Steagall repeal.^[135] Repeating themes from the 1980s, Leach stated Glass–Steagall was "out of synch with reality"^[136] and Rubin argued "it is now time for the laws to reflect changes in the world's financial system."^[135]

Leach and Rubin expressed a widely shared view that Glass–Steagall was "obsolete" or "outdated."^[137] As described above, Senator Proxmire^[56] and Representative Markey^[111] (despite their long-time support for Glass–Steagall) had earlier expressed the same conclusion. With his reputation for being "conservative" on expanded bank activities,^[94] former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker remained an influential commentator on legislative proposals to permit such activities.^[138] Volcker continued to testify to Congress in opposition to permitting banks to affiliate with commercial companies and in favor of repealing Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32 as part of "rationalizing" bank involvement in securities markets.^[139] Supporting the Leach and Rubin arguments, Volcker testified that Congressional inaction had forced banking regulators and the courts to play "catch-up" with market developments by "sometimes stretching established interpretations of law beyond recognition."^[140] In 1997 Volcker testified this meant the "Glass–Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking is now almost gone" and that this "accommodation and adaptation has been necessary and desirable."^[141] He stated, however, that the "ad hoc approach" had created "uneven results" that created "almost endless squabbling in the courts" and an "increasingly advantageous position competitively" for "some sectors of the financial service industry and particular institutions."^[141] Similar to the GAO in 1988^[72] and Representative Markey in 1990^[111] Volcker asked that Congress "provide clear and decisive leadership that reflects not parochial pleadings but the national interest."^[141]

Reflecting the regulatory developments Volcker noted, the commercial and investment banking industries largely reversed their traditional Glass–Steagall positions. Throughout the 1990s (and particularly in 1996), commercial banking firms became content with the regulatory situation Volcker described. They feared "financial modernization" legislation might bring an unwelcome change.^[142] Securities firms came to view Glass–Steagall more as a barrier to expanding their own commercial banking activities than as protection from commercial bank competition. The securities industry became an advocate for "financial modernization" that would open a "two-way street" for securities firms to enter commercial banking.^[143]

Status of arguments from 1980s

While the need to create a legal framework for existing bank securities activities became a dominant theme for the "financial modernization" legislation supported by Leach, Rubin, Volcker, and others, after the GLBA repealed Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32 in 1999, commentators identified four main arguments for repeal: (1) increased economies of scale and scope, (2) reduced risk through diversification of activities, (3) greater convenience and lower cost for consumers, and (4) improved ability of U.S. financial firms to compete with foreign firms.^[144]

By 1995, however, some of these concerns (which had been identified by the Congressional Research Service in 1987^[70]) seemed less important. As Japanese banks declined and U.S.-based banks were more profitable, "international competitiveness" did not seem to be a pressing issue.^[145] International rankings of banks by size also seemed less important when, as Alan Greenspan later noted, "Federal Reserve research had been unable to find economies of scale in banking beyond a modest size."^[146] Still, advocates of "financial modernization" continued to point to the combination of commercial and investment banking in nearly all other countries as an argument for "modernization", including Glass–Steagall "repeal."^[147]

Similarly, the failure of the Sears Financial Network and other nonbank "financial supermarkets" that had seemed to threaten commercial banks in the 1980s undermined the argument that financial conglomerates would be more efficient than "specialized" financial firms.^[148] Critics questioned the "diversification benefits" of combining commercial and investment banking activities. Some questioned whether the higher variability of returns in investment banking would stabilize commercial banking firms through "negative correlation" (i.e., cyclical downturns in commercial and investment banking occurring at different times) or instead increase the probability of the overall banking firm failing.^[149][150] Others questioned whether any theoretical benefits in holding a passive "investment portfolio" combining commercial and investment banking would be lost in managing the actual combination of such activities.^[151] Critics also argued that specialized, highly competitive commercial and investment banking firms were more efficient in competitive global markets.^[152]

Starting in the late 1980s, John H. Boyd, a staff member of the Minneapolis Federal zaxira banki, consistently questioned the value of size and product diversification in banking.^[149][153] In 1999, as Congress was considering legislation that became the GLBA, he published an essay arguing that the "moral hazard" created by depozitni sug'urtalash, muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lish uchun juda katta (TBTF) considerations, and other governmental support for banking should be resolved before commercial banking firms could be given "universal banking" powers.^[154] Although Boyd's 1999 essay was directed at "universal banking" that permitted commercial banks to own equity interests in non-financial firms (i.e., "commercial firms"), the essay was interpreted more broadly to mean that "expanding bank powers, by, for example, allowing nonbank firms to affiliate with banks, prior to undertaking reforms limiting TBTF-like coverage for uninsured bank creditors is putting the 'cart before the horse.'"^[155]

Despite these arguments, advocates of "financial modernization" predicted consumers and businesses would enjoy cost savings and greater convenience in receiving financial services from integrated "financial services firms."^[156]

After the GLBA repealed Sections 20 and 32, commentators also noted the importance of scholarly attacks on the historic justifications for Glass–Steagall as supporting repeal efforts.^[157] Throughout the 1990s, scholars continued to produce empirical studies concluding that commercial bank affiliate underwriting before Glass–Steagall had not demonstrated the "conflicts of interest" and other defects claimed by Glass–Steagall proponents.^[158] By the late 1990s a "remarkably broad academic consensus" existed that Glass–Steagall had been "thoroughly discredited."^[159]

Although he rejected this scholarship, Martin Mayer wrote in 1997 that since the late 1980s it had been "clear" that continuing the Glass–Steagall prohibitions was only "permitting a handful of large investment houses and hedge funds to charge monopoly rents for their services without protecting corporate America, investors, or the banks."^[160]Ximan Minskiy, who disputed the benefits of "universal banking," wrote in 1995 testimony prepared for Congress that "repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, in itself, would neither benefit nor harm the economy of the United States to any significant extent."^[161] In 1974 Mayer had quoted Minsky as stating a 1971 presidential commission (the "Hunt Commission") was repeating the errors of history when it proposed relaxing Glass–Steagall and other legislation from the 1930s.^[162]

With banking commentators such as Mayer and Minsky no longer opposing Glass–Steagall repeal, consumer and community development advocates became the most prominent critics of repeal and of financial "modernization" in general. Helen Garten argued that bank regulation became dominated by "consumer" issues, which produced "a largely unregulated, sophisticated wholesale market and a highly regulated, retail consumer market."^[163] In the 1980s Representative Fernand Seyn-Jermeyn (D-RI), as chairman of the House Banking Committee, sought to tie any Glass–Steagall reform to requirements for free or reduced cost banking services for the elderly and poor.^[164] Democratic Representatives and Senators made similar appeals in the 1990s.^[165] During Congressional hearings to consider the various Leach bills to repeal Sections 20 and 32, consumer and community development advocates warned against the concentration of "economic power" that would result from permitting "financial conglomerates" and argued that any repeal of Sections 20 and 32 should mandate greater consumer protections, particularly free or low cost consumer services, and greater community reinvestment requirements.^[166][167]

Failed 1995 Leach bill; expansion of Section 20 affiliate activities; merger of Travelers and Citicorp

By 1995 the ability of banks to sell insurance was more controversial than Glass–Steagall "repeal." Representative Leach tried to avoid conflict with the insurance industry by producing a limited "modernization" bill that repealed Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32, but did not change the regulation of bank insurance activities.^[168] Leach's efforts to separate insurance from securities powers failed when the insurance agent lobby insisted any banking law reform include limits on bank sales of insurance.^[169]

Similar to Senator Proxmire in 1988,^[87] Representative Leach responded to the House's inaction on his Glass–Steagall "repeal" bill by writing the Federal Reserve Board in June 1996 encouraging it to increase the limit on Section 20 affiliate bank-ineligible revenue.^[86] When the Federal Reserve Board increased the limit to 25% in December 1996, the Board noted the Qimmatli qog'ozlar sanoat assotsiatsiyasi (SIA) had complained this would mean even the largest Wall Street securities firms could affiliate with commercial banks.^[170]

The SIA's prediction proved accurate two years later when the Federal Reserve Board applied the 25% bank-ineligible revenue test in approving Salomon Smit Barni (SSB) becoming an affiliate of Citibank ning birlashishi orqali Sayohatchilar va Citicorp shakllantirish Citigroup bank holding company. The Board noted that, although SSB was one of the largest US securities firms, less than 25% of its revenue was "bank-ineligible."^[171] Citigroup could only continue to own the Travelers insurance underwriting business for two (or, with Board approval, five) years unless the Bank Holding Company Act was amended (as it was through the GLBA) to permit affiliations between banks and underwriters of property, casualty, and life insurance. Citigroup's ownership of SSB, however, was permitted without any law change under the Federal Reserve Board's existing Section 20 affiliate rules.^[172]

In 2003, Charles Geisst, a Glass–Steagall supporter, told Frontline the Federal Reserve Board's Section 20 orders meant the Federal Reserve "got rid of the Glass–Steagall Act."^[173] Former Federal Reserve Board Vice-Chairman Alan Blinder agreed the 1996 action increasing "bank-ineligible" revenue limits was "tacit repeal" of Glass–Steagall, but argued "that the market had practically repealed Glass–Steagall, anyway."^[174]

Shortly after approving the merger of Citicorp and Travelers, the Federal Reserve Board announced its intention to eliminate the 28 "firewalls" that required separation of Section 20 affiliates from their affiliated bank and to replace them with "operating standards" based on 8 of the firewalls. The change permitted banks to lend to fund purchases of, and otherwise provide credit support to, securities underwritten by their Section 20 affiliates.^[175] This left Federal Reserve Act Sections 23A (which originated in the 1933 Banking Act and regulated extensions of credit between a bank and any nonbank affiliate) and 23B (which required all transactions between a bank and its nonbank affiliates to be on "arms-length" market terms) as the primary restrictions on banks providing credit to Section 20 affiliates or to securities underwritten by those affiliates.^[176] Sections 23A and B remained the primary restrictions on commercial banks extending credit to securities affiliates, or to securities underwritten by such affiliates, after the GLBA repealed Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32.^[177]

1997-98 legislative developments: commercial affiliations and Community Reinvestment Act

In 1997 Representative Leach again sponsored a bill to repeal Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32. At first the main controversy was whether to permit limited affiliations between commercial firms and commercial banks.^[178] Securities firms (and other financial services firms) complained that unless they could retain their affiliations with commercial firms (which the Bank Holding Company Act forbid for a commercial bank), they would not be able to compete equally with commercial banks.^[179] The Clinton Administration proposed that Congress either permit a small "basket" of commercial revenue for bank holding companies or that it retain the "unitary thrift loophole" that permitted a commercial firm to own a single savings and loan.^[180] Representative Leach, House Banking Committee Ranking Member Henry Gonzalez (D-TX), and former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker opposed such commercial affiliations.^[181]

Meanwhile, in 1997 Kongress har chorakda reported Senate Banking Committee Chairman Al D'Amato (R-NY) rejected Treasury Department pressure to produce a financial modernization bill because banking firms (such as Citicorp) were satisfied with the competitive advantages they had received from regulatory actions and were not really interested in legislative reforms.^[182] Reflecting the process Paul Volcker had described,^[141] as financial reform legislation was considered throughout 1997 and early 1998, Kongress har chorakda reported how different interests groups blocked legislation and sought regulatory advantages.^[183]

The "compromise bill" the House Republican leadership sought to bring to a vote in March 1998, was opposed by the commercial banking industry as favoring the securities and insurance industries.^[184] The House Republican leadership withdrew the bill in response to the banking industry opposition, but vowed to bring it back when Congress returned from recess.^[185] Commentators describe the April 6, 1998, merger announcement between Travelers and Citicorp as the catalyst for the House passing that bill by a single vote (214-213) on May 13, 1998.^[186] Citicorp, which had opposed the bill in March, changed its position to support the bill along with the few other large commercial banking firms that had supported it in March for improving their ability to compete with "foreign banks."^[187]

The Clinton Administration issued a veto threat for the House passed bill, in part because the bill would eliminate "the longstanding right of unitary thrift holding companies to engage in any lawful business," but primarily because the bill required national banks to conduct expanded activities through holding company subsidiaries rather than the bank "operating subsidiaries" authorized by the OCC in 1996.^[188]

On September 11, 1998, the Senate Banking Committee approved a bipartisan bill with unanimous Democratic member support that, like the House-passed bill, would have repealed Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32.^[189] The bill was blocked from Senate consideration by the Committee's two dissenting members (Phil Gramm (R-TX) and Richard Shelby (R-AL)), who argued it expanded the Jamiyatni qayta investitsiya qilish to'g'risidagi qonun (CRA). Four Democratic senators (Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Russell Feingold (D-WI), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), and Paul Wellstone (D-MN)) stated they opposed the bill for its repeal of Sections 20 and 32.^[166][190]

1999 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act

In 1999 the main issues confronting the new Leach bill to repeal Sections 20 and 32 were (1) whether bank subsidiaries ("operating subsidiaries") or only nonbank owned affiliates could exercise new securities and other powers and (2) how the CRA would apply to the new "financial holding companies" that would have such expanded powers.^[191] The Clinton Administration agreed with Representative Leach in supporting "the continued separation of banking and commerce."^[192]

The Senate Banking Committee approved in a straight party line 11-9 vote a bill (S. 900) sponsored by Senator Gramm that would have repealed Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32 and that did not contain the CRA provisions in the Committee's 1998 bill. The nine dissenting Democratic Senators, along with Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD), proposed as an alternative (S. 753) the text of the 1998 Committee bill with its CRA provisions and the repeal of Sections 20 and 32, modified to provide greater permission for "operating subsidiaries" as requested by the Treasury Department.^[193] Through a partisan 54-44 vote on May 6, 1999 (with Senator Fritz Xollings (D-SC) providing the only Democratic Senator vote in support), the Senate passed S. 900. The day before, Senate Republicans defeated (in a 54-43 vote) a Democratic sponsored amendment to S. 900 that would have substituted the text of S. 753 (also providing for the repeal of Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32).^[194]

On July 1, 1999, the House of Representatives passed (in a bipartisan 343-86 vote) a bill (H.R. 10) that repealed Sections 20 and 32. The Clinton Administration issued a statement supporting H.R. 10 because (unlike the Senate passed S. 900) it accepted the bill's CRA and operating subsidiary provisions.^[195]

On October 13, 1999, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department agreed that direct subsidiaries of national banks ("financial subsidiaries") could conduct securities activities, but that bank holding companies would need to engage in merchant banking, insurance, and real estate development activities through holding company, not bank, subsidiaries.^[196] On October 22, 1999, Senator Gramm and the Clinton Administration agreed a bank holding company could only become a "financial holding company" (and thereby enjoy the new authority to affiliate with insurance and securities firms) if all its bank subsidiaries had at least a "satisfactory" CRA rating.^[197]

After these compromises, a joint Senate and House Conference Committee reported out a final version of S. 900 that was passed on November 4, 1999, by the House in a vote of 362-57 and by the Senate in a vote of 90-8. President Clinton signed the bill into law on November 12, 1999, as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (GLBA).^[198]

The GLBA repealed Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass–Steagall Act, not Sections 16 and 21.^[199] The GLBA also amended Section 16 to permit "well capitalized" commercial banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds (i.e., non-general obligation bonds),^[200] as first approved by the Senate in 1967.^[34] Otherwise, Sections 16 and 21 remained in effect regulating the direct securities activities of banks and prohibiting securities firms from taking deposits.^[199]

After March 11, 2000, bank holding companies could expand their securities and insurance activities by becoming "financial holding companies."^[201]

Aftermath of repeal

Please see the main article, Glass–Steagall: Aftermath of repeal, which has sections for the following:

• 1-bo'lim, Commentator response to Section 20 and 32 repeal
• 2-bo'lim, Financial industry developments after repeal of Sections 20 and 32
• Section 3, Glass–Steagall "repeal" and the financial crisis

The above article also contains information on proposed reenactment, or alternative proposals that will have the same effect or a partial reinstatement effect.

Tashqi havolalar

• 1933 yilgi Shisha-Shtagal to'g'risidagi qonun

Adabiyotlar

See also the References list (citations) in the main article, Glass–Steagall_Act.