Iroq va ommaviy qirg'in qurollari - Iraq and weapons of mass destruction

Ommaviy qirg'in qurollari
WMD world map.svg
Turi bo'yicha
Mamlakatlar bo'yicha
Ko'payish
Shartnomalar

Iroq faol tadqiqotlar olib bordi va keyinchalik ish bilan ta'minlandi ommaviy qirg'in qurollari (WMD) 1962 yildan 1991 yilgacha kimyoviy qurol zaxirasini yo'q qilgan va biologik va yadroviy qurol dasturlarini talablariga binoan to'xtatgan. Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizlik Kengashi.[1] Beshinchi Iroq prezidenti, Saddam Xuseyn, uchun xalqaro miqyosda mahkum etilgan kimyoviy quroldan foydalanish qarshi 1980 yilgi kampaniya davomida Eron va Kurdcha paytida va undan keyin tinch aholi Eron-Iroq urushi. 1980-yillarda Saddam keng ko'lamli ishlarni amalga oshirdi biologik qurol dasturi va yadroviy qurol dasturi, ammo hech qanday yadroviy bomba qurilmagan. Keyin Fors ko'rfazi urushi (1990-1991), Birlashgan Millatlar (Iroq hukumati bilan birga) ko'p miqdordagi Iroq kimyoviy qurollarini va ularga tegishli uskunalar va materiallarni joylashtirgan va yo'q qilgan; Iroq kimyoviy, biologik va yadro dasturlarini to'xtatdi.[2]

2000-yillarning boshlarida ma'muriyatlar Jorj V.Bush va Toni Bler Saddam Xuseynning qurol-yarog 'dasturlari hanuzgacha qurollarni faol ravishda ishlab chiqarayotgani va Iroqda katta miqdordagi qurol-yarog' zaxiralari yashiringanligini ta'kidladi. Qurolsizlanish bo'yicha hal qilinmagan savollar holatini hal qilish bo'yicha BMT tomonidan tekshirishlar 2002 yil noyabrdan 2003 yil martgacha qayta boshlandi,[3] ostida Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti Xavfsizlik Kengashining 1441-sonli qarori, Xuseyndan BMT va IAEA inspektsiyalari bilan "zudlik bilan, so'zsiz va faol hamkorlik" qilishni talab qilgan, mamlakatiga hujum qilishdan sal oldin.[4] Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Xuseynning tez-tez hamkorlik qilmasligi 1441-sonli qarorni buzgan deb ta'kidladi, ammo Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizlik Kengashiga dalil yo'qligi sababli kuch ishlatishga ruxsat beruvchi yangi rezolyutsiya qabul qilishga ishontirmadi.[5][6][7] Shunga qaramay, Bush tinch choralar Iroqni u qurol deb atagan qurolni zararsizlantira olmasligini ta'kidladi va qurolni ishga tushirdi Fors ko'rfazidagi ikkinchi urush o'rniga. Bir yil o'tgach, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Senati rasmiy ravishda chiqarildi Iroq bo'yicha urushdan oldingi razvedkaning Senatning hisoboti Bush ma'muriyatining urushgacha bo'lgan Iroq qurolli kuchlari haqidagi bayonotlarining aksariyati chalg'ituvchi va asosiy razvedka tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanmagan degan xulosaga keldi. Keyinchalik Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari rahbarligidagi tekshiruvlar natijasida Iroq ilgari faol ravishda WMD ishlab chiqarish va zaxiralashni to'xtatgani aniqlandi; urushni ko'pchilik, shu jumladan 2008 yilgi respublikachilar prezidentligiga nomzod deb atashgan Jon Makkeyn, Xato".[1]

Iroq imzoladi Jeneva protokoli 1931 yilda Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi Shartnoma 1969 yilda va Biologik qurollar to'g'risidagi konventsiya 1972 yilda, lekin uni 1991 yil 11 iyungacha ratifikatsiya qilmagan. Iroq Kimyoviy qurollar to'g'risidagi konventsiya 2009 yil yanvar oyida, Iroq uchun kuchga kirishi bilan bir oy o'tib, 12 fevralda amalga oshiriladi.[8]

Dasturni ishlab chiqish 1960-80-yillar

Iroq
Iroqning joylashuvi
Yadro dasturining boshlanish sanasi1959
Birinchi yadro quroli sinoviYo'q
Birinchi termoyadroviy qurol sinoviYo'q
Oxirgi yadro sinoviYo'q
Eng katta hosil sinoviYo'q
Jami testlarYo'q
Eng yuqori zaxiraYo'q
Hozirgi zaxiraYo'q; dastur kirib qoldi, tashlandi, Isroil tomonidan vayron qilingan Rasmiy dastur 1990 yilda tugagan.
Maksimal raketa masofasiAl-Husayn (400 km)
NPT imzolaganHa
Bog'dod yadro tadqiqotlari markazi - 1991 yil 10 mart Tuvayta yadro tadqiqot markazi, Bag'dod, ish tashlashdan keyin.

1959 yil - 17 avgust SSSR va Iroq SSSR uchun atom elektr stantsiyasini qurish to'g'risidagi shartnomani imzoladi va o'zaro tushunish doirasida yadro dasturini yaratdi.[9]

1968 yil - Sovet tomonidan etkazib beriladigan IRT-2000 tadqiqot reaktori va radioizotop ishlab chiqarish uchun ishlatilishi mumkin bo'lgan boshqa bir qator inshootlar yaqinida qurilgan. Bag'dod.[10][11]

1975 – Saddam Xuseyn Moskvaga kelib, atom elektr stantsiyasining ilg'or modelini qurish haqida so'radi. Moskva stansiya tomonidan tartibga solingan taqdirdagina ma'qullaydi Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi, ammo Iroq rad etdi. Biroq, 15 aprelda hamkorlik shartnomasi imzolandi va 1959 yilgi shartnomani almashtirdi.[12]

6 oydan keyin Parij 72 kg 93% uran sotishga rozi bo'ldi[13] va 3 milliard dollar qiymatida IAEA nazoratsiz atom elektr stansiyasini qurdi.

1970-yillarning boshlarida Saddam Xuseyn yashirin tuzilishga buyruq berdi yadro qurollari dastur.[14] Iroqning ommaviy qirg'in qurollari dasturlariga 1970-80 yillarda turli xil firmalar va hukumatlar yordam bergan.[15][16][17][18][19] Qismi sifatida Loyiha 922, Karl Kolb kabi nemis firmalari[iqtibos kerak ] Iroq kimyoviy laboratoriyalari, masalan, laboratoriyalar, bunkerlar, ma'muriy bino va birinchi ishlab chiqarish binolari kabi inshootlarni pestitsid zavodi qopqog'i ostida 1980-yillarning boshlarida qurishda yordam berdi. Boshqa nemis firmalari 1027 tonna kashshoflarini yuborishdi xantal gazi, zarin, tabun va gazlarni yirtib tashlash umuman. Ushbu ish Iroqqa 150 tonna xantal agenti va 60 tonna xantal ishlab chiqarishga imkon berdi Tabun 1983 va 1984 yillarda, o'n yil davomida davom etdi. Boshqa beshta nemis firmasi ishlab chiqarish uchun uskunalar etkazib berdi botulin toksin va mikotoksin mikroblar uchun kurash. 1988 yilda nemis muhandislari taqdimot qildilar santrifüj Iroqqa yadro quroli dasturini kengaytirishga yordam bergan ma'lumotlar. Ko'pgina nemis muhandislari ishtirok etgan laboratoriya jihozlari va boshqa ma'lumotlar taqdim etildi. Hammasi aytilganidek, Iroqdagi xalqaro kimyoviy qurollarning 52% Germaniyada ishlab chiqarilgan. Pestitsidlarni ishlab chiqarish bo'yicha davlat idorasi (SEPP) Germaniyaning Water Engineering Trading kompaniyasidan madaniy vositalar va inkubatorlarga buyurtma berdi.[20]

G'arbning Iroqning WMD dasturi bilan yordami

Eron-Iroq urushi paytida Qo'shma Shtatlar Iroqni qo'llab-quvvatladi, savdo-sotiq departamenti tomonidan tasdiqlangan 500 million dollarlik ikki tomonlama foydalanish uskunalari. Ular orasida rivojlangan kompyuterlar ham bor edi, ulardan ba'zilari Iroq yadro dasturida ishlatilgan.[21] Notijorat Amerika tipidagi madaniyat to'plami va Kasalliklarni nazorat qilish markazlari biologik namunalarini sotgan yoki yuborgan kuydirgi, G'arbiy Nil virusi va botulizm Iroqqa tibbiy tadqiqotlar uchun zarur deb da'vo qilgan 1989 yilgacha. Ushbu materiallarning bir qismi Iroqning biologik qurollarini tadqiq qilish dasturi uchun, boshqalari esa emlash uchun ishlatilgan.[22] Masalan, Iroq harbiylari 14578 turdagi Amerika madaniyati kollektsiyasiga biologik qurol sifatida foydalanish uchun eksklyuziv kuydirgi shtammlari sifatida joylashdilar. Charlz Duelfer.[23]

1980-yillarning oxirida Britaniya hukumati qurol-yarog 'ishlab chiqaradigan kompaniyani yashirincha berdi Matritsa Cherchill Saddam Xuseynning qurol-yarog 'dasturi uchun ehtiyot qismlarni etkazib berishga ruxsat, Britaniya sanoati esa etkazib berdi Jerald Bull u ishlab chiqqanidek Iroq supergiri. 1990 yil mart oyida Iroq tomon yo'naltirilgan yadroviy triggerlar ishi qo'lga olindi Xitrou aeroporti. The Scott hisoboti atrofini o'rab turgan maxfiylikning ko'p qismini ochdi Iroqqa qurol qachon ma'lum bo'lgan ish.[24] Britaniya hukumati xantal gazini ishlab chiqarish uchun ishlatilishi kerak bo'lgan xlor zavodini ham moliyalashtirdi.[25]

Iroqning yadroviy qurol dasturi 1981 yilda jiddiy muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi Osiroq qurol ishlatilishi mumkin bo'lgan yadroviy materialni ko'paytirishga qodir bo'lgan reaktor edi Isroil tomonidan bombardimon qilingan foydalanishga topshirilishidan oldin.[13] Devid Olbrayt va Mark Xibbs Atom olimlari byulleteni, ammo bu nuqtai nazardan rozi emasman. Texnologik muammolarning echimi juda ko'p edi, deydi ular.[26]

Eron-Iroq urushi

1980 yilda AQSh mudofaa razvedka agentligi Iroq bir necha yillardan buyon kimyoviy qurol ishlab chiqarish quvvatlarini faol ravishda qo'lga kiritgani va keyinchalik bu aniq bo'lganligi to'g'risida hisobot taqdim etdi.[27] 1980 yil noyabrda, ikki oy o'tgach Eron-Iroq urushi, kimyoviy qurol ishlatilganligi haqida birinchi xabar Tehron radiosi Iroq kuchlari tomonidan Susangerdga zaharli gaz hujumi haqida xabar berganida sodir bo'ldi.[28] Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining xabar berishicha, kelgusi yilda ko'plab shunga o'xshash xurujlar sodir bo'ldi va Eronni rivojlantirish va joylashtirishga olib keldi xantal gazi qobiliyat.[29][30][31][32] 1984 yilga kelib, Iroq zaharli gazni Eronga qarshi katta samaradorlik bilan ishlatmoqda "inson to'lqini "hujumlar.[33] Kimyoviy qurollarga qarshi keng qo'llanilgan Eron davomida Eron-Iroq urushi.[34][35] 1991 yil 14 yanvarda Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi Iroq agenti 1985 yoki 1986 yillarda ko'rganini aytgan tibbiyot nuqtai nazaridan tibbiyot nuqtai nazaridan aytganda, harbiy suvchechakdan qanday zarar ko'rganini aytdi. Ikki hafta o'tgach, Qurolli Kuchlar Tibbiy razvedka markazi 69 iroqlik mahbusdan sakkiztasi qoni sinovdan o'tgan urush, 1971 yildan beri Iroqda tabiiy ravishda bo'lmagan chakka qarshi immunitetni ko'rsatdi; xuddi shu mahbuslar ham kuydirgi uchun emlangan. Ushbu urush paytida Iroq ham chechak, ham kuydirgi kasalligini qo'llagan degan taxmin.[36]

The Vashington Post 1984 yilda Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Eron-Iroq urushi paytida Iroq armiyasiga maxfiy ma'lumotlarni berishni boshladi. Bunga kimyoviy qurol zarbalarini nishonga olish to'g'risidagi ma'lumotlar kiritilgan. Xuddi shu yili Evropalik shifokorlar va BMTning ekspertlar missiyalari tomonidan Iroq eronliklarga qarshi kimyoviy qurol ishlatayotgani shubhasiz tasdiqlandi.[37] Ularning aksariyati Eron-Iroq urushi paytida ro'y bergan, ammo kimyoviy qurol kamida 1991 yilda Iroq janubidagi shia xalq qo'zg'oloniga qarshi ishlatilgan.[18] Urushdan keyingi Eronning hisob-kitoblariga ko'ra kimyoviy qurollardan keng foydalanilgan, Iroq bilan sakkiz yillik urush paytida Saddam Xuseynning kimyoviy qurollari 100 mingdan ortiq eronliklarga ta'sir qilgan.[38] Eron bugungi kunda dunyodagi eng ko'p zarar ko'rgan ikkinchi davlat ommaviy qirg'in qurollari, faqat Yaponiyadan keyin.[iqtibos kerak ] Rasmiy hisob-kitobga ko'ra, chegaraoldi shaharlarda yuqtirilgan tinch aholi yoki faxriylarning bolalari va qarindoshlari, ularning ko'pchiligida qon, o'pka va terida asoratlari bo'lgan, o'z ichiga olmaydi. Rasmiy xabarlarga ko'ra, asab gazi agentlari zudlik bilan 20 ming eronlik askarni o'ldirdilar. Omon qolgan 90000 kishidan 5000 ga yaqini doimiy ravishda tibbiy yordamga murojaat qiladi va 1000 ga yaqini hanuzgacha og'ir, surunkali kasalliklar bilan kasalxonaga yotqizilgan.[iqtibos kerak ] Ko'plab odamlar xantal gaziga duchor bo'lishdi. Saddam Xuseyn va uning ma'muriyati Amerika kuchlari tomonidan olib tashlanganiga qaramay, Eronda G'arb davlatlari birinchi navbatda o'zining kimyoviy qurol arsenalini ishlab chiqishda va boshqarishda yordam bergani va dunyo Iroqni jazolash uchun hech narsa qilmaganiga g'azab va g'azab bor. uning butun urush davomida kimyoviy qurol ishlatishi.[iqtibos kerak ] Masalan, Qo'shma Shtatlar va Buyuk Britaniya BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashida Iroqning ma'lum bo'lgan kimyoviy qurol hujumlarini qoralashga to'sqinlik qildilar. Urush paytida Iroqning kimyoviy qurol ishlatilishini tanqid qilgan biron bir rezolyutsiya qabul qilinmadi, ammo ko'pchilik ushbu foydalanishni qoralashni xohladi. 1986 yil 21 martda Birlashgan Millatlar Xavfsizlik Kengashi "kimyoviy qurollar Iroq kuchlari tomonidan Eron kuchlariga qarshi ko'p hollarda ishlatilganligini" tan oldi; ushbu bayonotga AQSh qarshi chiqdi, Xavfsizlik Kengashida unga qarshi ovoz bergan yagona mamlakat (Buyuk Britaniya betaraf qoldi).[39]

1988 yil 23 martda g'arbiy ommaviy axborot manbalari xabar berishdi Halabja Iroqda Kurdiston, bir necha kun oldin Iroq shaharchaga keng miqyosda kimyoviy hujum uyushtirgan edi. Keyinchalik hisob-kitoblarga ko'ra 7000 kishi halok bo'lgan va 20000 kishi yaralangan. The Halabja zahar gaziga hujum iroqliklarga qarshi xalqaro norozilikka sabab bo'ldi. O'sha yili AQSh Senati taklif qildi 1988 yilgi Genotsid to'g'risidagi qonunning oldini olish, AQShning Iroqqa yordamini to'xtatish va AQShning Iroq neftini import qilishni to'xtatish. Reygan ma'muriyati qonun loyihasini muddatidan ilgari deb qarshi oldi va oxir-oqibat uni kuchga kirishiga to'sqinlik qildi, buning sababi qisman DIA tomonidan qilingan xato bahosi edi. Eron hujum uchun. Hujum paytida shaharni Eron qo'shinlari va Tehron bilan ittifoqdosh Iroq kurd partizanlari egallab olishgan.[40] Iroqliklar Halabjadagi hujumni Eron kuchlari zimmasiga yukladi. Bu Saddam Husaynning 2003 yil dekabrdagi asirligidagi pozitsiyasi edi.[iqtibos kerak ] 2006 yil 21 avgustda kurdlarga qarshi genotsidda ayblanib Saddam Xuseyn va olti kodefendant, shu jumladan Hasan al-Majid ("Kimyoviy Ali") ustidan sud jarayoni boshlandi. Ushbu sud Halabjadagi hujumni qamrab olmasa-da, Iroqning "Anfal" operatsiyasi paytida boshqa qishloqlarga kimyoviy qurol bilan bombalashni o'z ichiga olgan hujumlarni qamrab oladi.[41]

Kimyoviy qurol hujumlari

Asosiy maqola: Iroq kimyoviy qurol dasturi
ManzilQurol ishlatilganSanaZarar ko'rgan narsalar
Xayj UmranXantal1983 yil avgust100 dan kam Eron / Kurd
PanjvinXantal1983 yil oktyabr-noyabr3001 eron / kurd
Majnun oroliXantal1984 yil fevral-mart2500 eronlik
al-BasrahTabun1984 yil mart50-100 eronlik
Xoviza MarshXantal va Tabun1985 yil mart3000 eronlik
al-FavXantal va Tabun1986 yil fevral8000 dan 10000 gacha eronliklar
Um ar-RasasXantal1986 yil dekabr1000s eronliklar
al-BasrahXantal va Tabun1987 yil aprel5000 Eronlik
Sumar /MehranXantal va asab agenti1987 yil oktyabr3000 eronlik
HalabjaXantal va asab agenti1988 yil martKurd / eronlik 7000 kishi
al-FavXantal va asab agenti1988 yil aprel1000s eronliklar
Baliq ko'liXantal va asab agenti1988 yil may100 yoki 1000 yillarda eronliklar
Majnun orollariXantal va asab agenti1988 yil iyun100 yoki 1000 yillarda eronliklar
Janubiy-markaziy chegaraXantal va asab agenti1988 yil iyul100 yoki 1000 yillarda eronliklar
an-Najaf –
Karbala maydon		Nerv agenti va CS1991 yil martNoma'lum

(Manba:[18])

1991 yil Fors ko'rfazi urushi

Asosiy maqola: Fors ko'rfazi urushi

1990 yil 2-avgustda Iroq bosqinchi Quvayt va xalqaro miqyosda keng qoralandi.[42]

AQSh boshchiligidagi xalqaro xalqlar koalitsiyasi 1991 yilda Quvaytni ozod qildi.[43]

Shartlariga ko'ra BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining 686-sonli rezolyutsiyasida belgilangan sulh bitimi va Qaror 687, 686-sonli qarori bilan Iroqqa kimyoviy, biologik va yadro qurollarini ishlab chiqarish, saqlash yoki ulardan foydalanish taqiqlangan. Shuningdek, shartnoma 150 kilometrdan oshiq masofaga ega bo'lgan raketalarni o'z ichiga olgan. Iroqda qurol-yarog 'tekshiruvlarini o'tkazish uchun BMTning Iroq bo'yicha maxsus komissiyasi (UNSCOM) va Xalqaro Atom Energiyasi Agentligi (IAEA) Iroq yadro dasturining yo'q qilinishini tekshirishi kerak edi.[44][45]

Fors ko'rfazi urushlari o'rtasida

UNSCOM tekshiruvlari 1991–1998 yillar

Asosiy maqola: Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Maxsus Komissiyasi

The Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Iroq bo'yicha maxsus komissiyasi (UNSCOM) 1990 yil Kuvaytga bostirib kirgandan so'ng Iroq qurol-yarog'ini tekshirish uchun tashkil etilgan. Bunga birinchi bo'lib rahbarlik qilgan Rolf Ekéus va keyinchalik Richard Butler. UNSCOM tomonidan Iroqqa bir necha bor tashrif buyurganida qurol nazorati bo'yicha mutaxassislar ingliz tilida ma'lumot olgan iroqlik biolog bilan suhbatlashdilar Rihab Rashid Taxa. AQSh Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligining 1999 yilgi hisobotiga ko'ra, odatdagidek muloyim Taha UNSCOM undan al-Hakam haqida so'roq qilganida, qichqirgan, qichqirgan va bir safar stulni sindirib tashlaganida, al-Hakamni talab qilganda, shiddatli g'azabga uchib ketgan. tovuqni boqadigan zavod edi.[46] "Bu hayvonlar uchun ozuqa ishlab chiqaradigan zavodning o'ziga xos jihatlari bor edi", dedi keyinchalik UNSCOM ijro etuvchi raisining o'rinbosari Charlz Duelfer, "atrofni havoga qarshi keng qamrovli mudofaadan boshlab". Muassasa 1996 yilda UNSCOM tomonidan yo'q qilingan.[47]

1995 yilda UNSCOMning qurol-yarog 'bo'yicha asosiy inspektori, avstraliyalik doktor Rod Barton UNAKOM tomonidan olingan Iroq hukumati 10 tonna sotib olganligini ko'rsatuvchi Taha hujjatlarini ko'rsatdi. o'sish muhiti Britaniyaning Oxoid nomli kompaniyasidan. O'sish ommaviy axborot vositalarining aralashmasi shakar, oqsillar va minerallar beradi ozuqa moddalari uchun mikroorganizmlar o'smoq. U kasalxonalarda va mikrobiologiya /molekulyar biologiya tadqiqot laboratoriyalari. Kasalxonalarda bemorlarning tamponlari diagnostika maqsadida o'sish vositasi bo'lgan idishlarga joylashtiriladi. Iroq kasalxonasida o'sish vositalarini iste'mol qilish yiliga atigi 200 kg ni tashkil etdi; hali 1988 yilda Iroq 39 tonna import qildi. UNSCOM tomonidan ushbu dalillarni ko'rsatgan Taha inspektorlarga 19000 litr o'sganini tan oldi botulinum toksini;[48] 8000 litr kuydirgi; 2000 litr aflatoksinlar, bu jigar etishmovchiligini keltirib chiqarishi mumkin; Clostridium perfringens, gazga olib kelishi mumkin bo'lgan bakteriya gangrena; va ritsin. Shuningdek, u tadqiqot olib borganini tan oldi vabo, salmonella, oyoq va og'iz kasalligi va tuya poxi, xuddi shu o'sish texnikasidan foydalanadigan kasallik chechak, ammo bu tadqiqotchilar uchun ishlashi xavfsizroq. AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya razvedka xizmatlari Saddam Xuseyn suvchechak virusini qurollantirishni rejalashtirgan bo'lishi mumkin deb qo'rqqan Taxaning tuya kasalligi bilan ishi aniqlanganligi sababli edi. Iroqda 1971 yilda chechak yuqtirgan va Qurolni razvedka, qurollarni tarqatmaslik va qurollarni boshqarish markazi (WINPAC) Iroq hukumati ifloslangan materialni saqlab qolgan deb hisoblaydi.[36]

Tekshiruvchilar Taxaning jamoasi odamlarga tajriba o'tkazganidan qo'rqishdi. Bir tekshiruv davomida ular 5 kubometr o'lchamdagi ikkita primat kattalikdagi nafas olish xonasini topdilar, ammo iroqliklar o'z tajribalarida katta primatlarni ishlatganligi haqida hech qanday dalil yo'q edi. Sobiq qurol inspektorining so'zlariga ko'ra Skott Ritter uning 1999 yilgi kitobida Endgame: Iroq inqirozini hal qilish, UNSCOM 1995 yil 1 iyuldan 15 avgustgacha Abu Graib qamoqxonasidan 50 mahbus Iroqning shimoli-g'arbiy qismida joylashgan Hadisadagi harbiy postga ko'chirilganligini bilib oldi.[iqtibos kerak ] Iroq muxolifat guruhlarining aytishicha, olimlar mahbuslarga kuydirgi kasalligini sepgan, ammo bu da'volarni tasdiqlovchi dalillar topilmagan. Bir tajriba davomida, inspektorlarga aytishicha, 12 mahbus postlarga bog'langan, yonida kuydirgi yuklangan snaryadlar portlatilgan. Ritter jamoasi Abu Graib qamoqxonasidan mahbuslar sonini ko'rsatadigan hujjatlarni ko'rishni talab qildi. Ritterning yozishicha, ular 1995 yil iyul va avgust oylari yozuvlari yo'qolgan. Yo'qolgan hujjatlarni tushuntirishni so'rab, Iroq hukumati Ritterni Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasida ishlagan deb ayblagan va Baas partiyasi shtab-kvartirasi kabi ba'zi saytlarga UNSCOM kirish huquqini rad etgan.[49] Ekéus bunday josuslik urinishlariga qarshilik ko'rsatganligini aytgan bo'lsa-da, Butler huzuridagi agentlik komissiyasiga qarshi ko'plab ayblovlar ilgari surilgan, ammo Butler rad etgan.[50][51]

1991 yil aprel oyida Iroq kimyoviy qurol dasturlarining bir nechta deklaratsiyalari bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan birinchi narsani taqdim etdi.[52] Iroq tomonidan 1992 yil iyun, 1995 yil mart, 1996 yil iyun oylarida taqdim etilgan keyingi deklaratsiyalar faqat UNSCOM bosimidan so'ng paydo bo'ldi.[52] 1998 yil fevral oyida UNSCOM bir ovozdan Iroqning kimyoviy qurol dasturlari hajmini belgilashga qaratilgan 7 yillik urinishlardan so'ng Iroq hali ham Komissiyaga ular uchun Iroq BMTning qarorlari talab qilgan barcha qurolsizlanish choralarini ko'rgan degan xulosaga kelish uchun etarli ma'lumot bermaganligini aniqladi. kimyoviy qurolga tegishli.[52]

1991 yil avgust oyida Iroq UNSCOM biologik tekshiruv guruhiga haqiqatan ham biologik qurol dasturi borligini, ammo mudofaa maqsadida ekanligini e'lon qildi.[52] Ko'p o'tmay Iroq birinchi biologik qurol deklaratsiyasini taqdim etdi. UNSCOM bunday deklaratsiyalarni to'liq emasligini aniqlagandan so'ng, Iroqqa to'liq va to'liq deklaratsiya qilish uchun ko'proq bosim o'tkazildi.[52] Biologik qurollarning ikkinchi marta oshkor etilishi 1995 yil mart oyida bo'lib o'tdi. UNSCOM tekshiruvlari va inkor etib bo'lmaydigan dalillarni topgandan so'ng, Iroq birinchi marta tajovuzkor biologik qurol dasturi borligini tan olishga majbur bo'ldi.[52] Ammo Iroq hali ham qurollanishni rad etdi. Keyinchalik UNSCOM bosimi natijasida 1995 yil avgust oyida Iroqdan uchinchi marta taqiqlangan biologik qurol oshkor qilindi. Faqat Generaldan keyin Husayn Kamel al-Majid Iroqning barcha qurol-yarog 'dasturlari uchun mas'ul bo'lgan Sanoat va minerallar vaziri va Iroq harbiy sanoat korporatsiyasining sobiq direktori Iroqdan Iordaniyaga qochib ketdi, Iroq o'zining biologik urush dasturi ilgari qabul qilinganidan ancha kengroq bo'lganligini va dastur qurollanishni o'z ichiga olgan.[52] Bu vaqtda Iroq ilgari qabul qilinganidan ko'ra uzoqroq masofaga mo'ljallangan raketalarni ishlab chiqarish qobiliyatiga erishganini tan oldi.[52] Ayni paytda Iroq ta'minlaydi UNSCOM va IAEA ko'proq hujjatlar bilan chiqadi Husayn Kamel al-Majid tovuq fermasida yashiringan edi. Ushbu hujjatlar Iroqning rivojlanishi to'g'risida yanada aniq ma'lumot berdi VX gaz va uning yadro quroli yaratishga urinishlari.[52] Ko'proq deklaratsiyalar 1996 yil iyun va 1997 yil sentyabr oylarida amalga oshiriladi. Ammo 1998 yil aprel va iyul oylarida biologik qurollar guruhi va UNSCOM Ijroiya raisi Iroq deklaratsiyalari hali "tasdiqlanmagan" va "to'liq emas va etarli emas" deb e'lon qildi, birinchi deklaratsiyalardan etti yil o'tib. 1991 yilda berilgan.[52]

1998 yil avgustda Ritter BMT qurol-yarog 'inspektori lavozimidan voz kechdi va uni keskin tanqid qildi Klinton ma'muriyat va BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi chunki Iroqning ommaviy qirg'in qurollarini yo'q qilishni talab qilishda etarlicha kuchli bo'lmaganligi uchun. Ritter BMT Bosh kotibini ham aybladi Kofi Annan UNSCOM ishiga xalaqit berishda Iroqning harakatlariga yordam berish. "Iroq qurolsizlanayotgani yo'q", dedi Ritter 1998 yil 27 avgustda va ikkinchi bayonotida "Iroq kimyoviy zarba berish imkoniyatini saqlab qoladi". 1998 yilda UNSCOM qurol inspektorlari Iroqni tark etishdi. Ular Iroq rasmiylari tomonidan "tortib olingan", "mamlakatdan chiqarib yuborilgan" (Jorj V.Bush "yovuzlik o'qi" da aytganidek) yoki ular o'zlarining qo'llarini his qilganliklari sababli ketishni afzal ko'rganliklari to'g'risida juda ko'p munozaralar mavjud. missiyani umidsiz ko'rish uchun etarlicha bog'langan. Butlerning o'zi "Saddam Defiant" kitobida yozishicha, aynan AQSh elchisi Piter Burli Vashingtonning ko'rsatmalariga binoan Butlerga o'z jamoasini Iroqdan tortib olishni yaqinlashib kelayotgan AQSh va Buyuk Britaniyaning havo hujumlaridan himoya qilishni taklif qilgan.[iqtibos kerak ] oxir-oqibat 1998 yil 16-19 dekabr kunlari bo'lib o'tdi.

Tekshirishlar orasida: 1998-2003

1998 yil avgustda, samarali monitoring o'tkazilmagan holda, Skott Ritter Iroq "kimyoviy qurolli biologik qurollarni, ushbu qurollarni etkazib beradigan uzoq masofali ballistik raketalarni va hattoki ularning yadroviy qurollanish dasturining ba'zi jihatlarini qayta tiklay olishi" mumkinligini ta'kidladi.[53]

1999 yil iyun oyida Ritter intervyu beruvchiga shunday javob berdi: "Siz" Iroq harbiy jihatdan yaroqli biologik yoki kimyoviy qurolga egami? "Degan savolni berganingizda. Javob yo'q! Bu keskin YO'Q. Iroq bugungi kunda kimyoviy qurolni mazmunli miqyosda ishlab chiqarishi mumkinmi? Yo'q! Iroq biologik qurolni mazmunli miqyosda ishlab chiqarishi mumkinmi? Yo'q! Balistik raketalar? Yo'q! Bu taxta bo'ylab "yo'q". Shunday qilib, Iroq sifatli nuqtai nazardan qurolsizlantirildi va keyinchalik Ritter UNSCOMning ba'zi xodimlarini josuslikda aybladi va u qattiq tanqid qildi Bill Klinton ma'muriyati Iroq harbiylarini tinglash uchun komissiya mablag'laridan suiiste'mol qilganligi uchun.[54] Ritterning so'zlariga ko'ra: "Iroq bugungi kunda (1999) ommaviy qirg'in qurollariga ega emas."[55]

2000 yil iyun oyida Ritter bir parcha yozdi Bugungi kunda qurollarni nazorat qilish huquqiga ega Iroqni sifatli qurolsizlantirish masalasi.[56] 2001 yilda Iroqdagi UNSCOM qurol-yarog 'tekshiruvlariga bag'ishlangan hujjatli filmining teatrlashtirilgan namoyishi bo'lib o'tdi, Qumlarni almashtirishda: Unscom va Iroqni qurolsizlantirish haqidagi haqiqat. Filmni Ritterga noma'lum bo'lgan, Iroq ma'muriyatidan "Oziq-ovqat uchun yog '" kuponlarini olgan iroqlik amerikalik ishbilarmon moliyalashtirgan.[57]

2002 yilda Skott Ritter 1998 yilga kelib Iroqning 90-95% yadro, biologik va kimyoviy imkoniyatlari va bunday qurollarni etkazib berishga qodir uzoq masofali ballistik raketalari yo'q qilinganligini tasdiqladi. Ritterning ta'kidlashicha, texnik jihatdan 100% tekshirish mumkin emas, chunki Iroqda hanuzgacha yashirin qurol borligi uchun emas, balki Iroq ba'zi zaxiralarni oldindan yo'q qilgan va ular hech qachon mavjud emasligini da'vo qilgan. Hech qanday tekshiruv o'tkazilmaydigan davrda Ritterning Iroqqa bo'lgan munosabati o'zgargani ko'pchilikni hayratga soldi.[58]

2002-2003 yillardagi urush paytida Ritter ularni tanqid qildi Bush ma'muriyati va Iroqning WMD qobiliyatini qayta tiklaganligi to'g'risida ishonchli dalillar keltirmaganligini ta'kidladi. Bilan intervyuda Vaqt 2002 yil sentyabr oyida Ritter, Iroqda josuslik qilish uchun UNSCOMdan foydalanishga urinishlar bo'lganligini aytdi.[59] New York Times va Washington Post nashrlarining 1999 yil 8 yanvardagi ma'lumotlariga ko'ra, "[1998 yil martda] Saddam Xuseynning yashirin qurol va razvedka tarmoqlarini ochishga urinishda AQSh Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining tekshiruv guruhidan foydalangan juda murakkab elektron tinglash tizimini o'rnatish uchun Bag'dodga Amerika josusini yuboring. "[60][61]

UNSCOM Iroq hukumati tomonidan turli xil qiyinchiliklarga va hamkorlikning etishmasligiga duch keldi. 1998 yilda UNSCOM avval AQSh so'roviga binoan olib qo'yilgan edi "Desert Fox" operatsiyasi. Shunga qaramay, UNSCOMning taxminicha, Iroq qurolli kuchlarining 90-95% i 1998 yilgi olib qo'yilishidan oldin muvaffaqiyatli yo'q qilingan. Shundan so'ng, to'rt yil davomida (1998 yildan 2002 yilgacha) Iroq hech qanday tashqi qurol inspektorisiz qoldi. Shu vaqt ichida Iroq WMD dasturlarini faol ravishda qayta boshlaganligi haqida taxminlar paydo bo'ldi. Xususan, Jorj V.Bush ma'muriyatidagi turli shaxslar hamda Kongress yadroviy qurol haqida xavotir bildirishgacha bordi.

Iroqda 1998 yildan keyin ham WMD dasturlari mavjudmi yoki yo'qmi va ular bilan hamkorlik qiladimi-yo'qmi haqida tortishuvlar mavjud Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Monitoring, tekshirish va tekshirish komissiyasi (UNMOVIC) to'liq edi. Qurollarning bosh inspektori Xans Bliks 2003 yil yanvar oyida "biz tekshirmoqchi bo'lgan barcha saytlarga kirish imkoni berildi" va Iroq bu borada "juda yaxshi hamkorlik qildi", ammo "Iroq qurolsizlanishni chinakam qabul qilmaganga o'xshaydi".[62] 7 mart kuni Xans Bliks Xavfsizlik Kengashiga qilgan murojaatida: "Shu fonda, endi Iroq UNMOVIC bilan" zudlik bilan, shartsiz va faol "hamkorlik qilganmi yoki yo'qmi degan savol tug'iladi, chunki bu 1441-rezolyutsiyaning 9-bandiga binoan talab qilinadi ( 2002) ... ... Iroq tomoni tomonidan qurolsizlanish bo'yicha uzoq yillik muammolarni hal qilish maqsadida ilgari surilgan ko'plab tashabbuslar "faol" yoki hatto "faol" deb qaralishi mumkin, bu tashabbuslar 3-4 yangi rezolyutsiyadan bir necha oy o'tgach, "zudlik bilan" hamkorlik deb aytish mumkin emas, shuningdek, ular barcha dolzarb sohalarni qamrab olmaydi. " AQShning ba'zi rasmiylari ushbu qarama-qarshi bayonotni talablarga rioya qilmaslik to'g'risidagi deklaratsiya sifatida tushundilar.

1998 yilda BMT Iroqdan ketganidan keyin to'rt yil davomida Iroqda qurol tekshiruvlari o'tkazilmagan va Iroq ular hech qachon qayta taklif qilinmasligini ta'kidladi.[63] Bundan tashqari, Saddam "maxfiy buyruq" bilan chiqdi, chunki Iroq BMTning biron bir rezolyutsiyasiga amal qilishi shart emas, chunki uning fikriga ko'ra "AQSh xalqaro huquqni buzgan".[64]

2001 yilda Saddam shunday degan edi: "biz qurol ishlab chiqarishni yoki eng zararli qurollarni izlamoqchi emasmiz ... ammo biz hech qachon Iroq va arab millatini himoya qilish uchun qurolga egalik qilishdan tortinmaymiz".[65] The Xalqaro strategik tadqiqotlar instituti Britaniyadagi (IISS) 2002 yil sentyabr oyida Iroqning harbiy salohiyatini sharhini e'lon qildi va agar chet el manbalaridan bo'linadigan materiallar olinadigan bo'lsa, Iroq bir necha oy ichida yadro qurolini yig'ishi mumkin degan xulosaga keldi.[66] Shu bilan birga, IISS shuningdek, bunday xorijiy manbalarsiz kamida minimal yillar talab etiladi degan xulosaga keldi.

Saddamning 1991 yilgi Fors ko'rfazi urushi oldidan uranni qurol darajasiga qadar boyitgan yadro santrifüj dasturini yaratgan doktor Mahdi Obidiy, The New York Times Iroqlik olimlar yadro dasturini qayta boshlash bo'yicha bilimga ega bo'lishsa-da, 2002 yilga kelib bu g'oya "boshqa davrning xira tushiga" aylandi.[67]

2003 yil Iroq urushi

2003 yil 5 fevral - AQSh davlat kotibi Kolin Pauell namunaviy shishani ushlab turish kuydirgi ga taqdimot berayotganda Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizlik Kengashi.

WMD-ga egalik qilishni Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari tomonidan qo'zg'atadigan asosiy motiv sifatida ko'rsatdi Iroq urushi.

Prelude

Shuningdek qarang: Iroq urushi uchun asos va Iroq urushi
Asosiy maqolalar: Iroq qurolsizlanish inqirozi va Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizlik Kengashi va Iroq urushi

2002 yil oxirida Saddam Xusseyn Xans Bliksga yozgan maktubida BMTning qurol-yaroq inspektorlarini mamlakatga qaytarishga taklif qildi. Keyinchalik, Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti Xavfsizlik Kengashining 1441-sonli qarori Iroqda yangi tekshiruvlar o'tkazishga ruxsat beruvchi chiqarilgan. Qo'shma Shtatlar Iroqning so'nggi qurol deklaratsiyasida materiallar va o'q-dorilarning hisob-kitob qilinmaganligini da'vo qildi; iroqliklar bu kabi barcha materiallar yo'q qilingan deb da'vo qilishdi, buni bir necha yil oldin Iroqning eng yuqori darajadagi defektori aytgan edi, Husayn Kamel al-Majid. Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining avvalgi inspektsiya agentligi UNSCOMning xabarlariga ko'ra, Iroq 600 metrik tonna kimyoviy moddalar ishlab chiqardi, shu jumladan xantal gazi, VX va zarin; kimyoviy vositalar bilan 25000 ga yaqin raketa va 15000 ta artilleriya snaryadlari hanuzgacha topilmagan.

2003 yil yanvar oyida Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining qurol-yarog 'inspektorlari Iroq yadroviy qurolga ega ekanligi yoki faol dasturga oid hech qanday ma'lumot topmaganligini xabar qilishdi. UNSCOMning ba'zi sobiq inspektorlari Qo'shma Shtatlar Iroq ommaviy qirg'in qurollarini ishlab chiqarishni qayta tikladimi yoki yo'qmi, aniq bilishi mumkinmi, degan savolga qo'shilmaydilar. Robert Galluchchi "Agar Iroqda [uran yoki plutoniy] bo'lganida, ular yadroviy qurolni to'qib chiqarishlari mumkin edi va agar ular mavjud bo'lsa, biz buni bilib olamiz deb o'ylashimiz uchun hech qanday asos yo'q". Xuddi shunday, sobiq inspektor Jonatan Taker ham "Haqiqatan ham Iroq nima borligini hech kim bilmaydi. Siz sun'iy yo'ldosh tasviridan zavod ichida nima bo'layotganini aniqlay olmaysiz" dedi. Biroq, Xans Bliks 2003 yil yanvar oxirida Iroq "BMTning qurolsizlanishini talab qiladigan qarorlarini chin dildan qabul qilmaganligini" aytdi.[68] U hisoblanmagan ba'zi materiallar borligini da'vo qildi. Kimyoviy qurollarning yo'q qilinishiga dalil bo'lgan joylar topilganligi sababli, UNSCOM Iroq bilan yo'q qilingan miqdorlarning Iroq ishlab chiqargan miqdorga mos kelishini aniqlash usullari ustida faol ish olib bordi.[69][70] Keyingi choraklik hisobotda, urushdan so'ng, UNMOVIC tomonidan Iroqda vayron qilingan narsalarning umumiy miqdori to'planishi mumkin.[71] Bunga quyidagilar kiradi:

  • 50 ta joylashtirilgan Al-Samud 2 raketalar
  • AS2 raketalari bilan bog'liq turli xil uskunalar, shu jumladan transport vositalari, dvigatellar va jangovar kallaklar
  • 2 ta katta yonilg'i quyish kamerasi
  • Xantal gazi bilan to'ldirilgan 14 155 mm chig'anoqlar, xantal gazi taxminan 49 litrni tashkil etadi va hali ham yuqori darajada
  • Taxminan 500 ml tiodiglikol
  • Ba'zi 122 mm kimyoviy kallaklar
  • Ba'zi kimyoviy uskunalar
  • 224,6 kg muddati o'tgan o'sish vositasi

Ba'zi qurol-yarog 'qurollari (yoki qobiliyati) haqiqatan ham inspektorlardan yashirilganligi haqidagi da'volarga qarshi turish uchun, Skott Ritter keyinroq bahslashar edi;

Shubha yo'qki, Iroq Xavfsizlik Kengashi tomonidan qabul qilingan rezolyutsiyada belgilangan qurolsizlanish majburiyatlarini to'liq bajarmagan. Ammo boshqa tomondan, 1998 yildan beri Iroq tubdan qurolsizlantirildi: Iroqning ommaviy qirg'in qurollarining 90-95 foizi ishonchli tarzda yo'q qilindi ... Yo'qolgan 5-10 foiz tahdidni keltirib chiqarmaydi. ... Bu qurol-yarog 'dasturining qismlarini tashkil qiladi, ularning umumiy miqdori unchalik katta emas, ammo hanuzgacha taqiqlangan ... Biz Iroqqa sof sog'liqni taqdim eta olmaymiz, shuning uchun biz qurolni yopolmaymiz. ularning ommaviy qirg'in qurollari to'g'risida kitob. Ammo bir vaqtning o'zida biz Iroqning nomuvofiqligi to'g'risida urushga loyiq taqiqlangan quvvatni amalda saqlab qolish vakili sifatida gapira olmaymiz.[72]

Ritter, Saddamning qo'lida bo'lgan yillar davomida, agar u saqlanib qolgan bo'lsa, uzoq vaqtdan beri zararsiz moddalarga aylangan bo'lar edi, degan fikrni ilgari surdi. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, Iroqdagi Sarin va tabunning yaroqlilik muddati taxminan besh yil, VX esa bir oz ko'proq (lekin ko'p emas) davom etadi va nihoyat botulinum toksini va suyuq kuydirgi uch yil davom etadi.[73][74]

Huquqiy asos

Asosiy maqola: Iroq urushi qonuniyligi
Prezident Jorj V.Bush 2003 yil 19 martda Oval idoradan xalqqa murojaat qilib, Iroq ozodligi operatsiyasi boshlanganligini e'lon qildi.[75] "Qo'shma Shtatlar aholisi va bizning do'stlarimiz va ittifoqchilarimiz ommaviy qotillik qurollari bilan tinchlikka tahdid soluvchi noqonuniy rejim rahm-shafqatida yashashmaydi". Senat qo'mitasi ma'muriyatning urushdan oldingi Iroqning WMD haqidagi ko'plab bayonotlari asosiy razvedka tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanmaganligini aniqladi.

2003 yil 17 martda, Lord Goldsmith, Buyuk Britaniyaning Bosh prokurori Iroqqa bostirib kirish uchun hukumatining qonuniy asoslarini belgilab berdi. U shunday dedi Xavfsizlik Kengashining 678-sonli qarori Iroqqa qarshi vakolatli kuch, u to'xtatilgan, ammo 687-sonli qaror bilan bekor qilinmagan, u Iroqqa ommaviy qirg'in qurollarini yo'q qilish bo'yicha doimiy majburiyatlarni yuklagan. 687-sonli rezolyutsiyani jiddiy ravishda buzish 678-sonli qarorga binoan kuch ishlatish vakolatini qayta tiklaydi. 1441-sonli qarorda Xavfsizlik Kengashi Iroq qurolsizlanish bo'yicha o'z majburiyatlarini to'liq bajarmaganligi sababli 687-sonli qarorni jiddiy ravishda buzganligini aniqladi. Garchi 1441-sonli qaror Iroqqa amal qilish uchun so'nggi imkoniyatni bergan bo'lsa-da, Buyuk Britaniyaning Bosh prokurori Goldsmit "Iroq bajarmaganligi aniq" deb yozgan. Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti Xavfsizlik Kengashining aksariyat hukumatlari 1441-sonli qaroridan keyin kuch ishlatish uchun hali ham ruxsat yo'qligini aniq ta'kidladilar. Darhaqiqat, 1441 o'tgan paytda AQSh va Buyuk Britaniyaning vakillari 1441 yilda harbiy harakatlar uchun hech qanday shart yo'qligini aniq aytishdi. Keyin - AQSh Elchi Jon D. Negroponte quyidagi so'zlarni keltiradi:

"Avtomatizm" mavjud emas va bu ikki bosqichli jarayon va shu munosabat bilan biz rezolyutsiya uchun bildirilgan asosiy xavotirlarni bajardik [...] Qanday qonunbuzarlik bo'lsa yoki mavjud deb topilsa, u ko'rib chiqiladi Kengashda va kengash boshqa choralar ko'rilishidan oldin bu masalani ko'rib chiqish imkoniyatiga ega bo'ladi.[76]

Buyuk Britaniyaning BMTdagi elchisi ser Jeremi Grinstok quyidagicha fikr bildirdi:

Biz muzokaralar paytida "avtomatiklik" va "yashirin qo'zg'atuvchilar" haqida xavotirlarni baland va baland eshitdik - bu juda muhim qarorga binoan biz harbiy harakatlarga shoshilmaymiz; Iroqdagi har qanday qonunbuzarlik juda muhim bo'lgan qaror bo'yicha Kengash tomonidan muhokama qilinishi kerak. Javob sifatida biz qabul qilgan matnning hammualliflaridan biri sifatida bir xil darajada aniq bo'lishga ijozat bering: ushbu Qarorda "avtomatiklik" yo'q.[77]

Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining o'zi hech qachon Iroq o'zining "so'nggi imkoniyatidan" foydalana olmadi, deb e'lon qilish imkoniga ega emas edi, chunki AQSh bosqini uni muhim nuqtaga aylantirdi. Amerika prezidenti Jorj V.Bush Saddam Xuseynning iste'foga chiqishi va Iroqni tark etishi uchun 48 soat vaqt borligini aytdi.[78]

Koalitsiya razvedkani kengaytirdi

2003 yil 30 mayda, Pol Volfovits bilan suhbatda aytib o'tdi Vanity Fair jurnal ommaviy qirg'in qurollari masalasi Saddam Xuseynni hokimiyatdan chetlatish sabablari orasida Bush jamoasi o'rtasida eng katta kelishuv nuqtasi bo'lganligi. U shunday dedi: "Haqiqat shundaki, AQSh hukumat byurokratiyasi bilan juda ko'p bog'liq bo'lgan sabablarga ko'ra, biz hamma kelisha oladigan bitta masalada to'xtadik, bu asosiy sabab ommaviy qirg'in qurollari edi, ammo, har doim ham bor Birinchisi - ommaviy qirg'in qurollari, ikkinchisi - terrorizmni qo'llab-quvvatlash, uchinchisi - Iroq xalqiga nisbatan jinoiy muomala. Aslida menimcha, to'rtinchi ustunlik bor deb ayta olasiz, bu birinchi ikkisi o'rtasidagi bog'liqlik. "[79]

2004 yil iyun oyida BBC bilan suhbatda, Devid Kay, sobiq rahbari Iroq tadqiqot guruhi, quyidagi izohni berdi: "U erda turgan har bir kishi - men bosh vazir Blerni yaqinda aytganidek aytganidek - aslida Iroq Survey guruhi haqiqiy qirg'in qurollarini echib tashlamoqchi, deb umid qilmoqda."

2002 yilda, Skott Ritter, avvalgi UNSCOM qurol inspektori Bush ma'muriyati va ommaviy axborot vositalarini Iroqning sobiq yadroshunos olimining guvohliklaridan foydalangani uchun qattiq tanqid qildi Xidir Hamza, Iroqqa bostirib kirish uchun asos sifatida 1994 yilda Iroqdan chiqib ketgan:

Biz Iroq yadro dasturining barcha yozuvlarini, ayniqsa ma'muriy yozuvlarni qo'lga kiritdik. Hammaning ismini oldik, ular qaerda ishlagan, nima qilgan va ro'yxatning eng yuqori qismida Saddamning "Bomba ustasi" (Hamzaning kitobi nomi bo'lgan va keyinchalik taxallusni olgan) keyin Jafar Dhia Jafar ismli odam bor edi. Xidir Hamza, va agar siz katta ma'muriy xodimlar ro'yxatiga kirsangiz, u erda Hamzaning ismini topa olmaysiz. Aslida biz uning ismini umuman topmadik. Chunki 1990 yilda u Iroq yadro dasturi uchun ishlamagan. U bu haqda hech qanday ma'lumotga ega emas edi, chunki u kickback mutaxassisi sifatida ishlagan Husayn Kamel Prezident saroyida.

U shimoliy Iroqqa boradi va u bilan uchrashadi Ahmad Chalabiy. U ichkariga kirib, men Saddamning "Bomba ishlab chiqaruvchisiman" deydi. Shuning uchun ular Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasiga qo'ng'iroq qilishadi va ular: "Biz sizning kimligingizni bilamiz, siz Saddamning" bomba ishlab chiqaruvchisi "emassiz, o'z hikoyangizni boshqalarga soting", deyishadi. Va u qo'yib yuborilgan, o'sha paytda uni barcha razvedka xizmatlari rad etgan, bu firibgar.

Va mana biz kimmiz Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi knows is a fraud, the US Government knows is a fraud, is allowed to sit in front of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and give testimony as an expert witness. I got a problem with that, I got a problem with the American media, and I've told them over and over and over again that this man is a documentable fraud, a fake, and yet they allow him to go on CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, and testify as if he actually knows what he is talking about.[80]

On June 4, 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts announced that the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence that he chaired would, as a part of its ongoing oversight of the intelligence community, conduct a Review of intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. On July 9, 2004, the Committee released the Iroq bo'yicha urushdan oldingi razvedkaning Senatning hisoboti. On July 17, 2003, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an address to the U.S. Congress, that history would forgive the United States and United Kingdom, even if they were wrong about weapons of mass destruction. He still maintained that "with every fiber of instinct and conviction" Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction.[81]

On February 3, 2004, Buyuk Britaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri Jack Straw announced an independent inquiry, to be chaired by Brokvell lord Butler, to examine the reliability of British intelligence relating to alleged ommaviy qirg'in qurollari Iroqda.[82] The Butler sharhi was published July 14, 2004.

Tomonidan ishlatiladigan taqdimot slayd AQSh davlat kotibi Kolin Pauell da BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi 2003 yil Iroqqa bostirib kirgunga qadar

In the buildup to the 2003 war, the Nyu-York Tayms published a number of stories claiming to prove that Iraq possessed WMD. One story in particular, written by Judit Miller, helped persuade the American public that Iraq had WMD: in September 2002 she wrote about an intercepted shipment of alyuminiy naychalar which the NYT said were to be used to develop nuclear material.[83] It is now generally understood that they were not intended (or well suited) for that purpose but rather for artillery rockets.[84] The story was followed up with television appearances by Kolin Pauell, Donald Ramsfeld va Kondoliza Rays all pointing to the story as part of the basis for taking military action against Iraq. Miller's sources were introduced to her by Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile favorable to a U.S. invasion of Iraq.[85] Miller is also listed as a speaker for The Middle East Forum, an organization which openly declared support for an invasion.[86] In May 2004 the New York Times published an editorial which stated that its journalism in the buildup to war had sometimes been lax. It appears that in the cases where Iraqi exiles were used for the stories about WMD were either ignorant as to the real status of Iraq's WMD or lied to journalists to achieve their own ends.[87]

Despite the intelligence lapse, Bush stood by his decision to invade Iraq, stating:

But what wasn't wrong was Saddam Hussein had invaded a country, he had used weapons of mass destruction, he had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction, he was firing at our pilots. He was a state sponsor of terror. Removing Saddam Hussein was the right thing for world peace and the security of our country.

In a speech before the World Affairs Council of Charlotte, NC, on April 7, 2006, President Bush stated that he "fully understood that the intelligence was wrong, and [he was] just as disappointed as everybody else" when U.S. troops failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.[88]

Intelligence shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was heavily used as support arguments in favor of military intervention, with the October 2002 C.I.A. report on Iraqi WMDs considered to be the most reliable one available at that time.[89]

"According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons." Senator Jon Kerri (D-Mass.) – Congressional Record, October 9, 2002[90]

On May 29, 2003, Endryu Gilligan paydo bo'ladi BBC's Today program early in the morning. Among the contentions he makes in his report are that the government "ordered (the Sentabr hujjati, a British Government dossier on WMD) to be sexed up, to be made more exciting, and ordered more facts to be...discovered." The broadcast is not repeated.[91]

On May 27, 2003, a secret Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi fact-finding mission in Iraq reported unanimously to intelligence officials in Washington that two trailers captured in Iraq by Kurdish troops "had nothing to do with biological weapons." The trailers had been a key part of the argument for the 2003 invasion; Secretary of State Colin Powell had told the United Nations Security Council, "We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. We know what the fermenters look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like." The Pentagon team had been sent to investigate the trailers after the invasion. The team of experts unanimously found "no connection to anything biological"; one of the experts told reporters that they privately called the trailers "the biggest sand toilets in the world." The report was classified, and the next day, the CIA publicly released the assessment of its Washington analysts that the trailers were "mobile biological weapons production." The White House continued to refer to the trailers as mobile biological laboratories throughout the year, and the Pentagon field report remained classified. It is still classified, but a Vashington Post report of April 12, 2006 disclosed some of the details of the report. Ga ko'ra Xabar:

A spokesman for the DIA asserted that the team's findings were neither ignored nor suppressed, but were incorporated in the work of the Iraqi Survey Group, which led the official search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The survey group's final report in September 2004 – 15 months after the technical report was written – said the trailers were "impractical" for biological weapons production and were "almost certainly intended" for manufacturing hydrogen for weather balloons.[92]

Umumiy Tommi Franks was quoted as saying: "I think no one in this country probably was more surprised than I when weapons of mass destruction were not used against our troops as they moved toward Baghdad."[93]

On February 6, 2004, U.S. President Jorj V.Bush ismli Iroq razvedka komissiyasi, raislik qiladi Charlz Robb va Lorens Silberman, to investigate U.S. intelligence, specifically regarding the 2003 yil Iroqqa bostirib kirish va Iroqniki ommaviy qirg'in qurollari. On February 8, 2004, Dr Xans Bliks, intervyusida BBC TV, accused the U.S. and UK hukumatlar of dramatising the threat of ommaviy qirg'in qurollari yilda Iroq uchun ishni kuchaytirish maqsadida 2003 yilgi urush against the government of Saddam Hussein.

Iroq tadqiqot guruhi

On May 30, 2003, The U.S. Department of Defense briefed the media that it was ready to formally begin the work of the Iroq tadqiqot guruhi (ISG), a fact finding mission from the coalition of the Iraq occupation into the WMD programs developed by Iraq, taking over from the British-American 75th Exploitation Task Force.

Various nuclear facilities, including the Bog'dod yadro tadqiqotlari markazi and Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, were found looted in the month following the invasion. (Gellman, May 3, 2003) On June 20, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that tons of uran, as well as other radioactive materials such as torium, had been recovered, and that the vast majority had remained on site. There were several reports of radiation sickness in the area. It has been suggested that the documents and suspected weapons sites were looted and burned in Iraq by talon-taroj qiluvchilar urushning so'nggi kunlarida.[94]

On September 30, 2004, the U.S. Iraq Survey Group issued its Final Report.[95] Among its key findings were:

  1. "Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted."[96]
  2. "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities;"[96]
  3. "Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of [Iraq's WMD] policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary."[96]
  4. "The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them."[96]
  5. "Saddam did not consider the United States a natural adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with the United States, according to Tariq 'Aziz and the presidential secretary."[96]
  6. Evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date;
  7. Concealment of nuclear program in its entirety, as with Iraq's BW program. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the program and destroy or surrender components of the program;
  8. After Desert Storm, Iraq concealed key elements of its program and preserved what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientific community;
  9. "Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring;"[96]
  10. A limited number of post-1995 activities would have aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.

The report found that "The ISG has not found evidence that Saddam possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but [there is] the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq, although not of a militarily significant capability." It also concluded that there was a possible intent to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, with Hussein pursuing WMD proliferation in the future: "There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were lifted..."[97] No senior Iraqi official interviewed by the ISG believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.

On October 6, 2004, the head of the Iroq tadqiqot guruhi (ISG), Charlz Duelfer, ga e'lon qildi AQSh Senati Qurolli xizmatlar qo'mitasi that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced and stockpiled any weapons of mass destruction since 1991, when BMT sanktsiyalar tayinlandi.[98]

After he began cooperating with U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2003, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program until 1997, handed over blueprints for a nuclear centrifuge along with some actual centrifuge components, stored at his home – buried in the front yard – awaiting orders from Baghdad to proceed. He said, "I had to maintain the program to the bitter end." Uning kitobida The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind, the Iraqi nuclear engineer explains that his nuclear stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted Saddam's bombmaking program. However, it would require a massive investment and a re-creation of thousands of centrifuges in order to reconstitute a full centrifugal enrichment program.

In a January 26, 2004 interview with Tom Brokaw ning NBC news, Kay described Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as being in a "rudimentary" stage. He also stated that "What we did find, and as others are investigating it, we found a lot of terrorist groups and individuals that passed through Iraq."[99] In responding to a question by Brokaw as to whether Iraq was a "gathering threat" as President Bush had asserted before the invasion, Kay answered:

Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. It's not a technical judgment. I think Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened.

In June 2004, the United States removed 2 tons of low-enriched uranium from Iraq, sufficient raw material for a single nuclear weapon.[100]

Demetrius Perricos, then head of UNMOVIC, stated that the Kay report contained little information not already known by UNMOVIC.[101] Many organizations, such as the journal Bioxavfsizlik va bioterrorizm, have claimed that Kay's report is a "worst case analysis".[102]

Captured documents

Asosiy maqola: "Iroq ozodligi" operatsiyasi

"Iroq ozodligi" operatsiyasi refers to some 48,000 boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes that were captured by the U.S. military during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Many of these documents seem to make clear that Saddam's regime had given up on seeking a WMD capability by the mid-1990s. Associated Press reported, "Repeatedly in the transcripts, Saddam and his lieutenants remind each other that Iraq destroyed its chemical and biological weapons in the early 1990s, and shut down those programs and the nuclear-bomb program, which had never produced a weapon." At one 1996 presidential meeting, top weapons program official Amer Mohammed Rashid, describes his conversation with UN weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus: "We don't have anything to hide, so we're giving you all the details." At another meeting Saddam told his deputies, "We cooperated with the resolutions 100 percent and you all know that, and the 5 percent they claim we have not executed could take them 10 years to (verify). Don't think for a minute that we still have WMD. We have nothing."[103] AQSh Kongress a'zosi Piter Xekstra called for the U.S. government to put the remaining documents on the Internet so Arabic speakers around the world can help translate the documents.[104]

Post-war discoveries and incidents

Shuningdek qarang: WMD conjecture in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War

Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, several reported finds of chemical weapons were announced, including half a dozen incidents during the invasion itself.

In April 2003, US Marines stumbled across a number of buildings which emitted unusual levels of radiation. Upon close inspection the troops uncovered "many, many drums" containing low-grade uranium, also known as sariq kek. According to an expert familiar with UN nuclear inspections, US troops had arrived at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center and the material under investigation had been documented, stored in sealed containers and subject to supervision by the Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi 1991 yildan beri.[105][106] The material was transported out of Iraq in July 2008 and sold to Canadian uranium producer Cameco Corp., in a transaction described as worth "tens of millions of dollars."[107][108]

A post-war case occurred on January 9, 2004, when Icelandic munitions experts and Danish military engineers discovered 36 120-mm ohak rounds containing liquid buried in Southern Iraq. While initial tests suggested that the rounds contained a qabariq agenti, subsequent analysis by American and Danish experts showed that no chemical agent was present.[109]

On May 2, 2004, a shell containing xantal gazi was found in the middle of a street west of Bag'dod. The Iroq tadqiqot guruhi investigation reported that it had been previously "stored improperly", and thus the gas was "ineffective" as a useful chemical agent. Rasmiylari Mudofaa vazirligi commented that they were not certain if use was to be made of the device as a bomb.[110]

On May 16, 2004, a 152 mm artillery shell was used as an improvised bomb.[111] The shell exploded and two U.S. soldiers were treated for minor exposure to a nerve agent (nausea and dilated pupils). On May 18 it was reported by U.S. Department of Defense intelligence officials that tests showed the two-chambered shell contained the chemical agent sarin, the shell being "likely" to have contained three to four liters of the substance (in the form of its two unmixed precursor chemicals prior to the aforementioned explosion that had not effectively mixed them).[110] Former U.S. weapons inspector Devid Kay aytdi Associated Press that "he doubted the shell or the nerve agent came from a hidden stockpile, although he didn't rule out that possibility." Kay also considered it possible that the shell was "an old relic overlooked when Saddam said he had destroyed such weapons in the mid-1990s."[112] It is likely that the insurgents who planted the bomb did not know it contained sarin, according to Brig. General Mark Kimmitt, and another U.S. official confirmed that the shell did not have the markings of a chemical agent.[112] The Iroq tadqiqot guruhi later concluded that the shell "probably originated with a batch that was stored in a Al Muthanna CW complex basement during the late 1980s for the purpose of leakage testing."[111]

In a July 2, 2004, article published by The Associated Press va Fox News, it was reported that sarin gas warheads dating back to the last Iran–Iraq War were found in South Central Iraq by Polish Allies. The Polish troops secured munitions on June 23, 2004,[113] but it turned out that the warheads did not in fact contain sarin gas but "were all empty and tested negative for any type of chemicals"—and it transpired that the Poles had bought the shells for $5,000 each.[114]

In 2004, hundreds of chemical warheads were recovered from the desert close to the Eron-Iroq chegarasi. Ga ko'ra Vashington Post, the munitions "had been buried near the Iranian border, and then long forgotten, by Iraqi troops during their eight-year war with Iran". Officials did not consider the discovery as evidence of an ongoing weapons program that was believed to be in existence before the invasion began.[115]

The Iraqi government informed the United Nations in 2014 that insurgents affiliated with the Islamic State terror group had seized control of the Mutana shtatining tashkil etilishi, including a chemical weapons depot northwest of Baghdad. The facility was partially destroyed and placed under the supervision of UNSCOM following the 1991 Gulf War. It housed some 2,500 sarin-filled rockets at the time of their departure in 1999. The U.N. said that the munitions were of "poor quality" and "would largely be degraded after years of storage under the conditions existing there."[116][117]

2005: Operation Avarice

In 2005, the CIA collaborated with the Armiya razvedka korpusi in contacting an unnamed Iraqi individual who had knowledge and possession of all chemical WMD stockpiles and munitions in Iraq.[118] The operation was classified from the public and from most of the armed forces.[118] In addition, chemical specialists and ordnance disposal units were assigned to the task to aid in the destruction of recovered WMDs.[118]

It is unknown who the individual is who held possession of the weapons, and how they had come into possession. Nonetheless, they cooperated with U.S. intelligence measures and sold all known chemical WMDs to the units heading Operation Avarice. As a result, the CIA and Army intelligence acquired over 400 rockets, missiles, and other chemical weapons in varying states of operation.[118]

The unnamed Iraqi individual periodically notified the CIA's Baghdad headquarters when they had additional weapons to sell. The sales varied in size, with the largest tradeoff being for 150 separate rockets containing chemical agents. Chemical and demolitions experts then destroyed the weapons. Many of the weapons were badly degraded, and were empty or held nonlethal liquid, but some of the weapons analyzed indicated a concentration of nerve agents far higher than military intelligence had initially expected Iraq held the capabilities to formulate, with the highest "agent purity of up to 25 percent for recovered unitary sarin weapons", which was considered highly lethal and dangerous.[118]

The mission resulted in the largest recovery of chemical weapons during the Iraq war. It was confirmed that these weapons were remnants of the Iraqi weapons program first developed during the Iran-Iraq war and confirmed that the Hussein government had failed to dismantle and dispose WMDs in its possession. The collaboration between American military intelligence and the unnamed Iraqi proprietor resulted in minimal attacks on U.S. military and coalition personnel or Iraqi citizenry from WMDs on a scale seen during the Iran-Iraq war, although minor attacks still occurred.[118]

The identity of the Iraqi seller was never ascertained, but there were several theories that he was an official of either the former or current Iraqi government, or perhaps a front for the Iraqi government. The source never revealed where the supply originated from, although it is speculated they came from the city of Amara, which was used as a forward base against Iranian forces during the 1980s.[118]

Military intelligence experienced some difficulty during the mission. At least once the undisclosed seller attempted to sell weapons with fake chemical components. In addition, he once "called the intel guys to tell them he was going to turn [WMDs] over to the insurgents" unless he was paid immediately.[118] However, the mission was overall considered a success for both nonproliferation and for minimizing risk exposure for military personnel on the ground in Iraq.[118]

Operation Avarice remained classified for security reasons until 2015.[118] Retired Lieutenant General Richard P. Zahner, the former highest-ranking army intelligence officer in Iraq, praised the operation for having "neutralized what could have become an arsenal used against the US and its allies".[118]

2006: House Armed Services Committee Hearing

On June 21, 2006 the Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari palatasining Razvedka bo'yicha doimiy tanlov qo'mitasi released key points from a classified report provided to them by the Milliy quruqlikdagi razvedka markazi on the recovery of chemical weapons in Iraq.[119] The declassified summary stated that "Since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent", that chemical munitions "are assessed to still exist" and that they "could be sold on the black market".[120] All weapons were thought to be manufactured in the 1980s and date to Iraq's war with Iran.[119] The report prompted US Senator Rik Santorum to hold a press conference in which he declared "We have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq."[121]

Davomida Qurolli kuchlar qo'mitasi meeting convened to discuss the topic, the center's commander, Army Colonel John Chiu, elaborated that the munitions are "badly corroded in most cases [and] some were deliberately dismantled, if you will, to prevent them from being used."[122] Nonetheless, in response to a question from committee member Kurt Ueldon, Col. Chui agreed that the munitions met the technical definition of weapons of mass destruction. "These are chemical weapons as defined under the Chemical Weapons Convention and yes, sir, they do constitute weapons of mass destruction."[123] Qurollar bo'yicha mutaxassis Devid Kay, who also appeared before the committee, disagreed with the assessment, contending that any chemical weapon produced by Iraq in the 1980s would not remain a viable weapon of mass destruction today. Kay said the chemical agent, though hazardous, is "less toxic than most things Americans have under their kitchen sink at this point".[119] Gapirish Milliy jamoat radiosi "s Talk of the Nation, weapons expert Charlz Duelfer agreed: "We said in the [ISG] report that such chemical munitions would probably still be found. But the ones which have been found are left over from the Iran-Iraq war. They are almost 20 years old, and they are in a decayed fashion. It is very interesting that there are so many that were unaccounted for, but they do not constitute a weapon of mass destruction, although they could be a local hazard.[124]

In September of the same year, the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Postwar Findings stated that such discoveries were consistent with the ISG assessment that "Iraq and Coalition Forces will continue to discover small numbers of degraded chemical weapons, which the former Regime mislaid or improperly destroyed prior to 1991. The ISG believes the bulk of these weapons were likely abandoned, forgotten and lost during the Iran-Iraq war because tens of thousands of CW munitions were forward deployed along the frequently and rapidly shifting battle front."[125]

Nyu-York Tayms tergov xulosasi

2014 yil oktyabr oyida Nyu-York Tayms reported that the total number of munitions discovered since 2003 had climbed to 4,990, and that U.S. servicemen had been exposed and injured during the disposal and destruction process.[126][127] US soldiers reporting exposure to xantal gazi va sarin allege they were required to keep their exposure secret, sometimes declined admission to hospital and evacuation home despite the request of their commanders. "We were absolutely told not to talk about it" by a colonel, a former sergeant said.[127] "All [munitions] had been manufactured before 1991, participants said. Filthy, rusty or corroded, a large fraction of them could not be readily identified as chemical weapons at all. Some were empty, though many of them still contained potent mustard agent or residual sarin. Most could not have been used as designed, and when they ruptured dispersed the chemical agents over a limited area."[127]

According to the investigative report, "many chemical weapons incidents clustered around the ruins of the Muthanna State Establishment, the center of Iraqi chemical agent production in the 1980s." The facility had fallen under the supervision of United Nations weapons inspectors after the first Gulf War and was known to house approximately 2,500 corroded chemical munitions, but the vast building complex was left unmanned once hostilities commenced in 2003 and was subject to looting.[127] Participants in the discoveries postulated another reason to conceal their exposure, as some of the chemical shells "appeared to have been designed in the United States, manufactured in Europe and filled in chemical agent production lines built in Iraq by Western companies."[127]

2009 Declaration

Iraq became a member state of the Kimyoviy qurollar to'g'risidagi konventsiya in 2009, declaring "two bunkers with filled and unfilled chemical weapons munitions, some precursors, as well as five former chemical weapons production facilities" according to OPCW Director General Rogelio Pfirter.[128] No plans were announced at that time for the destruction of the material, although it was noted that the bunkers were damaged in the 2003 war and even inspection of the site must be carefully planned.

The declaration contained no surprises, OPCW spokesman Michael Luhan indicated. The production facilities were "put out of commission" by airstrikes during the 1991 conflict, while United Nations personnel afterward secured the chemical munitions in the bunkers. Luhan stated at the time: "These are legacy weapons, remnants." He declined to discuss how many weapons were stored in the bunkers or what materials they contained. The weapons were not believed to be in a usable state.[128]

The destruction of these remnants was completed in 2018.[129]

Jamiyat idroki

In a study published in 2005,[130] a group of researchers assessed the effects reports and retractions in the media had on people's xotira regarding the search for WMD in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. The study focused on populations in two koalitsiya countries (Australia and USA) and one opposed to the war (Germany). This led to three conclusions:

  1. The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they are subsequently disconfirmed, can assist in the creation of yolg'on xotiralar in a substantial proportion of people.
  2. Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter people's beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the events the news stories are about.
  3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred.

A poll conducted between June and September 2003 asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News were three times as likely to believe that evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS.

Media manbaiRespondents believing evidence of WMD had been found in Iraq
Tulki33%
CBS23%
NBC20%
CNN20%
ABC19%
Matbaa vositalari17%
PBS –Milliy radio11%

Based on a series of polls taken from June–September 2003.[131]

Shuningdek qarang

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