Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining Iroqdagi faoliyati - CIA activities in Iraq - Wikipedia

AQSH Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi (Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi) Iroqda ishtirok etishning uzoq tarixiga ega. Garchi Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi bevosita ishtirok etmagan bo'lsa ham 1963 yil Baas to'ntarishi bu quvib chiqarilgan Abd al-Karim Qosim, 1962 yil o'rtalaridan boshlab Qosimni hokimiyatdan ag'darilguncha olib tashlashni rejalashtirgan edi, u Iroqdagi muxolifat guruhlari bilan, jumladan Baas partiyasi bilan aloqalarni rivojlantirgan va Qosim hukumatining yuqori martabali a'zosini zaharlangan ro'molcha bilan "qobiliyatsiz" qilishni rejalashtirgan edi. Keyin 1968 yil Baas to'ntarishi Iroqni tortib olgan Sovet ta'sir doirasi, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi o'sha paytda monarxiya hukumati ning Eron kurd isyonchilarini qurollantirish orqali Iroqni beqarorlashtirish. 1982 yildan boshlab Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Eron-Iroq urushi paytida Iroq razvedkasini taqdim qila boshladi. Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi 1996 yildagi muvaffaqiyatsiz to'ntarishga ham aloqador edi Saddam Xuseyn.

Intellekt muhim va umuman samarali rol o'ynadi Fors ko'rfazi urushi 1990-yillarning boshlarida, lekin buni oqlash va rejalashtirish borasida ancha munozarali edi Iroqqa bostirib kirish 2003 yilda. Quyidagi tegishli xronologik yozuvlarga qarang.

1958

O'rtasidagi munosabatlar Qo'shma Shtatlar (AQSh) va Iroq ta'qibga uchradi Iroq monarxiyasining ag'darilishi 1958 yil 14 iyulda Brigada boshchiligidagi respublika hukumati e'lon qilindi Abd al-Karim Qosim. Qosim operatsiyani rejalashtirgan, ammo uni polkovnik boshqargan Abdul Salam Orif.^[1] Uzoq vaqt Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi (Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi) ofitseri Garri Rositzke "armiya fitnasi haqidagi mish-mishlar bir necha oydan beri tarqalgan edi", deb aytdi Bag'dod, "ammo" na Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi agentlari va na Iroq fitnachilari to'ntarish qachon bo'lishini ayta olmadilar, chunki bu vaqt keskin o'zgarishga bog'liq edi. "^[2][3] Bundan tashqari, keyingi Davlat departamenti tergov "Iroq va AQSh razvedka idoralari Qosim to'g'risida bilar ekan, u hech qachon xavotirga sabab bo'lmaydi deb ishonmaganligini" ta'kidladi. Markaziy razvedka direktori Allen Dulles dedi Prezidentga Duayt Eyzenxauer Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasiga "tegishli dalillar yo'q edi" Misr "s Gamal Abdel Noser to'ntarishda, garchi u Nosirdan ilhomlangan bo'lsa ham. 15-iyul kuni Eyzenxauer Iroqdagi g'alayonga javoban AQSh dengiz piyodalarini Livanga yuborish Livan prezidentining iltimosiga binoan Camille Chamoun, Chamounning g'arbparast hukumatiga bir necha oy davom etgan fuqarolik tartibsizliklaridan so'ng tartibni tiklashda yordam berish maqsadida.^[1] Eyzenxauer ma'muriyati dastlab "Baatist yoki vaziyatni kommunistik ekspluatatsiya qilish ", ammo 30 iyulda yangi Iroq hukumatini tan oldi.^[1][4]

Qosim o'zini Iroqning "yagona etakchisi" qilib ko'rsatdi va Nosir bilan har qanday aloqani rad etdi, Orif esa Iroqning Iroqqa qo'shilishini ochiqchasiga targ'ib qildi. Birlashgan Arab Respublikasi (UAR) - Misrning qisqa muddatli ittifoqi va Suriya. 30 sentyabrda Qosim Orifni yuborish orqali uni zararsizlantirishga urindi G'arbiy Germaniya elchi sifatida; hali 2 oktyabrda Dulles bashorat qilgan edi: "Ehtimol, biz [uning] oxirgisi haqida eshitmaganmiz". Misr agentlari Bonn Orif bilan Qosimni ag'darish uchun fitna uyushtirgan, ammo Orif 4 noyabrda Bag'dodga qaytib kelganidan ko'p o'tmay hibsga olingan. Birlashgan Qirollik (U.K.) "uni Nosirga Iroqning alternativasi sifatida etishtirishga umid qilar edi", Qosimni dekabr oyida Misrning yana bir muvaffaqiyatsiz urinishi to'g'risida ogohlantirdi. "Noserning aralashuvi tez orada Qosimni o'z rejimini millatchilardan himoya qilish uchun tayanch tayanchini ta'minlash uchun kommunistlarga murojaat qilishga majbur qildi."^[5]

1959

Ta'siridan xavotirda Iroq Kommunistik partiyasi Qosim ma'muriyatidagi (ICP) a'zolari, Eyzenxauer "[Nosirga] Iroqda hokimiyatni qabul qilishga yordam berish yaxshi siyosat bo'lishi mumkinmi" degan savolni berishni boshladi. Biroq, Eyzenxauerning eng yaxshi maslahatchilari, jumladan Dalles va uning ukasi, Davlat kotibi Jon Foster Dulles - bundan katta ogohlantirildi. Masalan, 1959 yil 15 yanvarda Foster Dulles buni "qo'llarimizni Iroqdan uzoqlashtirish zarur" deb atadi, chunki AQSh "bu murakkab vaziyatga aralashish uchun etarlicha murakkab emas edi".^[6] 24 mart kuni Iroq - AQSh rasmiylarini hayratda qoldirgan holda - aksil-qarshi kurashdan bosh tortdi.Sovet ittifoq, Bag'dod pakti. Aprel oyida Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Milliy xavfsizlik kengashi (NSC) Iroq bo'yicha maxsus qo'mitani (SCI) tuzdi va vaziyatni qayta ko'rib chiqish va mamlakatni kommunistik ravishda egallashiga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun turli xil kutilmagan holatlarni taklif qildi.^[7] Ham yashirin, ham harbiy aralashuv o'ylab topilgan, ammo bu "dahshatga tushgan" AQShning Bag'doddagi elchisi Jon Jernegan, "u oxir-oqibat ma'muriyatni o'rniga Nosirni Iroqqa qarshi targ'ibotini Qosimga emas, balki kommunistlarga qaratishni o'zgartirish uchun bosishga undadi". Nosir bunga rozi bo'ldi va tez orada Qosim kommunistlarga qarshi ko'plab repressiv choralarni ko'rdi va Iroq "qizil rangga aylanib bormoqda" degan xavotirda edi.^[8][9] AQSh rasmiysi o'sha paytda "Nosirning kommunizmga qarshi so'nggi hujumlari G'arb davlatlari ko'p yillik ishlarida erishgan barcha narsalarga qaraganda Yaqin Sharqda kommunizmning ilgarilab ketishi uchun ko'proq ish qildi" deb ta'kidlagan edi.^[9] Bryan R. Gibsonning yozishicha, "Qo'shma Shtatlarni Noserning Qosim rejimini ag'darishga qaratilgan ko'plab yashirin urinishlar bilan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri bog'laydigan hujjatlar mavjud emas, ammo Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi yordam berganiga oid dalillar mavjud Iordaniya va UAR mamlakatga yana iroqliklarga kirib bordi. "^[10] SCI nihoyat 1961 yilning yanvarida yopildi.^[11]

UPI hisoboti

Richard Sale ning United Press International (UPI) Adel Darvish va boshqa mutaxassislarning xabar berishicha, 1959 yil 7-oktabrda Qosimga yosh bolani suiqasd qilish muvaffaqiyatsiz tugagan Saddam Xuseyn va Baasning boshqa fitnachilari Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi va Misr razvedkasining hamkorligi edi.^[12] Gibson, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining Qosimga qilingan suiqasd vaqti ko'r-ko'rona bo'lganligini va 1 oktyabrda MXX "aralashuvga qarshi siyosatini tasdiqlaganini" ko'rsatadigan maxfiy ma'lumotlarni o'chirib tashlagan hujjatlarni keltirib, Sotish va Darvish haqiqatiga qarshi chiqdi. Dulles olti kunni bashorat qildi voqeadan oldin Qosimning hayotiga suiqasd "yaqin ikki oy ichida" amalga oshirilishi mumkin edi, bu Gibson "aniq razvedkaning etishmasligidan" dalolat beradi. AQSh rasmiylari Qosim tezda jarohatlaridan xalos bo'lishiga umid qilib, Iordaniya va Eron Qosim kasalxonaga yotqizilgan paytda Iroqqa harbiy aralashuvdan Gibson, "Qo'shma Shtatlar Qosimga qarshi bir nechta fitnalardan xabardor bo'lganida, u hali ham aralashmaslik siyosatiga sodiq qolgan" deb taxmin qildi.^[13] Xuddi shunga o'xshash nuqtai nazardan, Brendon Vulf-Xannikutt quyidagicha ta'kidlaydi: "Men 7-oktabrga qadar (suiqasd qilishga) qadar Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi va Baas o'rtasidagi yashirin munosabatlarning biron bir dalilidan bexabarman. ... Ehtimol, bu oktyabr oyidir. 7, Baasni AQSh hukumatiga etkazdi. "^[14] Biroq, Kennet Osgood - Amerikaning fitnada qatnashganligi to'g'risida "to'g'ridan-to'g'ri hujjatli dalil" mavjud emasligini tan olgan holda - Misr "biron bir darajada" ishtirok etganligi va "Qo'shma Shtatlar Nosir bilan ish olib borganligi" keng tarqalganligi sababli izoh beradi. ba'zi darajadagi ... aniq dalillar shuki, Baas partiyasi faollari bilan AQSh-UAR hamkorlik qilishi mumkin emas. " Bundan tashqari, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi ushbu davrda Qosim hukumatiga qarshi favqulodda vaziyatlarni rejalashtirish bilan shug'ullangan: "[Sotish] da'volarining haqiqiyligi qanday bo'lishidan qat'iy nazar, hech bo'lmaganda hozirda maxfiylashtirilmagan hujjatlar AQSh rasmiylari Qosimga qarshi turli fitnalarni faol ko'rib chiqayotganligini va Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Iroqdagi yashirin operatsiyalar uchun mol-mulk yig'moqda edi. "^[9]

Garchi Saddam Saddam (u faqat qopqoq bilan ta'minlashi kerak edi) Qosimga o'q uzganidan so'ng, suiqasd muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan bo'lsa-da - Saddam Iroqqa qaytgan taqdirda o'lim xavfi ostida uch yildan ortiq vaqt davomida UARda muhojirlikda yashashga majbur bo'lgan - bu keng tarqalishga olib keldi. Iroq ichkarisidagi Saddam va Baas, ikkalasi ham qorong'ilikda bo'lgan va keyinchalik Saddamning ish paytida jamoat obro'sining muhim qismiga aylangan. Iroq prezidenti.^[9][15][16] Ehtimol, Saddam AQSh elchixonasiga tashrif buyurgan Qohira uning surgun paytida.^[17] AQShning sobiq yuqori martabali amaldori Marion Faruk-Sluglett va Piter Sluglettga Iroqlik Baasistlar, shu jumladan Saddam "Amerika hukumati bilan 1950-yillarning oxiri va 1960-yillarning boshlarida aloqada bo'lganligini" aytdi.^[18]

1960

Ga ko'ra Cherkov qo'mitasi hisobot:

1960 yil fevral oyida Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining Yaqin Sharq bo'limi bo'linma boshlig'i tomonidan tasdiqlangan [Jeyms H. Kritchfild ] "sog'liqni saqlashni o'zgartirish bo'yicha qo'mitani" "Iroqda Sovet bloki siyosiy manfaatlarini ilgari surmoqda" deb hisoblangan iroqlik polkovnikni "qobiliyatsiz" qilish bo'yicha "maxsus operatsiya" taklifi uchun chaqirdi. Bo'lim Qo'mitadan "agar u umuman nogironlikka olib kelmasa ham, maqsad kamida uch oy davomida odatdagi ish bilan shug'ullanishiga to'sqinlik qilishi mumkin bo'lgan usul" bo'yicha maslahat so'radi va quyidagilarni qo'shimcha qildi: "Biz sub'ektni doimiy ravishda doimiy ravishda izlamaymiz voqea joyidan olib tashlash; agar bu asorat yuzaga kelsa, biz ham qarshi emasmiz. " ... [1962] aprelda [Sog'liqni saqlashni o'zgartirish] qo'mitasi bir ovozdan DDPga [direktorning rejalar bo'yicha o'rinbosari, Richard M. Bissell Jr. ] "o'chiruvchi operatsiya" amalga oshirilishini va operatsiya boshlig'ining "juda kerakli" bo'lishini maslahat berganini ta'kidladi. Bissellning o'rinbosari, Treysi Barns, Bissell nomidan tasdiqlangan ... Tasdiqlangan operatsiya, Osiyo davlatlaridan polkovnikga mehnat qobiliyatini pasaytiradigan agent bo'lgan monogramma ro'molchani yuborish edi. [Jeyms] Scheider [Bissellning ilmiy maslahatchisi] guvohlik berdi, u hozirda oluvchining ismini eslamagan bo'lsa-da, o'sha davrda Osiyo mamlakatlaridan qandaydir materiallar bilan ishlangan ro'molcha orqali pochta orqali xabar yuborishni eslagan. uni olgan odamni ta'qib qilishdan maqsad. " ... Ushbu Qo'mita tekshiruvi davomida Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi ro'molcha "aslida hech qachon olinmagan (agar u haqiqatan ham yuborilgan bo'lsa)" ekanligini aytgan. Polkovnik: "Bizning ro'molcha taklifimiz ko'rib chiqilganidan ko'p o'tmay, Bag'doddagi otishma otryadidan oldin (biz hech qanday aloqasi bo'lmagan voqea) o'lim xastaligiga duchor bo'ldik" deb qo'shimcha qilgan.^[19]

Garchi ba'zi manbalar^[20] ushbu operatsiyani Qosimga qilingan suiqasd sifatida tasvirlash, boshqa manbalar ushbu talqin noto'g'ri yoki dalillar bilan qo'llab-quvvatlanmaganligini ta'kidlashadi,^{[21][22][23][24][25]} chunki Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi maqsadga suiqasd qilishni xohlagan degan tushunchani matnning o'zi aniq ma'nosi bilan rad etadi. Bundan tashqari, Qosim ro'molchani oluvchisi bo'lishi ehtimoldan yiroq emas, chunki Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi vakillari Iroq davlati rahbariga qilingan hujumni eslashlari mumkin edi. Qosim polkovnik emas, balki brigada generali bo'lgan va Iroqdagi Sovet manfaatlarini ochiqchasiga targ'ib qilmagan bo'lsa-da, Iroqning "Xalq sudi" ning sovetparast rahbari polkovnik Fahdil Abbos al-Mahdavi yuqoridagi tavsifga juda mos keladi.^[21][26] 1960 yil yanvarida Qosim ICPni amalda taqiqladi, ammo Mahdavi Qosim hukumati va bir nechta kommunistik-front guruhlari, shu jumladan "Tinchlik partizanlari" o'rtasida hal qiluvchi kanal bo'lib qoldi, bu 1961 yil may oyida rasmiy ravishda noqonuniy deb topilganiga qaramay jamoat oldida ishlashga ruxsat berildi va ma'lum bo'lgan. uchun ochiqdan-ochiq maqtovlari uchun Fidel Kastro shuningdek, uning Sovet Ittifoqi bo'ylab safarlari, Sharqiy blok va Xitoy.^[22][27] 1991 yilda sobiq yuqori martabali AQSh diplomati Hermann Eilts dedi jurnalistga Elaine Sciolino Mahdavi nishonga olingan edi.^[23]

1961

1961 yilga kelib, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi ichida kamida bitta yuqori darajadagi ma'lumot beruvchi yetishtirildi Baas partiyasining Iroq qanoti, unga partiya faoliyatini nazorat qilish imkoniyatini beradi.^[2]

1962

Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi simi shuni ko'rsatadiki, Baas partiyasi "1962 yil aprelida davlat to'ntarishi to'g'risida Arifga birinchi bor murojaat qilgan".^[29]

1962 yil o'rtalarida Qosimning bosqinchilik tahdidlaridan qo'rqib ketdi Quvayt va uning hukumati Britaniyaliklarga va Amerikaga tegishli bo'lganlarning 99,5 foizini o'zlashtirgan Iroq neft kompaniyasi ning (IPC) imtiyozli xoldinglar, Prezident Jon F. Kennedi Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasiga uni hokimiyatdan chetlashtiradigan harbiy to'ntarishga tayyorgarlik ko'rishni buyurdi. Archie Ruzvelt, kichik operatsiyaga rahbarlik qilish vazifasi yuklangan.^[30] O'sha paytda Eronda joylashgan Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining yuqori lavozimli ofitseri Gibsonga "Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Baas partiyasiga qiziqqan bo'lsa-da, aslida harbiylar uning asosiy diqqat markazida bo'lgan", deb aytgan.^[2] Xuddi shu davrda Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi juda maxfiy Iroq-Sovet Ittifoqiga kirib bordi "yer-havo" raketasi Sovet Ittifoqining ballistik raketalar dasturi to'g'risida ma'lumot beradigan loyiha.^[31]

Shuningdek, 1962 yilda Mahdavi va uning ba'zi oila a'zolari Mahdavi "gripp" deb nomlagan jiddiy ish bilan shug'ullanishgan. Ushbu kasallik 1962 yil aprel oyida Markaziy Razvedka Boshqarmasining Mahdavini zaharlash rejasi bilan bog'liqmi yoki yo'qmi noma'lum; Natan J. Citino "kasallik vaqti keltirilgan ko'rsatmalarda aytib o'tilganidek," qobiliyatsiz "operatsiya bilan to'liq mos kelmasligini" ta'kidlaydi.^[32]

1963

1963 yil 7 fevralda Davlat departamenti ijrochi kotibi Uilyam Brubek Iroq "Sovet harbiy va sanoat uskunalari va Sovet Ittifoqining notekis joylarda ishlash usullari to'g'risida texnik ma'lumot olish uchun eng foydali joylardan biriga aylandi" deb yozgan.^[34] AQSh rasmiylariga Qosimning AQSh qo'llab-quvvatlamoqda degan yolg'on da'volariga javob bermaslik haqida ko'rsatma berildi Kurd isyonchilari AQShning Iroqdagi mavjudligini saqlab qolish istagidan.^[35] Balansda osilgan "razvedka bonanzasiga" kirish imkoni bo'lganida, AQSh rasmiylari "Qosimni og'irlashtirishga nisbatan katta istaksizlikni" namoyish qilishdi.^[36]

Iroqning Baas partiyasi zo'ravonlik to'ntarishida Qosimni ag'darib, qatl etdi 1963 yil 8 fevralda. Mahdavi Qosim bilan birga qatl etildi: "Keyin ularning jasadlari davlat televideniesida besh daqiqa davom etgan dahshatli filmda namoyish etildi. Jinoyatchilarning oxiri namozdan keyin darhol efirga uzatilgan va a Feliks mushuk multfilm. "^[37] Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi to'ntarishni uyushtirganligi to'g'risida doimiy mish-mishlar tarqalgan bo'lsa-da,^[38] maxfiylashtirilmagan hujjatlar va Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining sobiq zobitlarining ko'rsatmalari Amerikaning to'g'ridan-to'g'ri ishtiroki yo'qligini ko'rsatadi, garchi AQSh 1962 yil iyul va dekabr oylarida Baasistlarning to'ntarish tashabbusi qilganligi to'g'risida xabardor qilingan va davlat to'ntarishidan keyingi harakatlar "eng yaxshi holatda buni rad etdi va eng yomoni, bu keyingi zo'ravonlikka hissa qo'shdi. "^{[39][40][41][42]} Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi "hech bo'lmaganda 1961 yildan" beri Baas partiyasining to'ntarishini rejalashtirishni diqqat bilan kuzatib borganiga qaramay, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi rasmiysi Ruzvelt bilan Qosimga qarshi harbiy to'ntarishni qo'zg'ashda ishlagan va keyinchalik u Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining Iroqdagi operatsiyalarining boshlig'i bo'lgan va Suriya, "Baas partiyasining harakatlariga aloqadorligini rad etdi", buning o'rniga Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining Qosimga qarshi harakatlari o'sha paytda rejalashtirish bosqichida bo'lganligini ta'kidladi: "Men hanuzgacha davlat to'ntarishida rol o'ynashi mumkin bo'lgan odamlar bilan aloqa qilish bilan shug'ullanganman. unga qarshi urinish. "^[43] Aksincha, Brendon Vulf-Xannikutt "Olimlar Amerikaning 1963 yil fevraldagi Iroqdagi to'ntarishga qarshi tashqi siyosatini talqin qilishda ikkiga bo'linishmoqda", deb ta'kidlaydilar, ammo "davlat to'ntarishidagi Amerikaning roli to'g'risida ishonchli dalillar" keltiradi.^[44]

Qosimning sobiq muovini Orifga (u Baasist bo'lmagan) asosan tantanali ravishda Prezident unvoni berildi, ammo taniqli Baasist general Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr Bosh vazir etib tayinlandi. Yangi hukumatning eng qudratli etakchisi Iroqning Baas partiyasining kotibi Ali Solih al-Sadiy edi, u Milliy gvardiya militsiyasini boshqargan va gumon qilingan kommunistlar va boshqa dissidentlar yuzlab, hatto minglab odamlarni qirg'in qilgan. to'ntarishdan keyingi kunlarda.^[45][46] Kennedi ma'muriyati Iroqning o'zgarishi istiqbollarini ko'rib chiqdi Sovuq urush ehtiyotkorlik bilan optimizm bilan, oxir-oqibat Iroq uchun 55 million dollarlik qurol-yarog 'kelishuvini ma'qulladi.^[47] Ma'lumotlarga ko'ra, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi al-Sa'diy Milliy Gvardiyasini kommunistlar va boshqa chapchilar ro'yxatlarini taqdim etgan, ular hibsga olingan yoki o'ldirilgan.^[48] Ushbu da'vo 1963 yil 27 sentyabrda paydo bo'lgan Al-Ahram King bilan intervyu Iordaniyalik Xusseyn u Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi maoshida bo'lganligi to'g'risidagi xabarlarni tarqatib yubormoqchi bo'lganlar:

Qosim qatl etilganidan keyin

Siz menga Amerika razvedkasining orqasida turganini aytasiz Iordaniyadagi 1957 yilgi voqealar. 8 fevral kuni Iroqda sodir bo'lgan voqealar Amerika razvedkasi tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanganligini aniq bilaman, deb aytishga ijozat bering. Hozir Bag'dodda hukmronlik qilayotganlarning ba'zilari bu haqda bilishmaydi, lekin men haqiqatdan xabardorman. Baas partiyasi va Amerika razvedkasi o'rtasida ko'plab uchrashuvlar bo'lib o'tdi, bu Quvaytda muhimroqdir. Bilasizmi ... 8 fevral kuni Iroqni chaqirgan maxfiy radio davlat to'ntarishini amalga oshirgan odamlarga hibsga olinishi va qatl qilinishi uchun u erdagi kommunistlarning ismlari va manzillarini etkazib berayotgan edi? ... Shunga qaramay Men men Amerika va imperializm agenti bo'lganlikda ayblanuvchiman!^[18][49][50]

Ga binoan Xanna Batatu Biroq, "Baasistlar 1958-1959 yillarda, kommunistlar butunlay ochiq maydonga tushganda va undan oldin, Milliy Birlik Jabhasi yillarida - 1957-1958 yillarda ular bilan tez-tez muomalada bo'lganlarida, bunday ma'lumotlarni to'plash uchun katta imkoniyatga ega edilar. ularni barcha darajalarda. " Bundan tashqari, "ko'rib chiqilayotgan ro'yxatlar qisman eskirgan" bo'lib, ular 1963 yildan ancha oldin tuzilganligini dalil sifatida qabul qilishlari mumkin edi.^[49] Batatuning izohi qo'llab-quvvatlanadi Razvedka va tadqiqotlar byurosi "[Kommunistik] partiyaning a'zolari [hozirgi hukmron bo'lgan Ba't partiyasi tomonidan tuzilgan ro'yxatlar asosida to'planmoqda]" va ICP Baasistlar "deyarli barcha mol-mulkini fosh qilgani" haqida xabar diqqat bilan aniqlangan va ro'yxatga olingan. "^[52] Boshqa tomondan, Citino AQShning Bag'doddagi elchixonasida ikki mansabdor - Uilyam Lakeland va Jeyms E. Akins - "1962 yil Iyulda Iroqning chap matbuotida qurolsizlanish va tinchlik uchun o'tkazilgan Moskva konferentsiyasini yoritishda Iroq kommunistlari va ularning tarafdorlari ro'yxatlarini tuzish uchun foydalanilgan ... Bu ro'yxatga savdogarlar, talabalar, professional jamiyatlar a'zolari va jurnalistlar kirgan. eng katta bitta guruh. "^[53] Lakeland, SCIning sobiq ishtirokchisi, "to'ntarishdan so'ng Milliy Gvardiya tergovchisi bilan aloqani shaxsan davom ettirgan" va uning o'sha paytdagi Iroqning AQShdagi harbiy attaşesi, mayor Xasan Mustafo an-Naqib bilan o'zaro aloqada bo'lishiga ta'sir qilgan bo'lishi mumkin. Qosimdan keyin Baas partiyasi, unda qatnashgan millatchilarga qarshi "Mahdavining o'lim jazosini qo'llab-quvvatladi" 1959 yil Mosul qo'zg'oloni.^[54] Bundan tashqari, "Weldon C. Mathews inson huquqlari buzilishida ishtirok etgan Milliy Gvardiya rahbarlari AQSh tomonidan politsiya dasturi doirasida o'qitilganligini sinchkovlik bilan aniqladi. Xalqaro hamkorlik ma'muriyati va Xalqaro taraqqiyot agentligi."^[55]

Baas hukumati 1963 yil noyabrida qulab tushdi Suriya bilan birlashish masalasida (qaerda a raqib filial Baas partiyasidan edi mart oyida hokimiyatni egallab oldi ) va as-Sa'diy Milliy gvardiyasining ekstremistik va nazoratsiz xatti-harakatlari. Prezident Arif Iroq harbiylarining katta ko'magi bilan Baaschilarni hukumatdan tozalab, Milliy Gvardiyani oyoqqa turishga buyruq berdi; al-Bakr as-Sa'diy-ni olib tashlash uchun Orif bilan til biriktirgan bo'lsa-da, 1964 yil 5-yanvarda Arif al-Bakrni yangi lavozimidan olib tashladi. Vitse prezident, Baas partiyasiga uning hukumati ichida o'z o'rnini saqlab qolish imkoniyatini berishidan qo'rqib.^[56] Partiyaning hokimiyatdagi qisqa muddati davomida Britaniya va Isroil rasmiylar va G'arb neft kompaniyalari vakillari odatda Baasga shubha bilan qarashgan, ammo AQSh rasmiylari, shu jumladan elchi Robert C. Kuchli Vulf-Hunnikutt Baatistlarning Iroqni modernizatsiya qilish qobiliyatining "romantik" tushunchasi sifatida tavsiflagan narsalarga ega edi va Milliy Gvardiyaning shafqatsizligi va aqidaparastligi haqidagi xabarlarni Lakeland "taniqli arablarning bo'rttirishga moyilligi" deb ataganiga bog'ladi. Noyabr to'ntarishidan so'ng, Baasistlarning vahshiyliklarini isbotlovchi dalillar paydo bo'ldi va Lakeland "Baasistik rejimga qarshi halokatli postmortem" ning muallifi bo'lib, u shunday xulosaga keldi: "Aynan shu sabab bilan Baasga qarshi xalq isyoni asosan haqli va shuning uchun mamlakatda yuz berayotgan siyosiy voqealarga, xususan Baasiy uyg'onish istiqbollariga ozmi-ko'pmi doimiy ta'sir qiladi. "^[57] Xuddi shunday, Slugletts Baasistlarni Iroqda avvalgi mislsiz "shafqatsiz vahshiylik" miqyosida "chuqur noxush qiyofani" rivojlantirgan deb ta'riflaydi, shu jumladan urushdan keyingi O'rta asrlarda shu paytgacha sodir bo'lgan eng dahshatli zo'ravonlik sahnalari. Sharq ":" Bog'doddagi deyarli har bir oilaning ta'siriga tushib qolgani sababli - va erkaklar ham, ayollar ham bir xil munosabatda bo'lishgan - Baaschilarning faoliyati ular uchun juda qattiq nafrat uyg'otdi va shu avlodning ko'plab iroqliklarida shu kungacha saqlanib kelmoqda. "^[58]

1968

Orif va ayniqsa, uning ukasi prezidentlari ostida Abdul Rahmon Orif, AQSh va Iroq 1958 yilgi inqilobdan keyingi har qanday davrga qaraganda yaqinroq aloqalarni rivojlantirdilar.^[59][60] The Lyndon B. Jonson 1965 yil iyul oyida Arifning IPCning imtiyozli xoldingi milliylashtirilishini qisman bekor qilish haqidagi Arifning taklifini ma'muriyat ijobiy qabul qildi (garchi oltita vazir a'zosining iste'foga chiqishi va Iroq jamoatchiligi orasida keng tarqalgan norozilik uni ushbu rejadan voz kechishga majbur qildi), shuningdek g'arbparast yurist Abdul Rahmon al-Bazzaz Bosh vazir lavozimida ishlash; Bazzaz 1966 yil may oyida Xandren tog'idagi jangda kurdlarning g'alaba qozonganidan so'ng kurd isyonchilari bilan tinchlik bitimini amalga oshirishga urindi.^[61] Rahman Orif (bundan buyon matnda "Orif" deb yuritiladi) Iroqda "prezidentlik lavozimini egallashidan oldin elchi Strong bilan do'stlik o'rnatgan va 1966 yil aprel oyi orasida AQShga bir qator do'stona imo-ishoralar qilgan holda" mo''tadil kuchlarning biri "deb hisoblangan. va 1967 yil yanvar.^[62][63] Arifning iltimosiga binoan Prezident Jonson 1967 yil 25 yanvarda Oq uyda Iroqning beshta generali va Iroq elchisi Nosir Xani bilan uchrashib, "ikki hukumat o'rtasida tobora yaqinroq munosabatlarni o'rnatish istagi" ni takrorladi.^[64] Jonsonning so'zlariga ko'ra Milliy xavfsizlik bo'yicha maslahatchi, Uolt Uitmen Rostou, NSC hatto Arifni AQShga davlat tashrifi bilan kutib olish haqida o'ylar edi, garchi bu taklif oxir-oqibat uning hukumati barqarorligidan xavotir tufayli rad etilgan edi.^[65][66] Kasallikning boshlanishidan oldin Olti kunlik urush, Iroq tashqi ishlar vaziri Adnan Pachachi AQShning bir qator rasmiylari bilan uchrashib, 1 iyun kuni kuchayib borayotgan Yaqin Sharq inqirozini muhokama qildi, shu jumladan AQShning BMTdagi elchisi Artur Goldberg, Davlat kotibining siyosiy masalalar bo'yicha muovini Evgeniy V. Rostov, Davlat kotibi Din Rask va Prezident Jonsonning o'zi.^[67] Arablarning qimmatbaho mag'lubiyati bilan yuzaga kelgan siyosiy muhit Iroqni 7 iyun kuni AQSh bilan munosabatlarni buzishga undadi va pirovardida Orifning nisbatan mo''tadil hukumati qulashini ta'minladi.^[68] Orif singari, Orif ilgari Iroqdagi radikal va mo''tadil elementlarni muvozanatlashtirmoqchi bo'lgan, ammo urush muvozanatlashtirdi, chunki Orif ko'tarilgan iroqlik millatchilarni, ayniqsa qayta tayinlash orqali ko'tarildi Tohir Yahyo bosh vazir lavozimiga.^[69] Yahyo 1963 yil oxiridagi birinchi premerlik paytida milliy neft kompaniyasini tashkil etish niyatida ekanligini e'lon qildi va bu uchun asos yaratdi. Iroq milliy neft kompaniyasi (INOC). 1967 yil iyuldan 1968 yil iyulgacha bo'lgan ikkinchi vazirlik davrida Yahyo INOCni qayta tiklashga o'tdi va u bilan ishlashga intildi. Frantsiya va Sovet Ittifoqi IPCni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri milliylashtirish uchun texnik salohiyatni rivojlantirish, Iroqning "neftini Isroilga qarshi kurashda qurol sifatida" ishlatishga va'da berishdi.^[70]

1968 yil may oyida Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Iroq harbiylaridagi radikallar Arif hukumati uchun xavf tug'dirayotgani va "kuchlar muvozanati shunday bo'lganki, biron bir guruh hal qiluvchi qadamlarni tashlash uchun kuchni etarli darajada his qilmasligi bilan" "To'xtab turgan inqilob" deb nomlangan hisobot tayyorladi. , "shundan keyin sodir bo'lgan to'siq" ko'plab muhim siyosiy va iqtisodiy masalalar shunchaki e'tibordan chetda qoladigan vaziyatni yaratdi. "^[72] 1968 yil iyun oyida Belgiyaliklar AQSh Davlat departamentidan Iroq rasmiylariga xabar yuborishdi, agar Iroq avvalgi norozilik namoyishi paytida AQSh elchixonasi va konsulligiga etkazilgan zarar uchun tovon puli to'lashga rozi bo'lsa va boshqa shartlarni bajargan bo'lsa, shu jumladan oxirigacha normal munosabatlarni tiklashni taklif qilishdi. Iroq Isroilning 1967 yilgi g'alabasidan keyin joriy qilingan AQSh tovarlari va xizmatlarini boykot qilishga; garchi AQSh rasmiylari davlat to'ntarishini oldini olishga umid qilsalar-da, Iroqning ushbu uverturaga javobi haqida hech qanday ma'lumot yo'q.^[73] 17-iyul kuni Iroqning Baas partiyasi - prezident sifatida al-Bakr, mudofaa vaziri sifatida Abd ar-Rahmon al-Dovud va Abd ar-Razzoq an-Naif bosh vazir sifatida—qonsiz to'ntarishda hokimiyatni qo'lga kiritdi, Orifni Londonga uchadigan samolyotga joylashtirish. 1963 yilda qisqa muddatli koalitsiya hukumati qulaganini eslab, al-Bakr tezda Naif va Dovudni (ikkalasi ham Baasistlar bo'lmagan) o'z lavozimlaridan chetlashtirilishini va 30 iyulda surgun qilinishini buyurib, Baas partiyasi ustidan nazoratni kuchaytirdi. Iroqqa qadar 2003 yil mart oyida AQSh boshchiligidagi bosqin. keyinchalik al-Bakr bosh vazir va armiyaning bosh qo'mondoni etib tayinlandi.^[74][75] 2 avgust kuni Iroq tashqi ishlar vaziri Abdul Karim Shayxli Iroq "sotsialistik lager, xususan Sovet Ittifoqi va Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi bilan" yaqin aloqalarni o'rnatishga intilishini e'lon qildi. Noyabr oyi oxiriga kelib, AQShning Beyrutdagi elchixonasi Iroq ko'plab chap va kommunistik dissidentlarni ozod qilgani haqida xabar berdi, garchi "hech qanday ko'rsatma yo'q edi ... [ularga] rejimda katta rol berildi". Yaqinda Arif hukumati Sovetlar bilan yirik neft bitimini imzolaganligi sababli, Baas partiyasining Moskva bilan munosabatlarni yaxshilashga qaratilgan tezkor urinishlari AQSh siyosatchilari uchun to'liq zarba emas edi, ammo ular "tez orada paydo bo'ladigan strategik ittifoqni ko'rib chiqdilar. . "^[76]

1970

The Richard M. Nikson qachon tashqi ma'muriyat tashqi siyosiy inqirozga duch keldi Iroq 9 iroqlik yahudiyni ommaviy ravishda qatl etdi 1969 yil yanvar oyi oxirida uydirma josuslik ayblovlari bilan.^[77][78] Nikson ma'muriyati dastlab Iroq bilan yaqin aloqada bo'lgan amerikalik ittifoqchilarni, masalan Frantsiya, Ispaniya va Hindiston - hukumatga bosim o'tkazish uchun, ammo Iroq rasmiylari "noaniq so'zlar bilan [Iroq] ichki ishlaridan chetda qolish uchun" javob berishdi. AQSh BMT Bosh kotibini ham undadi U Thant aralashish uchun, lekin u Bag'dod qaroriga ta'sir o'tkaza olmadi. Niksonning davlat kotibi, Uilyam P. Rojers, AQShning BMTdagi elchisi bo'lib, qatllarni "dunyo vijdoniga qarshi" deb qoraladi Charlz Yost Iroqning xatti-harakatlari "hissiyotlarni uyg'otish va Yaqin Sharqda gumon va dushmanlikning juda portlovchi muhitini kuchaytirish uchun" ishlab chiqilganligini aytib, bu masalani BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashiga olib bordi.^[79] 1968 yil boshida Buyuk Britaniya o'z kuchlarini "Suvayshning sharqidan", shu jumladan Fors ko'rfazi mintaqasidan olib chiqib ketish niyati haqida e'lon qilgan edi, shu bilan AQSh rasmiylarini xavotirga solib, Jonson ma'muriyatini "ikki ustunli siyosat" deb nomlangan narsani shakllantirishga undadi. AQSh Eronni qo'llab-quvvatlaydi va Saudiya Arabistoni Fors ko'rfazi barqarorligini saqlashga qaratilgan harakatlarida. Nikson ma'muriyati oxir-oqibat Niksonning eski do'sti Shoh boshqargan Eronni barpo etishga e'tibor qaratib, ushbu siyosatni qayta ko'rib chiqadi. Muhammad Rizo Pahlaviy (bundan keyin "Shoh" deb yuritiladi), hukmron mintaqaviy kuch sifatida.^[80][81] Shoh Iroqdagi Baas hukumatiga ishonmas edi, u "to'dalar va qotillar to'dasi" deb hisoblagan.^[82] 1969 yil yanvar oyida Iroqning provokatsion harakatlaridan so'ng, Shoh Iroqni "jazolash" ga va ehtimol Eronning suverenitetini qisman qo'lga kiritishga intildi. Shatt al-Arab suv yo'li - 1937 yilgi shartnoma Iroq ustidan deyarli to'liq nazorat o'rnatgan - bir qator majburlash choralari orqali: Mart oyining boshida u Eronning kurd ittifoqchilariga Kirkuk va Musul atrofidagi IPC inshootlariga hujum qilib, Iroqqa millionlab dollar zarar etkazdi; aprel oyida u 1937 yilgi shartnomani bir tomonlama bekor qildi; va 1970 yil yanvar oyida u Iroq hukumatiga qarshi muvaffaqiyatsiz to'ntarish tashabbusiga homiylik qildi.^[83] Shoh Iroq armiyasining aksariyati Kurdistonda joylashganligini bilar edi - Iroqda qo'shimcha uchta Iroq brigadasi joylashgan bo'lsa-da, shuning uchun Iroq harbiy qasos olishga qodir emas edi, ammo u "imtiyozlar evaziga kurdlarga etkazib berishni to'xtatishni" taklif qildi. Shatt "degan taklifni Iroq rad etdi.^[84]

Shohning agressiv harakatlari Iroqni Kurdlar urushini tugatishga intilishga ishontirdi. 1969 yil dekabr oyi oxirida al-Bakr o'z o'rinbosarini yubordi, Saddam Xuseyn, kurdlar etakchisi bilan bevosita muzokara olib borish Mustafo Barzani va uning yaqin yordamchisi Dr. Mahmud Usmon. Shoh ushbu muzokaralar to'g'risida xabar topganidan g'azablandi va Iroq hukumatiga qarshi to'ntarishni homiylik qildi, bu 1970 yil 20-dan 21-yanvarga o'tar kechasi rejalashtirilgan edi. Ammo Iroq xavfsizlik kuchlarida "uchrashuvlar va intervyularning aksariyati haqida to'liq yozuvlar bor edi. sodir bo'ldi, "fitnani buzish, Eronning Iroqdagi elchisini chiqarib yuborish va" kamida 33 fitna "ni 23 yanvargacha qatl etish.^[85] 24 yanvarda Iroq Kurd muxtoriyatini qo'llab-quvvatlashini e'lon qildi va 11 martda Saddam va Barzani Iroqning ikki tomonlama xarakterini tan olish to'g'risida kelishuvga erishdilar ("Mart kelishuvi" deb nomlanishdi) ... [va] 1974 yil martga qadar amalga oshirilishi kerak bo'lgan Kurdistonning o'zini o'zi boshqarish mintaqasi ", garchi AQSh rasmiylari kelishuv majburiy ekanligiga shubha bilan qarashgan.^[86]

Iroq fraktsiyalari koalitsiyasi, jumladan Baas partiyasining kurd muxoliflari ishtirok etgan 1970 yildagi muvaffaqiyatsiz to'ntarish tashabbusida Amerikaning ishtirok etgani haqida da'volar mavjud edi. Edmund Gharib 1969 yil avgust oyida Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi kurdlarga Iroq hukumatini ag'darishga yordam berish to'g'risida kelishuvga erishgan deb da'vo qilmoqda, ammo bu da'voni tasdiqlovchi dalillar kam bo'lsa ham, 1969 yilda Iroq va Suriyadagi operatsiyalar uchun mas'ul bo'lgan Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi xodimi "AQShning bu bilan aloqadorligini rad etdi Kurdlar 1972 yilgacha. " Davlat departamentiga fitna to'g'risida Iroqlik tadbirkor Loufti Obeydiy 15 avgust kuni xabar bergan, ammo yordam berishdan qat'iy bosh tortgan.^[87] Iroqda surgun qilingan Sa'ad Jabr 8-dekabr kuni AQShning Bayrutdagi elchixonasi rasmiylari bilan to'ntarish rejasini muhokama qildi; embassy officials reiterated that the U.S. could not involve itself in the conspiracy, although on December 10 the State Department authorized the embassy to tell Jabr "we would be prepared to consider prompt resumption of diplomatic relations and would certainly be disposed to cooperate within the limits of existing legislation and our overall policy" if the "new government prove[d] to be moderate and friendly."^[88][89][90] In late August 1970, the CIA was informed of another plot to overthrow the Ba'athist government, which was being organized by Shia muxoliflar.^[91][92]

1972–1975

Aleksey Kosygin (chapda) va Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr 1972 yilda Iroq-Sovet do'stlik va hamkorlik shartnomasini imzoladi

In the aftermath of the March Accord, Iranian and Israeli officials tried to persuade the Nixon administration that the agreement was part of a Soviet plot to free up Iraq's military for aggression against Iran and Israel, but U.S. officials refuted these claims by noting that Iraq had resumed purging ICP members on March 23, 1970, and that Saddam was met with a "chilly" reception during his visit to Moscow on August 4–12, during which he requested deferment on Iraq's considerable foreign debt.^[93] Iraqi–Soviet relations improved rapidly in late 1971 in response to the Soviet Union's deteriorating alliance with Egyptian leader Anvar al-Sadod, who succeeded Nasser following the latter's death on September 28, 1970.^[94] However, even after Iraq signed a secret arms deal with the Soviets in September 1971, which was finalized during Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko 's December trip to Baghdad and "brought the total of Soviet military aid to Iraq to above the $750 million level," the State Department remained skeptical that Iraq posed any threat to Iran.^[95][96] On April 9, 1972, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin signed "a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation" with al-Bakr, but U.S. officials were not "outwardly perturbed" by this development, because, according to the NSC staff, it was not "surprising or sudden but rather a culmination of existing relationships."^[97][98]

It has been suggested that Nixon was initially preoccupied with pursuing his policy of détente with the Soviet Union and with the May 1972 Moscow Summit, but later sought to assuage the Shah's concerns about Iraq during his May 30–31 trip to Tehran. In a May 31 meeting with the Shah, Nixon vowed that the U.S. "would not let down [its] friends," promising to provide Iran with sophisticated weapons ("including F-14lar va F-15lar ") to counter the Soviet Union's agreement to sell Iraq Mig-23 samolyotlar. According to Nixon's National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State, Genri Kissincer, and numerous scholars, Nixon also agreed to a covert operation to assist Barzani's Kurdish rebels while in Tehran. (Barzani had resumed his alliance with Iran and Israel after a December 1970 assassination attempt on his son Idris, which he held the Ba'ath Party responsible for.) There is, however, no official record that this occurred, with the only record that Nixon approved the operation being an August 1 memo from Kissinger to 40 qo'mita principals.^[99] It is therefore plausible that two additional factors ultimately convinced Nixon to approve the operation, despite widespread opposition to supporting the Kurds within the State Department and CIA: Iraq's complete nationalization of the IPC on June 1, after Iraq began exporting oil from North Rumaila to the Soviet Union in April; and the July 18 withdrawal of 15,000 Soviet military personnel from Egypt, which Kissinger's deputy, General Aleksandr Xeyg, Jr., predicted on July 28 "will probably result in more intense Soviet efforts in Iraq."^[100]

From October 1972 until the abrupt end of the Kurdish intervention after March 1975, the CIA "provided the Kurds with nearly $20 million in assistance," including 1,250 tons of non-attributable weaponry.^[101] The main goal of U.S. policy-makers was to increase the Kurds's ability to negotiate a reasonable autonomy agreement with the government of Iraq.^[102] To justify the operation, U.S. officials cited Iraq's support for xalqaro terrorizm and its repeated threats against neighboring states, including Iran (where Iraq supported Baluchi and Arab separatists against the Shah) and Kuwait (Iraq launched an unprovoked attack on a Kuwaiti border post and claimed the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah va Bubiyan in May 1973), with Haig remarking: "There can be no doubt that it is in the interest of ourselves, our allies, and other friendly governments in the area to see the Ba'thi regime in Iraq kept off balance and if possible overthrown."^[103][104] After Nixon's resignation in August 1974, President Jerald Ford was briefed about the Kurdish intervention on a "need-to-know" basis—leaving Kissinger, former CIA director and ambassador to Iran Richard Xelms, Arthur Callahan (chief of the CIA Station in Tehran), and Callahan's deputy—to actually implement the U.S. policy.^[105] To prevent leaks, the State Department was not informed of the operation.^[106] In fact, the State Department had dispatched Arthur Lowrie to establish a U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad shortly prior to Nixon's decision to support the Kurds; the Interests Section officially opened on October 1, 1972.^[107] Lowrie repeatedly warned that there was a power struggle between moderates and extremists within the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, and that the Shah's aggressive posture towards Iraq, combined with the Ba'ath Party's belief that the U.S. sought to overthrow it, empowered the extremists while forcing Iraq to turn towards the Soviet Union for arms resupply.^[108] Helms and the CIA rejected Lowrie's analysis and his proposal that the U.S. try to improve relations with Iraq, with Helms stating "[We] are frankly skeptical that in practice we could help the moderates without building up our extremist enemies." The CIA went further, producing a report that cautioned "the level of political violence is very high ... This is not a happy situation nor a happy government for the US to try to do business with."^[109][110] After a failed coup attempt on June 30, 1973, Saddam consolidated control over Iraq and made a number of positive gestures towards the U.S. and the West, such as refusing to participate in the Saudi-led oil embargo following the Yom Kippur urushi, but these actions were largely ignored in Washington.^[111]

On March 11, 1974, the Iraqi government gave Barzani 15 days to accept a new autonomy law, which "fell far short of what the regime had promised the Kurds in 1970, including long-standing demands like a proportional share of oil revenue and the inclusion of the oil-rich and culturally significant city of Kirkuk into the autonomous region" and "gave the regime a veto over any Kurdish legislation."^[112] Barzani allowed the deadline to lapse, triggering the outbreak of the Ikkinchi Iroq-Kurd urushi aprel oyida.^[113] Although the CIA had stockpiled "900,000 pounds of non-attributable small arms and ammunition" to prepare for this contingency, the Kurds were in a weak position due to their lack of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. Moreover, Soviet advisers contributed to a change in Iraq's tactics that decisively altered the trajectory of the war, allowing the Iraqi army to finally achieve steady gains against the Kurds where it had failed in the past.^[114] To prevent a collapse of the Kurdish resistance, Kissinger negotiated a deal with Israel to provide the Kurds with $28 million in heavy weaponry, but all assistance came to a sudden end shortly after the Shah and Saddam embraced one another at a press conference in Algiers on March 6, 1975: Saddam had agreed to a concession on the border of the Shatt al-Arab waterway in return for an end to "all subversive infiltration from either side."^[115][116] The increasingly overt Iranian involvement necessary to stave off a Kurdish defeat—including the presence of Iranian soldiers dressed in Kurdish uniforms, who participated in combat for as long as 10 days at a time, thus raising the possibility that further escalation might lead to "open war" between Iran and Iraq—combined with assurances from Arab leaders including Sadat, King Hussein, and Jazoir "s Xouari Bumedieni that "Saddam Hussein was ready to pull Iraq out of [the] Soviet orbit if Iran would take away the [Kurdish revolt] which was forcing them into the arms of the Soviets"—also helped convince the Shah that an accommodation with Iraq was necessary and desirable.^[117][118] In the aftermath, over 100,000 Kurds fled to Iran, while the Iraqi government brutally consolidated its control over Iraqi Kurdistan—destroying as many as 1,400 villages by 1978, imprisoning 600,000 Kurds in resettlement camps, and ultimately waging a campaign of genocide against the Kurds 1988 yilda.^[119]

A leaked Congressional investigation boshchiligidagi Otis Pike and a February 4, 1976 The New York Times tomonidan yozilgan maqola Uilyam Safire^[120] have heavily influenced subsequent scholarship regarding the conduct of the Kurdish intervention.^[121] As a result, there is a widespread belief that U.S. officials prodded Barzani into rejecting the Iraqi government's initial offer of autonomy, cynically agreed to "sell out" the Kurds at the Shah's behest, refused to provide any humanitarian assistance for Kurdish refugees, and failed to respond to "a heartbreaking letter" Barzani sent Kissinger on March 10, 1975, in which he stated: "Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way with silence from everyone."^[122] In fact, declassified documents reveal that U.S. officials warned Barzani against his proposal to declare autonomy unilaterally, as they knew doing so would provoke the Iraqi government, even as the goal of permanently dividing Iraq and maintaining an autonomous Kurdish government would require massive resources irreconcilable with ishonarli inkor etish.^[123][124] However, Barzani could never have accepted Iraq's "watered-down autonomy law," as it was inconsistent with the terms of the March Accord and ignored outstanding Kurdish demands.^[125] The Shah's "sell-out" blindsided American and Israeli officials, as well as his own advisers; Kissinger had personally lobbied the Shah against reaching any agreement with Iraq, and questioned the logic of "trad[ing] a valuable coercive asset ... for a modest border concession."^[126] The U.S. provided $1 million in aid to Kurdish refugees—and, on March 17, Kissinger responded to Barzani's letter: "We can understand that the difficult decisions which the Kurdish people now face are a cause of deep anguish for them. We have great admiration for the courage and dignity with which those people have confronted many trials, and our prayers are with them."^[127][128] With neither Iran nor kurka willing to allow their territory to be used to support the Kurds, the U.S. and Israel were forced to abandon their assistance.^[129] According to Gibson, "The Pike Report ignored inconvenient truths; misattributed quotes; falsely accused the United States of not providing the Kurds with any humanitarian assistance; and, finally, claimed that Kissinger had not responded to Barzani's tragic plea, when in fact he had ... This was not the 'textbook case of betrayal and skulduggery' that the Pike Report had led many people to believe."^[102][130] Gibson concedes that U.S. involvement was self-serving and "advanced America's Cold War interests, though not entirely at the expense of the Kurds."^[131] Joost Hiltermann offers a contrasting analysis: "The exoneration shouldn't go unqualified. Kissinger cared for the Kurds only to the extent that they could be used in the pursuit of US interests, and he would surely have abandoned them sooner or later."^[132]

1979

Longtime CIA officer George Cave met with the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Abbos Amir-Entezam va tashqi ishlar vaziri Ibrohim Yazdi on October 15, 1979 as part of an intelligence-sharing liaison approved by Davlat kotibining Yaqin Sharq ishlari bo'yicha yordamchisi Garold X. Sonders; this preceded the initiation of the Eron garovidagi inqiroz on November 4. Cave told Mark J. Gasiorovskiy that he "warned Iran's leaders of Iraqi invasion preparations and told them how they could monitor these preparations and thus take steps to counter them." However, while Entezam and Yazdi corroborated Cave's account of the briefing, neither man seems to have shared this information with other Iranian officials, perhaps out of fear that their relationship with a CIA officer would be misconstrued. Owing largely to extensive post–inqilobiy purges of its armed forces, Iran was in fact grossly unprepared for Iroqning 1980 yil sentyabr oyida Eronga bostirib kirishi. The veracity of the underlying intelligence supporting Cave's warning, and its implications with regard to allegations that the U.S. gave Saddam a "green-light" to invade Iran, have been debated. Gasiorowski contended that "If Iran's leaders had acted on the information provided in Cave's briefings ... the brutal eight–year [Eron-Iroq urushi ] hech qachon bo'lmasligi mumkin. "^{[133][134][135]}

1982

On July 27, 1982, at the direction of the Reygan ma'muriyati 's NSC, Tomas Tvetten arrived in Baghdad to share CIA satellite imagery on Iranian troop movements with the Iraqi Muxabarat. This was "the first U.S. provision of intelligence to Iraq" during the Iran–Iraq War, and sparked a short-lived debate over whether Iraq would tolerate a CIA presence in the country: Mukhabarat head Barzan Tikriti told Twetton to "get the hell out of Iraq," but Iraqi military intelligence—"having already drooled over it and having said repeatedly how valuable it was"—subsequently informed Twetton "we'll continue to look at your information, and we'll assess whether it is of use to us in any way." This intelligence may have played a crucial role in blocking the Iranian invasion of Iraq in 1982. According to Twetton: "One of our officers met one of the Iraqi military intelligence officers in Kurdistan about three years ago. He said that the intelligence we provided to them made all the difference. It prevented an Iraqi collapse."^[136]

1984

In 1984, the CIA "established a formal intelligence liaison" with the Mukhabarat, which provided the CIA with information on terrorist groups including the Abu Nidal tashkiloti. However, there was a delay between the CIA's provision of intelligence to the Mukhabarat and that intelligence being received and analyzed by the Iraqi military, which resulted in much of it not being actionable. Therefore, the CIA eventually began working directly with Iraqi military intelligence, thereby negating its leverage on Iraqi-sponsored terrorism.^[137]

1991

The CIA provided intelligence support to the U.S. military in "Cho'l qalqoni" operatsiyasi va "Cho'l bo'roni" operatsiyasi.^[138]

Mohammed Abdullah Shawani's "saga illustrates a little-understood part of the Iraq story—the CIA's attempt to mobilize Iraqi officers [against Hussein's regime]. At the center was Shahwani, a Sunniy dan Mosul and a charismatic commander who made his reputation in 1984 with a helicopter assault on Iranian troops atop a mountain in Iraqi Kurdistan. His popularity made him dangerous to Saddam Hussein, and he was arrested and interrogated in 1989. He fled the country in May 1990, just before Iraq invaded Kuwait."^[139] In 1991, Shahwani began efforts to organize a military coup utilizing former members of the special forces, which Hussein had disbanded.^[139]

1992

A 1992 CIA map of southeastern Iraq with oilfields, airfields, and other strategic locations identified.

After the Gulf War, CIA took steps to correct the shortcomings identified during the Gulf War and improve its support to the US military, beginning improved communications with major US military commands. In 1992, CIA created the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to enhance cooperation and increase information flow between the CIA and the military. OMA is subordinate to the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support and is jointly staffed by CIA officers from all directorates and military personnel from all the services.^[138]

According to former U.S. intelligence officials interviewed by The New York Times, the CIA indirectly supported a bomb and sabotage campaign between 1992 and 1995 in Iraq conducted by the Iroq milliy kelishuvi insurgents, led by Iyad Allawi. The campaign had no apparent effect in toppling Saddam Hussein's rule.^[140]

According to former CIA officer Robert Baer, various rebel groups were attempting to oust Hussein at the time. No public records of the CIA campaign are known to exist, and former U.S. officials said their recollections were in many cases sketchy, and in some cases contradictory. "But whether the bombings actually killed any civilians could not be confirmed because, as a former CIA official said, the United States had no significant intelligence sources in Iraq then." In 1996, Amneh al-Khadami, who described himself as the chief bomb maker for the Iraqi National Accord, recorded a videotape in which he talked of the bombing campaign and complained that he was being shortchanged money and supplies. Two former intelligence officers confirmed the existence of the videotape. Mr. Khadami said that "we blew up a car, and we were supposed to get $2,000" but got only $1,000, as reported in 1997 by the British newspaper Mustaqil, which had obtained a copy of the videotape.^[140] The campaign was directed by CIA asset Dr. Iyad Allawi,^[141] later installed as interim prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003.

1993

Funding Kurdish organizations,^[142] the CIA worked to create a new Kurdish-led intelligence agency in Iraq called Asayesh (Kurdcha for "security").^[143]

1994

After Saddam had been deposed in 2003, U.S. and Iraqi sources provided an account of the unsuccessful strategy of deposing Saddam by a coup d'état during the 1990s, an effort reportedly known within CIA by the cryptonym "DBACHILLES".^[144]

Ga binoan Washington Post,^[145]the CIA appointed a new head of its Near East Division, Stephen Richter, who assumed that large parts of the Iraqi army might support a coup. A team met with Gen. Mohammed Abdullah Shawani,^[139] a former commander of Iraqi Special Forces, and a Turkman from Mosul. As the CIA was drafting its plans, the British encouraged the agency to contact an experienced Iraqi exile named Ayad Alawi, who headed a network of current and former Iraqi military officers and Ba'ath Party operatives known as wifaq, the Arabic word for "trust."

1996

The CIA was involved in the failed 1996 coup against Saddam Hussein.

Chalabi was convinced that the military-coup plan had been compromised and traveled to Washington in March 1996 to see the new CIA director, Jon Deutch va uning o'rinbosari, Jorj Tenet. He told them the Iraqis had captured an Egyptian courier who was carrying an Inmarsat satellite phone to Shawani's sons in Baghdad. When the CIA officials seemed unconvinced, Chalabi then went to his friend Richard Perle. Perle is said to have called Tenet and urged that an outside committee review the Iraq situation.

But the coup planning went ahead. DBACHILLES succeeded in reaching a number of senior Iraqi military officers, but was compromised and collapsed in June 1996. The Iraqis began arresting the coup plotters on June 26. At least 200 officers were seized and more than 80 were executed, including Shawani's sons. Top CIA officials reportedly blamed Chalabi for exposing the plot, and the recrimination has persisted ever since.

As a follow-on to the coup plotting, in the run-up to, and during the invasion, both Alawi and Shawani played important roles in the US/UK effort to encourage Iraqi officers to surrender or defect. It did not quite work out that way. The Iraqi military did not defect or surrender, they just went home.^[144]

2002

The betaraflik ushbu maqolaning bahsli. Tegishli munozarani munozara sahifasi. Iltimos, ushbu xabarni o'chirmang buning uchun shartlar bajariladi. (2017 yil sentyabr) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling)

Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Maxsus faoliyat bo'limi paramilitary teams were the first teams in Iraq arriving in July 2002. Once on the ground they prepared the battle space for the subsequent arrival of AQSh harbiylari kuchlar. SAD teams then combined with AQSh armiyasining maxsus kuchlari (on a team called the Northern Iraq Liaison Element or NILE).^[146] This team organized the Kurdcha Peshmerga for the subsequent US-led invasion. They combined to defeat Ansor al-Islom, ning ittifoqchisi Al-Qoida. If this battle had not been as successful as it was,^{[iqtibos kerak ]} there would have been a considerable hostile force behind the US/Kurdish force in the subsequent assault on Saddam's Army. The US side was carried out by Paramilitary Operations Officers from SAD/SOG and the Army's 10-maxsus kuchlar guruhi.^{[146][147][148]}

SAD teams also conducted high risk special reconnaissance missions behind Iraqi lines to identify senior leadership targets. These missions led to the initial strikes against Saddam Xuseyn va uning asosiy generallari. Although the initial strike against Hussein was unsuccessful in killing the dictator, it was successful in effectively ending his ability to command and control his forces. Other strikes against key generals were successful and significantly degraded the command's ability to react to and maneuver against the US-led invasion force.^[146][149]

NATO member Turkey refused to allow its territory to be used by the US Army's 4th Infantry Division for the invasion. As a result, the SAD, US Army Special Forces joint teams and the Kurdish Peshmerga were the entire northern force against Saddam's Army during the invasion. Their efforts kept the 1st and 5th Corps of the Iroq armiyasi in place to defend against the Kurds rather than their moving to contest the coalition force coming from the south. This combined US Special Operations and Kurdish force soundly defeated Saddam's Army, a major military success, similar to the victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan.^[146] Four members of the SAD/SOG team received the CIA's rare Intelligence Star for their "heroic actions".^[147]

2003

U.S. intelligence on Iraqi ommaviy qirg'in qurollari (WMD) had been the focus of intense scrutiny in the U.S. Successive chronological entries deal with the resistance in Iraq.

Richard Kerr, a 32-year CIA veteran who served three years as deputy director for intelligence, was commissioned to lead a review of agency analysis of Iraqi WMD claims, and produced a series of reports, one of which is unclassified.^[150] Kerr told journalist Robert Dreyfuss that CIA analysts felt intimidated by the Bush administration, saying, "A lot of analysts believed that they were being pressured to come to certain conclusions … . I talked to a lot of people who said, 'There was a lot of repetitive questioning. We were being asked to justify what we were saying again and again.' There were certainly people who felt they were being pushed beyond the evidence they had."^[151] In a January 26, 2006 interview, Kerr acknowledged this had resulted in open antagonism between some in the CIA and the Bush White House, saying, "There have been more leaks and discussions outside what I would consider to be the appropriate level than I've ever seen before. And I think that lack of discipline is a real problem. I don't think an intelligence organization can kind of take up arms against politics, or a policy-maker. I think that will not work, and it won't stand."^[152]

Evidence against Iraq having a WMD program included information from CIA officer Valeri Plame, who, in a July 14, 2003 Washington Post newspaper column by Robert Novak, was identified publicly as "an agency operative on weapons of mass destruction." Plame's husband, Ambassador Jozef C. Uilson IV had been sent by CIA to the African nation of Niger to investigate claims that Iraq intended to purchase uranium yellowcake from that country, which was incorporated in President George W. Bush's 2003 yil Ittifoq davlati manzili to support waging a preventive war against Iraq. Qarang Iraq 2007 investigations for the aftermath of this claims and disclosures about them.

Kennet Pollak, a former National Security Council expert on Iraq, who generally supported the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein,^[153] aytdi Seymur Xers that what the Bush administration did was

"... dismantle the existing filtering process that for fifty years had been preventing the policymakers from getting bad information. They created pechkalar to get the information they wanted directly to the top leadership.... They always had information to back up their public claims, but it was often very bad information," Pollack said.^[154]

Some of the information used to justify the U.S. invasion of Iraq came from a discredited informant codenamed "Curveball" by CIA, who falsely claimed that he had worked as a chemical engineer at a plant that manufactured mobile biological weapon laboratories as part of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. Despite warnings to CIA from the Germaniya Federal razvedka xizmati regarding the authenticity of his claims, they were incorporated into President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address and Kolin Pauell 's subsequent presentation to the UN Security Council.^[155][156]

Saddam Husaynni qo'lga olish

The mission that captured Saddam Hussein was called ""Qizil tong" operatsiyasi ". It was planned and carried out by the JSOC's Delta Force and SAD/SOG teams (together called Tezkor guruh 121 ). The operation eventually included around 600 soldiers from the 1st Brigade of the 4-piyoda diviziyasi.^[157][158] Special operations troops probably numbered around 40. Much of the publicity and credit for the capture went to the 4th Infantry Division soldiers, but CIA and JSOC were the driving force. "Task Force 121 were actually the ones who pulled Saddam out of the hole" said Robert Andrews, former deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. "They can't be denied a role anymore."^[157]

2004

In 2004, the lack of finding WMD, the continuing armed resistance against the U.S. military occupation of Iraq, and the widely perceived need for a muntazam ravishda ko'rib chiqish of the respective roles of the CIA, the FBI, and the Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi.

On July 9, 2004, the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq ning Senatning razvedka qo'mitasi reported that the CIA exaggerated the alleged danger presented by ommaviy qirg'in qurollari yilda Iroq, accusation that largely unsupported by the available intelligence.^[159]

New Iraqi intelligence forms

2004 yil fevral oyida,^[139] the new Iraqi National Intelligence Service, or INIS, was established in February 2004 "as a nonsectarian force that would recruit its officers and agents from all of Iraq's religious communities. Its chief, Gen. Mohammed Shahwani, is a Sunni from Mosul. He is married to a Shiite and his deputy is a Kurd. Shahwani, a commander of Iraqi special forces during the Iran–Iraq War, has worked closely with the CIA for more than a decade – first in trying to topple Saddam Hussein, then in trying to build an effective intelligence organization."

There is a competing intelligence service "called the Ministry of Security, was created last year under the direction of Sheerwan al-Waeli. He is a former colonel in the Iraqi army who served in Nasiriyah under the old regime. He is said to have received training in Iran and to be maintaining regular liaison with Iranian and Syrian intelligence officers in Baghdad. His service, like Shahwani's organization, has about 5,000 officers."

The CIA had hoped that Shahwani's INIS could be an effective national force and a deterrent to Iranian meddling. To mount effective operations against the Iranians, Shahwani recruited the chief of the Iran branch of the Saddam Hussein-era Mukhabarat. That made the Iranians and their Shiite allies nervous.

Shahwani's operatives discovered in 2004 that the Iranians had a hit list, drawn from an old Defense Ministry payroll document that identified the names and home addresses of senior officers who served under the former regime. Shahwani himself was among those targeted for assassination by the Iranians. To date, about 140 officers in the INIS have been killed.^[139]

Though many in Maliki's government regard Shahwani with suspicion, his supporters say he has tried to remain independent of the sectarian battles in Iraq. He has provided intelligence that has led to the capture of several senior al-Qaeda operatives, according to U.S. sources, as well as regular intelligence about the Sunni insurgency. Several months ago, Shahwani informed Maliki of an assassination plot by a bodyguard who secretly worked for Shiite militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr. Shahwani's service uncovered a similar plot to assassinate Iraq's deputy prime minister, Barham Salih, a Kurd.

Shahwani's coup plans suffered a setback in June 1996, when the Mukhabarat killed 85 of his operatives, including three of his sons. But he continued plotting over the next seven years, and on the eve of the American invasion in March 2003, Shahwani and his CIA supporters were still hoping to organize an uprising among the Iraqi military. Shahwani's secret Iraqi network was known as "77 Alpha," and later as "the Scorpions."

The Pentagon was wary of the Iraqi uprising plan, so it was shelved, but Shahwani encouraged his network in the Iraqi military not to fight—in the expectation that the soldiers would be well treated after the American victory. Then came the disastrous decision in May 2003 by L. Pol Bremer va Koalitsiya vaqtinchalik hokimiyati to disband the Iraqi military and cut off its pay. The rest, as they say, is history.

Instead of the one good intelligence service it needs, Iraq today has two—one pro-Iranian, the other anti-Iranian. That's a measure of where the country is: caught between feuding sects and feuding neighbors, with a superpower ally that can't seem to help its friends or stop its enemies.^[139]

Abu Graib

Also in 2004, reports of Abu Graib qiynoqqa solinishi va mahbuslarga nisbatan zo'ravonlik yuzaga chiqdi. In the subsequent investigation by MG Antonio Taguba, he stated "I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses." OGA is a common euphemism for the CIA. Further, "The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees" (6–8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law."^[160]

Da Abu Graib qamoqxonasi, a prisoner named Manadel al-Jamadiy vafot etdi.^[161]

2006

Tayler Drumheller, a 26-year CIA veteran and former head of covert operations in Europe, told CBS News 60 daqiqa correspondent Ed Bradley in an April 23, 2006 interview that there was widespread disbelief within the agency about the Bush administration's public claims regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. According to Drumheller, the CIA had penetrated Saddam Hussein's inner circle in the fall of 2002, and this high-level source told CIA "they had no active weapons of mass destruction program." Asked by Bradley about the apparent contradiction with Bush administration statements regarding Iraqi WMDs at that time, Drumheller said, "The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming. And they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy."^[162]

2007

As of June 2007, "Shahwani is now in the United States. Unless he receives assurances of support from Maliki's government, he is likely to resign, which would plunge the INIS into turmoil and could bring about its collapse.^[139]

2007 investigations

The disclosure of Mrs. Wilson's then-still-classified covert CIA identity as "Valerie Plame" led to a grand jury investigation and the subsequent indictment and conviction of Vice President Cheyni sobiq shtab boshlig'i, Lyuis Libbi, on charges of perjury, obstruction of justice, and yolg'on bayonotlar berish to federal investigators.^[163]

"The Surge"

CIA paramilitary units continued to team up with the JSOC in Iraq and in 2007 the combination created a lethal force many credit with having a major impact in the success of "the Surge ". They did this by killing or capturing many of the key al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq.^[164][165] A CBS 60 daqiqa intervyu, Pulitser mukofoti - yutuqli jurnalist Bob Vudvord described a new special operations capability that allowed for this success. This capability was developed by the joint teams of CIA and JSOC.^[166] Several senior U.S. officials stated that the "joint efforts of JSOC and CIA paramilitary units was the most significant contributor to the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq".^[164][167]

On October 26, 2008, SAD/SOG and JSOC conducted an operation in Syria targeting the "foreign fighter logistika tarmog'i " bringing al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq (See 2008 yil Abu Kamol bosqini ).^[168] Bu haqda AQSh manbasi ma'lum qildi CBS News bu "xorijiy jangchilarning etakchisi, an al-Qoida officer, was the target of Sunday's cross-border raid." He said the attack was successful, but did not say whether or not the al-Qaeda officer was killed.^[169] Fox News later reported that Abu Ghadiya, "al-Qa'ida's senior coordinator operating in Syria", was killed in the attack.^[170] The New York Times reported that during the raid U.S. forces killed several armed males who "posed a threat".^[171]

Shuningdek qarang

• Iroq - AQSh munosabatlari
• Qo'rquv amaliyoti

Adabiyotlar

Bibliografiya

• Gibson, Bryan R. (2015). Sotildi? AQSh tashqi siyosati, Iroq, kurdlar va sovuq urush. Palgrave Makmillan. ISBN  978-1-137-48711-7.CS1 maint: ref = harv (havola)
• Citino, Natan J. (2017). "Xalq sudi". Arab kelajagini tasavvur qilish: AQSh-Arab munosabatlaridagi modernizatsiya, 1945–1967. Kembrij universiteti matbuoti. ISBN  9781108107556.CS1 maint: ref = harv (havola)

Qo'shimcha o'qish

• Vulf-Xannikutt, Brendon (2011 yil mart). "Imtiyozli rejimning oxiri: Iroqdagi neft va Amerika kuchi, 1958-1972".
• Gibson, Bryan R. (2013 yil aprel). "AQSh tashqi siyosati, Iroq va sovuq urush 1958-1975" (PDF).