Yaponiya-Janubiy Koreya savdo mojarosi - Japan–South Korea trade dispute

2019–2020 yillarda Yaponiya - Janubiy Koreya savdo mojarosi
Qismi Yaponiya - Janubiy Koreya munosabatlari va Yaponiya-Koreya mojarolari

Do'konda "Yaponiyani boykot qilish" stikeri Mokpo, Janubiy Koreya
Sana2019 yil 1 iyul - hozirgacha (1 yil, 5 oy va 3 kun)
Manzil
Yaponiya va Janubiy Koreya
Holat

Davom etayotgan

  • Yaponiya va Janubiy Koreya bir-birini "Oq ro'yxat" dan olib tashlashmoqda.[1]
Savdo mojarosiga aloqador tomonlar

 Janubiy Koreya

 Yaponiya

Yaponiya-Janubiy Koreya savdo mojarosi,
Yaponiya - Janubiy Koreya iqtisodiy urushi (Janubiy Koreyada),
Yaponiya iqtisodiy qasos (Janubiy Koreyada)
Yaponcha ism
Kanji日韓 貿易 紛争 yoki 日韓 対 立
Xiraganaっ か ん ぼ う き ふ ん そ う yoki
っ か ん た い り つ
Koreyscha ism
Hangul
Khon일 무역 분쟁
Khon일 경제 전쟁
일본 경제 보복
Xanja

The Yaponiya-Janubiy Koreya savdo mojarosi davom etmoqda iqtisodiy ziddiyat o'rtasida assimetrik xususiyatga ega Yaponiya va Janubiy Koreya, dunyodagi uchinchi va o'ninchi (2019 yilda o'n birinchi) eng yirik milliy iqtisodiyot. Bundan tashqari, sifatida tanilgan Yaponiya - Janubiy Koreyadagi iqtisodiy urush Koreya tomonida.[2][3]

Yaponiya hukumati tomonidan yuqori texnologik materiallar bo'yicha eksport nazorati bo'yicha ziddiyatning sababi sifatida Janubiy Koreya hukumati eksport nazorati va strategik tovarlarning qayta sotilishini oldini olish bo'yicha qoidalarga rioya qilmaganligi va Yaponiya hukumatining eksport nazorati bo'yicha dialogni o'tkazish haqidagi talabini inobatga olmaganligi sababli keltirildi. uch yil davomida.[4] Biroq, Janubiy Koreya tomoniga bu qasos sifatida qabul qilindi Janubiy Koreyaning Oliy sudi kompensatsiya va keyingi qasos bilan bog'liq qarorlar qo'zg'atilgan Mun Chje In.[5][6]

Savdo mojarosi sezilarli darajada yomonlashishiga olib keldi Yaponiya - Janubiy Koreya munosabatlari ikki mamlakatdan beri eng past nuqtaga ularning diplomatik munosabatlarini normallashtirdi 1965 yilda.[7][8]

Fon

Asosiy maqola: Yaponiya-Koreya mojarolari
Qo'shimcha ma'lumotlar: Yaponiya - Janubiy Koreya munosabatlari, Yaponiya iqtisodiyoti, Janubiy Koreya iqtisodiyoti va Yaponiya hukmronligi ostidagi Koreya

Yaponiya va Janubiy Koreya dunyodagi eng yirik iqtisodiyotlar qatoriga kiradi, 3 va 11-o'rinlarni egallaydi mos ravishda YaIM bo'yicha. Xotira chiplarini ishlab chiqaruvchi dunyodagi eng yirik Janubiy Koreya va chip ishlab chiqarishda hal qiluvchi materiallarni etkazib beruvchi eng yirik Yaponiya shu paytgacha texnologik mahsulotlar uchun beshik bo'lib kelgan. smartfonlar va shaxsiy kompyuterlar.

Janubiy Koreyaning uyi Samsung Electronics va SK Hynix, birgalikda dunyodagi xotira chiplarining uchdan ikki qismini ishlab chiqaradigan kompaniyalar.[9] Yaponiyada 3 ta kompaniya (JSR korporatsiyasi, Shou Denko va Shin-Etsu kimyoviy ) shuningdek, Kanto Denka Kogyo kabi, dunyodagi 90% ishlab chiqaradi Ftorli polimid va Fotoresist, ikkalasi ham LCD va OLED displeylari uchun ishlatiladi va 70% Vodorod ftoridi, LSI, DRAM va NAND flesh xotirasini yaratish uchun ishlatiladi.[10][11] Ma'lumotlarga ko'ra, Janubiy Koreya florlangan polimidning 94 foizini, fotoresistlarning 92 foizini va vodorod ftoridining 44 foizini Yaponiyadan import qiladi. Koreya xalqaro savdo assotsiatsiyasi.[12][eslatma 1] Boshqa tomondan, Yaponiya ushbu uchta material bo'yicha Janubiy Koreyaga 22,5%, 11,6% va 85,9% darajasida eksportga bog'liq edi.[14]

Ikki mamlakat o'rtasida diplomatik munosabatlar 1965 yil dekabrda imzolanganidan so'ng o'rnatildi normalizatsiya shartnomasi o'sha yilning iyun oyida qachon Yaponiya Janubiy Koreyani yagona qonuniy hukumat deb tan oldi Koreya yarim oroli. Keyingi bir necha o'n yilliklar davomida aloqalar rivojlanib borar ekan, ikkala mamlakat ham ikki eng kuchli ittifoqchiga aylandi Qo'shma Shtatlar Osiyoda, ta'siriga qarshi turish uchun Xitoy, Rossiya va Shimoliy Koreya.[15] Biroq, ularning munosabatlariga ko'plab davom etayotgan nizolar salbiy ta'sir ko'rsatdi, masalan Liancourt qoyalaridagi nizo (nomi bilan tanilgan Dokdo koreys tilida va Takeshima yapon tilida) va imperator Yaponiyaning o'sha paytdagi mustamlaka Koreyadagi odamlarga nisbatan munosabatini turli xil talqin qilishgan.

MITI tomonidan Janubiy Koreyaning global eksport nazorati rejimiga a'zo bo'lishini qo'llab-quvvatlashi

Janubiy Koreya o'z eksportini boshqarish tizimini 1980-yillarda tashkil qila boshladi, qarama-qarshi bo'lgan ichki va xalqaro bosimlar uning to'liq tatbiq qilinmaganligini anglatadi.[16] 1990-yillarning boshlarida Janubiy Koreya hali ham uning a'zosi emas edi eksportni global boshqarish rejimi. Yapon Xalqaro savdo va sanoat vazirligi (MITI) boshqa a'zo mamlakatlarga yondashuvlarni amalga oshirdi va Janubiy Koreyaga eksport nazorati tizimini amalga oshirish bo'yicha o'z majburiyatlarini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun tashrif buyurdi. Natijada, Janubiy Koreya 1996 yilda eksport nazorati bo'yicha ko'p tomonlama rejimning a'zosi bo'lishi mumkin, raketalar bundan mustasno va ular Yaponiyaga shu paytgacha MITIning sa'y-harakatlari uchun minnatdorchilik bildirishgan. Aynan 2001 yilda Janubiy Koreya Yaponiyaning MITI tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlangan qo'shimcha sa'y-harakatlaridan so'ng raketalar bo'yicha a'zo bo'lishi mumkin edi. Bunday munosabatlar o'rnatildi METI, yapon tilidan keyin 2001 yil Markaziy hukumat islohoti, 2004 yilda maxsus imtiyozli choralar ko'rish uchun "oq mamlakat" sifatida alohida munosabatlarga ruxsat berish.[17][18]

Yilda Jahon Savdo Tashkiloti (JST), 21-modda bo'yicha "xavfsizlik istisnolari" to'g'risida kelishuv mavjud.[19] Xavfsizlik uchun eksport nazorati bundan mustasno ekanligi aniq ko'rib chiqildi.[20]

Kompensatsiya bo'yicha sud qarorlari

Ikki mamlakatning o'zaro munosabatlari keyinchalik 2018 yil oxirida, keyin pasayib ketdi Janubiy Koreyaning Oliy sudi va boshqa yuqori sudlar bir qator yapon kompaniyalariga, shu jumladan buyurtma bergan qaror qabul qildilar Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nachi-Fujikoshi va Nippon Steel, adolatsiz munosabatda bo'lgan va noqonuniy ravishda ishchi kuchi bilan ta'minlashga majbur qilingan Janubiy Koreyaliklarning oilalariga tovon puli to'lash Ikkinchi jahon urushi urush harakatlari, masalan Yaponiyada Mitsubishi kemasozlik zavodida va dastgohsozlik zavodida ish haqi to'lamasdan kemalar va samolyotlar qurish Nagoya 1944 yilda. Ushbu qarorlar Yaponiya hukumatining g'azabini qo'zg'atdi va bu masala ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi diplomatik munosabatlarni normallashtirish to'g'risidagi 1965 yilgi shartnoma asosida hal qilingan deb da'vo qildi.

Demak, 1965 yildan buyon ikki mamlakat o'rtasida shakllangan do'stlik va hamkorlik munosabatlarining huquqiy asoslari barham topdi. Huquqiy asos "Yaponiya va Koreya Respublikasi o'rtasidagi mulk va da'volar bilan bog'liq muammolarni hal qilish va iqtisodiy hamkorlik to'g'risida bitim" dir. Janubiy Koreya tomoni keltirib chiqargan munosabatlar atrofidagi ushbu og'ir vaziyatda Yaponiya hukumati Janubiy Koreyaga qarshi zarur choralarni ko'radi.[21]

30 oktabrda Oliy sud Nippon Steel kompaniyasining urush paytida yuz bergan majburiy mehnatga jalb qilingan to'rt nafar Janubiy Koreyalik ishchilarga tovon puli to'lashni talab qilgan 2013 yilgi buyrug'ini bekor qilish to'g'risidagi apellyatsiya shikoyatlarini rad etdi va ishchilarning har biriga 100 million von miqdorida shaxsiy pul to'lashni buyurdi ( 87,700 AQSh dollari).[22] Bir oy o'tgach, 2018 yil 30-noyabrda Gvanju Oliy sudi Mitsubishi Heavy Industries kompaniyasining 2013 yilgi sud qarorining apellyatsiya shikoyati bo'yicha 23 ta da'vogarning har biriga tovon puli to'lash uchun kompaniya 80 million von (71 ming dollar) to'lashi kerakligi to'g'risidagi apellyatsiya shikoyatini rad etdi va qolgan 5 nafarining o'rnini qoplashni talab qildi. Yaponiya kompaniyasida ishlashga majbur bo'lgan Janubiy Koreyalik keksa odamlar, 28-noyabr kuni Oliy sud tomonidan alohida ajratilgan tartibda, 28 da'vogarning har biriga 150 million von (134 ming dollar) to'lashni buyurgan qariyalar, hanuzgacha tirik yoki ularning oilalari.[23][24] 2019 yil 18-yanvar kuni Seul Oliy sudi ishdan bo'shatildi Nachi-Fujikoshi 2014 yil oktyabr oyida Seul Markaziy okrug sudining qaroriga binoan Janubiy Koreyaning har 17 ayoliga 80 milliondan 100 million vongacha (69000 AQSh dollaridan 89000 AQSh dollarigacha) to'lashi kerakligi to'g'risidagi qaror ustidan shikoyat.[25] chunki jabrdiydalarni og'ir sharoitlarda majburiy mehnatga "aldashgan".[26][27][28]

Teg tuman sudi 2019 yil 8-yanvar kuni Janubiy Koreyada joylashgan POSCO-Nippon Steel RHF Joint Venture (PNR) qo'shma korxonasida Nippon Steel tomonidan egalik qilingan 81.075 dona aktsiyalarni hibsga olish to'g'risida peyntiffning so'rovini ma'qulladi. POSCO Yaponiya po'lat ishlab chiqaruvchisiga tegishli taxminan 11 milliard von (9,78 million dollar) qiymatidagi 2,34 million aktsiyalarning bir qismidir.[29] Ushbu qaror 2019 yil mart oyida Daitson tuman sudi tomonidan Mitsubishi Heavy Industries savdo markasi va patent aktivlarini hibsga olish to'g'risidagi qaror bilan qabul qilingan.[30]

19 iyun kuni Janubiy Koreya majburiy mehnat qurbonlariga tovon puli to'lash uchun Yaponiya bilan mablag'larni birlashtirishni taklif qildi, ammo Yaponiya bu taklifni rad etdi.[31] Buning o'rniga Yaponiya 1965 yilgi Yaponiya-Koreya normallashtirish to'g'risidagi bitim qoidalariga muvofiq hakamlik hay'atini tuzishga chaqirdi. Panel uchinchi tomon mamlakatlaridan bittadan a'zodan iborat bo'ladi.[31]

Xronologiya

Chapdan o'ngga: Kang Kyung-wha, Mayk Pompeo va Tarō Kōno yilda Bangkok, 2019 yil avgust oyida bo'lib o'tgan uch tomonlama uchrashuvda

Iyul 2019
1-iyul kuni yapon tili Iqtisodiyot, savdo va sanoat vazirligi (METI) Janubiy Koreyaga boshqariladigan buyumlarni va ularga tegishli texnologiyalarni eksport qilish va o'tkazish bo'yicha yangilangan litsenziyalash siyosati va protseduralarini qo'llagan.[4] 4-iyuldan kuchga kirgan ushbu qarorlar sanoatda yangilangan litsenziyalash siyosatini, shu jumladan litsenziyalash jarayonini belgilab qo'ydi va eksport qiluvchilarni har bir yuk uchun 90 kungacha tasdiqlash izlashga majbur qildi.[32] Vazirlar Mahkamasi kotibining o'rinbosari Yasutoshi Nishimura cheklovlar xavfsizlik nuqtai nazaridan kelib chiqqanligini aytdi.[33] Janubiy Koreya hukumati Yaponiya hukumati qaror qilgan masalada "iqtisodiy qasos" ko'rsatmoqda, deb javob berdi Janubiy Koreyaning Oliy sudi, qarorlarini o'zgartirish mumkin emas Janubiy Koreya hukumati.[34]

Bilan bog'liq press-relizda eksportni nazorat qilish va tartibga solish, Yaponiyaning METI kompaniyasi Janubiy Koreyani "Oq mamlakatlar" tarkibidan chiqarish jarayonini boshlaydi va Yaponiyadagi eksportyorlardan ftorlangan ba'zi narsalar uchun individual eksport litsenziyalariga ega bo'lishni talab qiladi. polimid, qarshilik ko'rsatish va ftorli vodorod va ularning tegishli texnologiyalari.[4] METI aniq misollar keltirmaganligi sababli,[35] ba'zi yapon ommaviy axborot vositalari Janubiy Koreyaning cheklangan kimyoviy moddalarni Birlashgan Arab Amirliklari, Eron yoki Shimoliy Koreyaga o'tkazganligiga shubha qilishdi.[36] Masalan, yapon teleradiokompaniyasi Fuji TV va yapon gazetasi Sankei Shimbun 10-iyul kuni xabar berishicha, so'nggi to'rt yil ichida (2015 yildan 2019 yil martigacha) Janubiy Koreya potentsial qurolga ega bo'lgan 156 ta strategik mahsulotni yashirincha eksport qilinmoqda.[37] Ro'yxat asab agenti uchun ingredientlarni o'z ichiga olgan VX, Shimoliy Koreya rahbarining o'gay ukasi Kim Chen Namni o'ldirishda foydalanilgan Kim Chen In va Birlashgan Arab Amirliklariga va boshqa joylarga kontrabanda yo'li bilan olib kirilgan gidroflorik kislota.[38]

Janubiy Koreya hukumati Yaponiya ommaviy axborot vositalarining ayblovlarini rad etdi. Janubiy Koreyaning savdo, sanoat va energetika vaziri Sung Yun-mo Yaponiyadan kimyoviy moddalar olib keluvchi kompaniyalar ustidan o'tkazilgan favqulodda tekshiruv ushbu kimyoviy moddalarning Shimoliy Koreyaga eksport qilinayotgani to'g'risida hech qanday dalil topilmagani va Yaponiyaning da'volari asossiz va to'xtatilishi kerakligini aytdi.[39] A Bareunmirae partiyasi qonun chiqaruvchi Xa Tae-Kyung Yaponiya hukumati strategik buyumlarni yapon kompaniyalari tomonidan Shimoliy Koreyaga noqonuniy olib o'tilganligini fosh qilganligi to'g'risida yana bir da'vo bilan chiqdi, bu eksport to'g'risidagi ma'lumotlarni kuzatib boruvchi nodavlat tashkilot - Xavfsizlikni Savdo nazorati bo'yicha ma'lumot markazi (CISTEC). boshqaruv elementlari.[40] Boshqalar esa Yaponiyaning savdo cheklovlarini qisman Janubiy Koreya kompaniyalari tomonidan gumon qilinayotgan intellektual mulk huquqlarini buzish uchun qasos olish uchun bahona deb bilishadi.[41]

So'ngra Janubiy Koreya Tashqi ishlar vazirligi va Savdo, sanoat va energetika vazirligi nomidan 8-9 iyul kunlari Jenevada Jahon savdo tashkilotining tovarlar savdosi bo'yicha Kengashi yig'ilishida Yaponiyaning eksport cheklovlarini olib tashlash rejasini e'lon qildi.[42]

Samsung Electronics rais o'rinbosari Li Chje Yon Yaponiya etkazib beruvchilardan yordam so'rash uchun 7-iyul kuni Yaponiyaga yo'l oldi.[43] U 12-kuni Yaponiyadan qaytib keldi va xabarlarga ko'ra uni uzoq vaqt davomida ishlab chiqarish uchun zarur bo'lgan resurslarni ta'minladi.[44][45]

12 iyul kuni Yaponiya va Janubiy Koreyaning vakillari Tokioda yig'ilish o'tkazib, ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi diplomatik aloqalarning yomonlashishini muhokama qildilar, ammo bu masalani hal qila olmadilar.[46] Bir hafta o'tgach, Janubiy Koreyaning Savdo, sanoat va energetika vazirligi 12-iyul kuni bo'lib o'tgan ma'muriy brifing va elektron pochta almashinuvidan so'ng matbuot anjumani o'tkazganligi sababli va matbuot anjumanida ba'zi bir noto'g'ri ma'lumotlar kiritilganligi sababli, METI faktlarni matbuot sifatida oshkor qildi ozod qilish.[47]

24-iyul kuni ikki mamlakat yuqori texnologik eksportga oid masalani ko'rib chiqdilar JST Jenevada, ular yuqori lavozimli amaldorlarni yuborgan. Yaponiya Tashqi ishlar vazirligining iqtisodiy ishlar bo'yicha bosh direktori Shingo Yamagamini yubordi. Janubiy Koreya savdo vazirining o'rinbosari Kim Sen Xoni ham yubordi.[48][49] Shu kuni Janubiy Koreyaning Savdo, sanoat va energetika vazirligi (MOTIE) vaziri ularni nazorat qilish, Yaponiya va Janubiy Koreya o'rtasidagi siyosiy muloqot, Janubiy Koreyaning eksport nazorati tizimi va Yaponiyaning yangilanishi natijasida erkin savdoga global ta'sir ko'rsatishi mumkin. Bunga javoban METI Yaponiyaning Janubiy Koreyaning odatdagi qurollarga va ommaviy qirg'in qurollariga mos kelishini da'vo qilayotgan Janubiy Koreyaning barcha tizimlariga nisbatan pozitsiyasiga oydinlik kiritdi va hozirgi zamonda ikki tomonlama siyosiy muloqotning etishmasligi bilan bog'liq vaziyatni tushuntirdi.[47]

Avgust 2019
2 avgust kuni Yaponiya Vazirlar Mahkamasi Janubiy Koreyani "oq ro'yxat" dan chiqarishni ma'qulladi.[50] Savdo sheriklari sifatida eng maqbul maqomga ega bo'lgan mamlakatlar 27 mamlakatdan iborat edi. "Eng maqbul savdo maqomini" yo'qotish, qurolga aylanishi mumkin bo'lgan narsalar ro'yxatidagi yana o'nlab mahsulotlarga tegishli bo'ladi.[51] Qaror 40 ming kishining ommaviy fikr-mulohazalaridan so'ng qabul qilindi, bu 90 foizdan ko'prog'ini qo'llab-quvvatlaydi. Savdo vaziri Xiroshige seku savdo choralari ikki mamlakatning o'zaro aloqalariga zarar etkazish uchun mo'ljallanmaganligini aytdi.[52] Keyinchalik, hukumat rasmiy ravishda mamlakatni imtiyozli savdo maqomi ro'yxatidan chiqarib tashlagan va nashr etilgan qonun loyihasini e'lon qiladi. KANPO, 7-avgust kuni Yaponiyaning rasmiy gazetasi.[53][54] Biroq, qonun loyihasida Yaponiya uchta chip va displey materiallaridan tashqari cheklovlar qo'yadigan qo'shimcha narsalar nazarda tutilmagan.[55]Yaponiya hukumatining reytingini pasaytirish va Janubiy Koreyani oq ro'yxatdan chiqarish to'g'risidagi qarori e'lon qilinganidan 21 kun o'tib, 2019 yil 28-avgustda kuchga kiradi. Yangi tahrirda Janubiy Koreya qayta ko'rib chiqilgan Yaponiya eksport nazorati tizimida "B" guruhiga kiradi.[56][2-eslatma] Bu shuni anglatadiki, yapon ishlab chiqaruvchilari imtiyozli savdo sheriklariga berilgan sodda tekshiruvlar o'rniga, Janubiy Koreyaga eksport qilinadigan 1120 strategik materiallar uchun har bir texnologiya bilan bog'liq shartnomani tasdiqlash uchun ariza berishlari kerak.[1]

Bangkokda bo'lib o'tgan ASEAN Plus Three uchrashuvida Janubiy Koreyaning tashqi ishlar vaziri Kang Kyung-xva va uning o'sha paytdagi yaponiyalik hamkasbi Tare Kono to'qnashib ketishdi, Kang Yaponiyaning eksport nazorati "bir tomonlama va o'zboshimchalik" bilan ayblandi. Ammo Kōno eksport nazorati JST qoidalariga to'liq mos kelishini talab qilmoqda.[57][58]

8 avgust kuni Yaponiya hukumati Seko tomonidan o'tkazilgan matbuot anjumanida ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi ziddiyatlarni yumshatish uchun chip va displeylar tayyorlashda ishlatiladigan asosiy materialni Janubiy Koreyaga etkazib berishni ma'qulladi.[59] Janubiy Koreya Bosh vazirining so'zlariga ko'ra, tasdiqlash 7-avgustda berilgan Li Nakon, EUV fotorezistlari deb nomlanuvchi material mavjud edi, bu Samsungning zamonaviy chip chiplarini ishlab chiqarish uchun juda muhimdir.[60] Ammo Yaponiya ushbu uchta yuqori texnologik materiallar noto'g'ri ishlatilganligi aniqlansa, mamlakat eksportni qattiq tekshirishni kengaytirishi, shu jumladan dasturlar ekspertizasini kengaytirishi haqida ogohlantirdi.[61] Xuddi shu material 20 avgust kuni Yaponiya tomonidan ham tasdiqlangan.[62]

12-avgust kuni Janubiy Koreya hukumati Yaponiyaning ushbu harakatiga javoban 29 ta afzal ko'rilgan savdo sheriklaridan tashkil topgan Yaponiyaning "Oq ro'yxat" dan chiqarilishi bo'yicha choralarni ko'rmoqda va 8 avgust kuni kechiktirildi.[63][64] Qaror 18-sentabrda hukumat 14-avgustdan 3-sentabrgacha hukumat veb-saytlari va elektron pochtalari orqali jamoatchilik fikrlarini yig'ish jarayonini tugatgandan so'ng kuchga kiradi, bu fikrlarning 91% qayta ko'rib chiqishni yoqlagan.[65][66][67] Qayta ko'rib chiqish kuchga kirgandan so'ng Yaponiyaning maqomi o'zgargan. Yaponiya Koreyaning eksport nazorati tizimida yangi tashkil etilgan A-2 guruhiga kiradi. A-2 guruhi a'zosi sifatida Yaponiyaga ba'zi istisnolardan tashqari, B guruhidagi mamlakatlar bilan bir xil munosabatda bo'lishadi.[68][69]

28-avgust kuni Yaponiyada eksport savdosini nazorat qilish buyrug'iga qisman o'zgartirish kiritildi.[50] Shu kuni Janubiy Koreya hukumati tomonidan e'lon qilindi. Ushbu e'longa javoban METI o'z yozuvlarini Janubiy Koreyaning fikrlarini inkor etish uchun press-reliz sifatida taqdim etdi.[70]

29-avgust kuni Yaponiya Janubiy Koreyaning eng maqbul savdo holatidan chiqarilishidan buyon birinchi eksport materiallarini ma'qulladi. Yaponiyada eksportni kuchaytirgandan beri birinchi marta eksport qilingan materiallar vodorod ftoridni jo'natmoqda. Materialning asosiy oluvchisi Samsung Electronics.[71] Ammo Yaponiya eksportni tasdiqlashdan bosh tortdi.[72]

2019 yil sentyabr
3 sentyabr kuni METI Janubiy Koreyaning strategik buyumlarni eksport qilish va import qilish to'g'risida jamoatchilik bildirishnomasini qayta ko'rib chiqish rejalariga oid fikr va savollarini yubordi.[73]

Janubiy Koreyaning Savdo, sanoat va energetika vazirligi Yaponiyaning eksport nazorati va uchta materialning cheklanishi yuzasidan JSTga shikoyat yuborishini e'lon qildi. Savdo vaziri Yo Myung-xi, 11 sentyabr kuni OAVga bergan intervyusida u cheklovlarni "Janubiy Koreyani to'g'ridan-to'g'ri nishonga oluvchi kamsituvchi xatti-harakat va bu siyosiy sababga ega" deb ta'riflagan.[74][75] Yaponiya savdo vaziri Isshu Sugawara 20 sentyabr kuni bo'lib o'tgan matbuot anjumanida JSTni nizolarini hal qilish bo'yicha Janubiy Koreya bilan muzokaralar olib borishga rozi bo'ldi.[76][77]

26 sentyabrda yangi tayinlangan Yaponiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Toshimitsu Motegi Nyu-York shahrida Janubiy Koreya tashqi ishlar vaziri Kan Kyong-va bilan uchrashdi. Ikki davlat o'zaro muammoni hal qilishda biron bir yutuqqa erisha olmayapti, bu ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi "katta kelishmovchiliklar", ammo muloqotni davom ettirishga kelishib oldilar.[78][79]

Oktyabr 2019
1-oktabr kuni Janubiy Koreyaning Savdo, sanoat va energetika vazirligi Yaponiya hukumati ushbu mamlakatga vodorod ftorid etkazib berishni ma'qullamaganligi to'g'risida bayonot berdi, garchi yapon eksportchisi materiallarni eksport qilish uchun ariza topshirganiga 90 kun o'tgan bo'lsa ham.[80]

11-oktabr kuni Yaponiya Jahon savdo tashkilotining Jeneva shahrida Janubiy Koreya hukumati bilan Yaponiyaning Janubiy Koreyaga eksport qilish bo'yicha litsenziyalash siyosati va protseduralarini yangilash borasida Jahon savdo tashkilotining shartnomasi bo'yicha maslahatlashuvlar o'tkazdi.[81][82] Bu JSTning nizolarni hal qilish protsedurasining bir qismidir, unga ko'ra Janubiy Koreya ikki tomonlama muzokaralarni talab qildi. Agar bu masala 60 kun ichida hal etilmasa, Janubiy Koreya Jahon Savdo Tashkilotining nizolarni hal qilish organidan ushbu masala bo'yicha qaror chiqarish uchun panel tuzilishini so'raydi.[74]

Noyabr 2019
19-noyabr kuni JST shartnomasi bo'yicha ikki tomonlama maslahatlashuvlarning ikkinchi bosqichi bo'lib o'tdi. Yaponiya JSTning nomuvofiqligi haqidagi da'vo mutlaqo asossiz ekanligini ta'kidladi. Va Yaponiya eksportga litsenziyalar fuqarolik maqsadlari uchun mo'ljallanganligi tasdiqlangandan keyin va harbiy maqsadlar uchun yo'naltirish xavfi mavjud emasligini, Yaponiyaning bu chorasi eksportni taqiqlamaganligi va etkazib berish zanjirlariga ta'sir ko'rsatilmaganligini yana bir bor tushuntirdi. .[83] Ushbu muzokaralar ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi savdo mojarosini hal qila olmaydi.[84]

22-noyabr kuni Janubiy Koreya Jahon savdo tashkilotining Yaponiyaning eksport nazoratiga qarshi petitsiyasini to'xtatishga qaror qildi.[85]

2019 yil dekabr
4-dekabr kuni Yaponiyaning METI kompaniyasi Koreyaning Savdo, sanoat va energetika vazirligi (MOTIE) bilan Yaponiya-Koreyaning eksport nazorati bo'yicha VII dialogiga Bosh direktor darajasida tayyorgarlik uchrashuvini o'tkazdi. Tayyorgarlik uchrashuvida ikkala tomon ham bo'lib o'tadigan siyosiy muloqot tafsilotlarini, shu jumladan sanalar va kun tartiblarini muhokama qildilar.[86]

16-dekabr kuni Yaponiyaning METI kompaniyasi Koreyaning MOTIE kompaniyasi bilan eksportni nazorat qilish bo'yicha Yaponiya-Koreya ettinchi siyosati muloqotini o'tkazdi. Muloqot davomida ikki tomon mutaxassislari muhim texnologik nazorat va ularning eksport nazorati tizimlari bilan bog'liq vaziyat va muammolar to'g'risida fikr almashdilar. Ikkala tomon ham o'zlarini qiziqtirgan muammolarni hal qilishga hissa qo'shish maqsadida Muloqot va aloqalarni davom ettirishga kelishib oldilar.[87]

2020 yil yanvar
Mun Chje In yangi yil murojaatida "Yaponiyaning eksporti, biznes, ishchi kuchi cheklanganligi sababli, hukumat va xalq asosiy materiallar, butlovchi qismlar va uskunalarni ishlab chiqarishni mahalliylashtirish uchun birlashdilar. Butun xalq birlashib, Bu chayqalib bo'lmaydigan mamlakatni barpo etish maqsadi. Bu vazifa bir necha o'n yillar davomida bajarilmagan edi, ammo biz faqat yarim yil ichida katta yutuqlarga erishdik. "[88]

2020 yil fevral
21-fevral kuni Yaponiyaning METI kompaniyasi Koreyaning MOTIE kompaniyasi bilan Bosh direktor darajasida tayyorgarlik uchrashuvini o'tkazdi. Uchrashuv natijasida har ikki tomon 10-mart kuni Yaponiya-Koreya 8-eksport nazorati siyosati dialogini o'tkazishga kelishib oldilar.[89]

2020 yil mart
6-mart kuni Yaponiyaning METI va Koreyaning MOTIE kompaniyasi 8-Yaponiya-Koreya eksport nazorati siyosati muloqotini 10-mart kuni videokonferentsaloqa tizimi orqali o'tkazishga kelishib oldilar.[90]10 mart kuni Yaponiyaning METI va Koreyaning MOTIE kompaniyasi 8-Yaponiya-Koreya eksport nazorati bo'yicha muloqotni o'tkazdilar. Muloqotda har ikki tomon ham o'zlarini qiziqtirgan muammolarni hal qilishga hissa qo'shish maqsadida tizimni takomillashtirish va savdo-sotiq va texnologik transferlarni nazorat qilish tizimini takomillashtirish bo'yicha fikr almashdilar.[91]

Iyun 2020
19 iyun kuni Jahon Savdo Tashkilotining nizolarni hal qilish jarayonining qayta tiklanishiga javoban Janubiy Koreya, Iqtisodiyot, savdo va sanoat vaziri Xiroshi Kajiyama Yaponiya-Koreyaning eksportni nazorat qilish siyosati bo'yicha avvalgi Dialoglar muzokaralarida kelishuvlarga putur etkazishi mumkinligi sababli bunday bir tomonlama harakat juda afsuslanarli ekanligini ta'kidlab o'tdi, bu erda har ikki tomon ham o'zaro qiziqtirgan masalalarni dialoglar va aloqa vositalari orqali hal qilishni o'rganib chiqdilar.[92]30-iyun kuni Janubiy Koreyaning JSTni tashkil etish to'g'risidagi dastlabki talabini to'sib qo'ygandan so'ng, Iqtisodiyot, savdo va sanoat vaziri Kajiyama Janubiy Koreyani stolga qaytishga va JST jarayonini to'xtatishga chaqirishni istayotganini aytib o'tdi, shunda biz qayta ishga tushirishimiz mumkin. Eksport nazorati siyosati dialoglari.[93]

Reaksiyalar

Janubiy Koreya

Hukumat

Janubiy Koreya hukumatining nizoga bo'lgan munosabati shundaki, Yaponiyaning eksport nazorati asossiz va adolatsiz. Unda ta'kidlanishicha, u yetarli darajada boshqarish tizimiga ega va aloqa etishmasligi Yaponiyaning oxiriga kelib qolgan. Bundan tashqari, ular Yaponiyaning eksport nazorati xalqaro qonunlarga zid ekanligini va har ikkala mamlakat iqtisodiyoti va global bozor uchun buzuvchi va zararli bo'lishini ta'kidladilar. Janubiy Koreya hukumati Yaponiyani eksport nazoratini qaytarib olishga chaqirdi, chunki ular o'zaro munosabatlarga zarar etkazadi.[94][95]

Oq ro'yxatni olib tashlashdan oldin

Tashqi ishlar vazirining birinchi o'rinbosari Cho Sey Yon boshchiligidagi Janubiy Koreya hukumati Yaponiya elchisini 1 iyul kuni Yaponiya tomonidan eksport cheklovlariga qarshi norozilik namoyishi o'tkazishga chaqirdi. Savdo, sanoat va energetika vaziri Sung Yun-Mo Yaponiyaning bu harakatini "chuqur pushaymon" deb atadi.[96]

Keyin, 10 iyul kuni Prezident Mun Chje In mamlakatning 30 konglomerati rahbarlari bilan uchrashuvda Yaponiyani "Yaponiya ilgari surib kelayotgan erkin savdo tamoyiliga qaytishga" chaqirdi va agar Janubiy Koreya kompaniyalari tomonidan cheklangan yangi cheklovlardan zarar ko'rsa, "javob choralarini ko'rishini" aytdi. Yaponiya hukumati.[97]

Oq ro'yxat olib tashlanganidan keyin

Yaponiyaning mamlakatni ro'yxatdan chiqarib tashlashiga javoban hukumat Yaponiyaning e'lon qilgan kuni (2-avgust) kuni hukumatning favqulodda yig'ilishini o'tkazdi va butun mamlakat bo'ylab televizion kanallarda jonli efirda namoyish etildi. Oy Yaponiyani qarorlardan ogohlantirdi. U mamlakat "qat'iy ravishda tegishli choralarni ko'rishi" haqida ogohlantirdi.[98] Shuningdek, u "biz hech qachon Yaponiyaga yutqazmaymiz" dedi.[99]

Hukumat baliq ovlash va qishloq xo'jaligi mahsulotlariga import kvotasini qat'iylashtirishni e'lon qildi Fukusima radioaktiv ifloslanish xavfi tufayli kiritilgan.[100]

15 avgustda Koreyaning yapon hukmronligidan ozod qilinganligining 74 yilligi munosabati bilan Prezident Mun nutq so'zlab, ziddiyatni yumshatish uchun Yaponiyani muloqotga qaytishga chaqirdi. Mun shuningdek, Janubiy Koreya "o'tmishda yashamagan" deb aytdi va Yaponiya Sharqiy Osiyoda tinchlik va farovonlikni ta'minlashda birgalikda etakchi rol o'ynashiga umid bildirdi.[101]

Yapon sanoatiga bo'lgan ishonchini kamaytirish uchun hukumat keng qamrovli tadqiqot va rivojlanish strategiyasini e'lon qildi. Bu kelgusi yetti yil davomida mahalliy materiallar, ehtiyot qismlar va uskunalar uchun izlanishlar va ishlanmalarga 7,8 trillion von (6,48 milliard dollar) sarflash rejasini o'z ichiga oladi.[102] Hukumat, shuningdek, asosiy sanoat materiallarini ishlab chiqarishda o'z imkoniyatlarini oshirish uchun 5 trillion von (4,12 milliard dollar) sarflashga va'da berdi. Katta ilmiy-tadqiqot investitsiyalari 2020 yildan 2022 yilgacha amalga oshiriladi.[103]

Janubiy Koreya sekinlashib borayotgan iqtisodiyotini rivojlantirish uchun 2020 yil uchun rekord darajada 513,5 trillion von (423,7 milliard dollar) byudjet taklif qiladi, bu 2019 yilgi byudjetga nisbatan 9,3 foiz o'sishni anglatadi. Xarajat takliflarining asosiy markazi 2020 yilda tadqiqot va ishlanmalar (AR-GE) uchun ajratilgan 24,1 trillion von (19,9 milliard dollar) ni tashkil etadi, bu 2019 yilga nisbatan 17,3 foizga ko'pdir, bu so'nggi o'n yil ichida eng yuqori ko'rsatkichdir.[104]

Mintaqaviy hukumatlar

Yaponiyaning Janubiy Koreyadagi savdo cheklovlariga javoban, mamlakat bo'ylab mintaqaviy hukumatlar Yaponiya mahsulotlarini boykot qilishni va almashinuv dasturlarini boshladilar. Aktsiya Yaponiya mahsulotlarini davlat xaridlari va lizingga berish, Yaponiyaga rasmiy ish safarlarida va Yaponiya shaharlari bilan "opa-singillik" munosabatlari kabi turli tadbirlarni to'xtatishni o'z ichiga oladi.[105]

Ikki mintaqaviy qonun chiqaruvchi organ, Seul Metropolitan Kengashi va Busan Metropolitan Kengashi 6 sentyabrda 284 yapon kompaniyasini, shu jumladan Mitsubishi Heavy Industries kompaniyasini "harbiy jinoyatchi kompaniyalar" deb nomlash majburiy bo'lmagan farmonlarini qabul qildi. Farmonlarga binoan ushbu yapon kompaniyalariga belgi qo'yilishi kerak, shaharlarning hokimlari va boshqa rasmiylaridan kelajakda kompaniyalardan mahsulot sotib olmasliklari so'raladi.[106][107] Pusan ​​bilan bog'liq vaziyatda, shuningdek, "urush jinoyati bilan shug'ullanadigan kompaniya mahsuloti" degan stikerlar allaqachon sotib olingan mahsulotlarga yopishtirilishi mumkin.[108]

Siyosiy partiyalar

The Ozodlik Koreya partiyasi, Yaponiyani eksportga qo'yilgan cheklovni olib tashlashga chaqirgan holda, Prezident Mun ushbu masalani ko'rib chiqayotganini ham tanqid qildi. Rep. Na Kyung-von Oy ma'muriyati bu masalani yanada kuchaytirgan va AQSh bilan munosabatlarni AQSh aralashmaydigan darajada buzgan deb da'vo qilmoqda.[109][110] LKP hukumatni qat'iy pozitsiyani tutishdan ko'ra, Yaponiya bilan diplomatik echim topishga e'tibor qaratishga chaqirdi.[111]

Janubiy Koreyadagi barcha siyosiy partiyalar Yaponiya importini cheklash zarurligini ta'kidladilar. Hozircha, ular vaziyatga qarab "Pan-milliy" favqulodda vaziyatlar idorasini yaratish rejalarini e'lon qilishdi.[112] Janubiy Koreyaning yirik siyosiy partiyalari 2019 yil 31 iyulda ikki tomonlama organni tashkil etishga kelishib oldilar.[113]

Boshqalar

Yaponlarga qarshi banner Mokpo
Shuningdek qarang: 2019 yil Janubiy Koreyada Yaponiya mahsulotlarini boykot qilish

Janubiy koreyaliklar Yaponiya hukumatining mamlakatni oq ro'yxatdan chiqarish to'g'risidagi qaroridan juda norozi. Ular cheklov Janubiy Koreya iqtisodiyotiga zarar etkazishidan qo'rqishadi va bosh vazir Shinzo Abeni ayblashadi.[114] Ko'pgina Janubiy Koreyaliklar ushbu cheklovlarni adolatsiz va adolatsiz deb bilishadi, chunki Yaponiya 1910 yildan 1945 yil Ikkinchi Jahon urushi tugaguniga qadar Koreya yarim orolini mustamlaka qilish paytida qilgan.

Yaponiyaning harakatiga javoban, 5-iyul kuni bir guruh janubiy koreyaliklar ko'chaga chiqib, yapon mahsulotlariga boykot e'lon qilishdi.[115] O'shandan beri ko'plab janubiy koreyaliklar Yaponiyaning barcha mahsulotlari va importini, jumladan oziq-ovqat va ichimliklar, kosmetika vositalari, transport vositalari va kiyim-kechaklarni boykot qilishga qaror qilishdi. Ba'zilar, shuningdek, Yaponiyaga rejalashtirilgan sayohatlarni bekor qilishdi.[116][117]

Yoqilgan Moviy uy 2019 yil iyul oyida prezidentning murojaatnomasi veb-saytida qariyb 27 ming kishi Yaponiya mahsulotlarini boykot qilish va Yaponiyaga sayyohlikni to'xtatishga chaqirgan petitsiyani imzoladi. Murojaat veb-saytida yozilishicha, agar bir oy ichida petitsiyani 200 ming kishi imzolasa, hukumat bu masalaga rasmiy javob qaytarishi shart.[118]

Kim Byon Kyu tomonidan yaratilgan NoNoJapan.com nomli veb-sayt 11 iyul kuni ochilgan bo'lib, koreyslar boykot qilgan yapon mahsulotlari va xizmatlari va ushbu yaponlarga alternativa koreys mahsulotlari.[119] Ko'proq koreyslar boykotga qo'shilishganida, veb-sayt trafikning keskin ko'tarilishi sababli serverning ishdan chiqishiga duch keldi.[119]

Taxminan 5000 kishi, shu jumladan 596 fuqarolik guruhlari a'zolari, 27-iyul kuni shamdan himoya qilishdi Gvanxvamun Plaza va Yaponiya elchixonasi oldida Bosh vazir Sindzo Abeni savdo cheklovlarini qo'ygani uchun tanqid qilish.[120] Shuningdek, ular 3 avgust kuni Seulda Yaponiyaning elchixonasi oldida yana bir sham qo'riqlash marosimini o'tkazdilar, unda mitingda qatnashayotgan tashkilotchining so'zlariga ko'ra 15000 dan ortiq kishi qatnashdi.[121]Xuddi shunday norozilik namoyishi 10 avgustda bo'lib o'tdi, hozirda 1000 talaba imzo chekdi. Namoyishchilar, shuningdek, Janubiy Koreyaning GSOMIA tarkibidan chiqarilishini talab qilmoqda, bu Yaponiya bilan harbiy ma'lumot almashish shartnomasi. Ishtirokchilar soni ikkinchi mitingga o'xshash edi.[122]

Shuningdek, ular Gwanghwamun Plaza-da keng miqyosli sham nurlarini namoyish qilishdi. Chosun Ilbo shtab-kvartirasi va Yaponiyaning 15 avgustdagi elchixonasi, ya'ni Koreyaning yapon mustamlakachiligidan ozod qilinganligining 74 yilligi. Ularning hisob-kitoblariga ko'ra, mitingda 30000 dan 100000 gacha odam qatnashadi.[123] Aksincha, konservativ guruhlar bir vaqtning o'zida miting o'tkazib, Yaponiyaga qarshi kayfiyatni qaytarishga chaqirishdi.[124][125]

Yaponiyaning Seuldagi elchixonasi oldida bo'lib o'tgan Yaponiya hukumatining qaroriga norozilik sifatida o'zini yoqib yuborgan ikki kishi bor. Birinchi hodisalar 19 iyul kuni mahalliy vaqt bilan soat 3: 24da sodir bo'lgan va voqeadan keyin bir kishi halok bo'lgan.[126] va ikkinchi hodisa 1 avgust kuni og'ir ahvolda bo'lgan 72 yoshli erkak tomonidan sodir bo'ldi.[127][128]

Yaponiya mahsulotlarini boykot qilish madaniy sektorga tarqaldi, eng so'nggilari chiqarildi Doraemon filmlar seriyasi Doraemon: Nobitaning Oyni tadqiq qilish tarixi Dastlab 14 avgustda rejalashtirilgan, filmning koreyscha dublyaji tugaganidan keyin ham noma'lum muddatga qoldirilgan edi. Iyul oyida yana bir yapon animatsion filmi, Butt detektiv filmi va Detektiv Konan: Moviy safirning mushti, Internetda noqulay onlayn sharhlarga duch keldi va faqat 134,000 va 200,000 chipta sotildi.[129][130]

Realmeter tomonidan 504 kattalar ishtirokida o'tkazilgan so'rovnoma shuni ko'rsatadiki, 24 iyul holatiga ko'ra respondentlarning 62,8% Yaponiya tovarlarini boykot qilyapmiz.[131][132] 1005 kattalar ishtirokida Gallup Korea tomonidan o'tkazilgan yana bir so'rov natijalariga ko'ra, atigi 12% Yaponiya haqida ijobiy fikr bildirgan, 77% esa salbiy fikrda. Xuddi shunday so'rov natijalariga ko'ra, respondentlarning 61% i mojaro uchun Yaponiya hukumatini ayblashadi, 17% esa Janubiy Koreya hukumati uchun javobgardir.[133]

Ko'plab Janubiy Koreyalik qonun chiqaruvchilarni ko'plab koreyalik qullar mehnatiga qarshi urush jinoyatlarida ishtirok etgan yapon kompaniyalariga qo'ygan sarmoyalarini cheklash yoki to'xtatishga chaqiriqlar bo'lgan. Korea Investing Corporation va Milliy pensiya xizmati buni amalga oshirish uchun bosimga duch keldi.[134][135] Pensiya jamg'armasi Yaponiya kompaniyalarining Ikkinchi Jahon Urushidagi urush harakatlari bilan bog'liq bo'lgan kompaniyalarga isbotlansa, 75 ta kompaniyani tark etish kerakmi, yo'qmi, yo'qmi, 1,23 trillion von (1,1 milliard dollar) miqdoridagi investitsiyani ko'rib chiqishni boshladi.[136]

Ba'zi Janubiy Koreyaning ommaviy axborot vositalari savdo mojarosi haqida tashvish bildirdi; masalan, yapon materiallariga katta bog'liqlik, nizoning cho'zilishi, AQShning aralashuviga shubha qilish va hukumatda nizoni hal qilish uchun ozgina imkoniyatlar mavjud.[137][138][139][140] Korea Times muharriri tanqid qildi Moviy uyning masala bo'yicha javob.[141]

Yaponiya

Hukumat

Yaponiya hukumatining pozitsiyasi asoslanadi global eksport nazorati rejimi strategik tovarlarning qayta sotilishini oldini olish,[142] va bu Janubiy Koreyaga bo'lgan ishonchni sezilarli darajada buzganligi sababli dasturni yangilash bilan bog'liq.[4][143]

Ularning ta'kidlashicha, Janubiy Koreyaning barcha nazoratlari WMD bilan bog'liq tovarlarni qamrab olayotgan bo'lsa-da, u odatdagi qurollarni ham qamrab oladimi-yo'qligiga hech qachon aniqlik kiritmagan. Yaponiya hukumati, shuningdek, Janubiy Koreya ikki xalq o'rtasidagi siyosiy muloqotlarni bir necha bor qoldirganini da'vo qildi. Yaponiya, shuningdek, Janubiy Koreyaga o'sha boshqa Osiyo mamlakatlarida oddiy savdo sherigi sifatida qarashini va "oq mamlakat" sifatida rag'batlantirish choralarini ko'rmasligini, o'zgarish xalqaro qonunlarga zid kelmasligini va bu embargo emasligini ta'kidlamoqda.[47][144]

Savdo vaziri Xiroshige Seko Janubiy Koreyaning Yaponiyani eng qulay savdo sheriklari ro'yxatidan olib tashlash harakatiga javoban, 13 avgust kuni Tvitterda Janubiy Koreya Yaponiyaning eksport nazorati bo'yicha xalqaro chora-tadbirlardan qanday qilib kam qolganini ko'rsatolmadi.[145] Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, Yaponiya nima uchun qo'shni davlatning ishonchli savdo sheriklari ro'yxatidan chiqarilganini tushunmaydi.[146]

Boshqalar

METI press-relizidan ko'p o'tmay, eksport nazorati uchun mas'ul bo'lgan professor MITI ommaviy axborot vositalarida ekspert bo'lmagan muharrirlar va sharhlovchilar tomonidan ko'plab tushunmovchiliklar bo'lganligi sababli, ushbu masala bo'yicha tuzatishlar va sharhlar berishni boshladi.[17][147][148][20]

Yaponiya hukumatining eksport eksportini nazorat qilishni amalga oshirishni yangilash to'g'risidagi qarori ko'plab odamlarning tanqidiga sabab bo'ldi, 75 kishidan iborat guruh, shu jumladan yozuvchi Satoshi Kamata, iqtisodiy tahlilchi Katsuto Uchixashi va Akira Kavasaki, Internet-petitsiyani imzolashdi, bu ikkala mamlakatni ham hal qilish uchun muloqot qilishga chaqirdi. ziddiyat.[149]

Tomonidan o'tkazilgan so'rov natijalariga ko'ra Asaxi Shimbun 15 iyulda respondentlarning 56 foizi hukumat eksport nazorati tarafdoridir, 21 foizi esa qo'llab-quvvatlamagan. Bosh vazirni qo'llab-quvvatlaydiganlar orasida Shinzo Abe, Respondentlarning 74 foizi buni qo'llab-quvvatlamoqda. Shinzo Abeni rad etganlar orasida 43% eksport nazorati tarafdorlari, 36% esa bunga qarshi ekanliklarini bildirishdi.[150]

Yaponlarning aksariyati hukumatning harakatlarini qo'llab-quvvatlashiga qaramay, 4 avgust kuni Shinjuku ko'chalarida Abe hukumatiga qarshi norozilik bildirgan 200 nafar yapon va koreys namoyishchilari bo'lgan. They called Abe to stop the export curbs to South Korea.[151] The amount of protesters increased on August 8. There were calls by the protestors for Abe to resign as the Prime Minister.[152][153] The organizer of the protests enlisted new participants through many social media platforms.[153]

In the midst of the trade dispute between the two countries, Japanese author Xirokazu Kore-eda urged Japanese and Korean artists to show support for one another to overcome their countries' political situation.[154]

Other countries and viewpoints

Many countries showed concern to the actions of the two countries hurting the global tech industry. Tech companies in the United States issued a letter to both countries urging the two nations to negotiate a resolution to the dispute.[155]

Five of America's largest tech industry groups including the Semiconductor Industry Association, which Qualcomm va Intel korporatsiyasi as a members, among its other companies, issued a joint letter to Japanese Economy Minister Hiroshige Sekō and South Korean Minister of Trade Yoo Myung-hee. They asked both sides to refrain from escalating their conflict.[156]

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged Japan and South Korea to show goodwill and resolve their trade spat through negotiations and dialogue.[157]

AQSh prezidenti Donald Tramp voiced concern about the worsening ties between Japan and South Korea. He said on 9 August that trade and history dispute put the country (United States) in a "very difficult position". He urged the two countries to "get along".[158]

Some observers have pointed out that the dispute may have been exacerbated by both of the countries' leaders to drum up political support. During the beginning of the trade dispute Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's ruling Liberal-demokratik partiya were gearing up for Upper House election on 21 July. At the same time, President Moon Jae-in faced criticism for his economic policy and lack of progress in relationship with North Korea. Observers noted that both leaders are unlikely to back down from the dispute due to political pressure.[159][160][161][141][162]

Many analysts and experts have viewpoints about the trade dispute as well. Political analyst Paul Triolo, who also practice head of geo-technology at Evroosiyo guruhi aytdi CNBC that since Japan and South Korea are U.S. allies, the United States will likely to involved in mediating the two countries in addition to China because from U.S. perspective, this is a "lose-lose confrontation", which could also inadvertently benefit China. On the other hand, Waqas Adenwala, Asia analyst at the Iqtisodchi razvedka bo'limi said it may be “awkward” for China to mediate in this dispute, as both South Korea and China were victims of Japan's invasion and brutal killings during World War II.[163]

Other analyst and experts, such as Kim Hyun-Chul, an expert on Japanese enterprise at Seoul National University, told ABC News unlike trade of finished goods, high-tech industry goods that are sourced globally are interdependent. Countries that rely on South Korea's semiconductors such as the United States, China and even Japan will all be adversely affected, causing a domino effect on the global supply chain in computer and smartphone industries. Meanwhile, Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific chief economist at IHS Markit, said U.S. electronics companies, many of which have large production hubs in both the U.S. and China, are vulnerable to supply shortages of South Korean memory chips, given the importance of South Korea as a supplier of chips not only hardware such as mobile phones and electronic products but also data processing programs.[164]

Korxona rahbarlari

On the annual conference of the Korea-Japan Economic Association in Seoul, 300 business leaders from the two countries have urged both governments to find a diplomatic solution for the trade disputes.[165]

Xalqaro tashkilot

The WTO headquarters in Jeneva, Shveytsariya, where South Korea filed a complaint

On July 14, 2019, at the request of South Korea, Jahon savdo tashkiloti (JST) agreed to formally discuss at its General Council meeting about Japan's semiconductors export curbs to South Korea.[166] On July 24, South Korea's delegation brought the dispute to the General Council meeting, and Japanese delegation told that the South Korea's complaints are not acceptable,[167] and other WTO members preferred not to get involved in the dispute.[168]

In June 2020, the U.S. backed Japan's invocation of the WTO national security exception in a dispute with South Korea over semiconductor materials.[169][170]

Efforts to resolve the dispute

China-Japan-South Korea meeting in Beijing

On 21 August, the two countries involved in the trade war, and China, involved in a different trade war with the United States, held a trilateral meeting in Beijing. In that meeting, Japan and South Korea agreed to discuss efforts to resolve the conflict over compensating Korean forced labourers that has escalated into a trade war. The then Foreign Minister, now Minister of Defense, Tarō Kōno said that the two countries shared the view on the need to resolve the dispute.[171] But South Korea's Foreign Minister said that South Korea hopes that the country will stick to "free and fair" trade for prosperity in the region.[172]

Prime Ministers and Presidents meeting

Aside from bilateral negotiations in WTO, the two countries hold a bilateral talks to resolve the problem. The first was on 24 October, when the Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon met with his counterpart Shinzō Abe in Tokyo.[173] The second was on 4 November in ASEAN summit in Bangkok where Moon Jae-in held an 11-minute conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister.[174]Photos of the meeting were taken by Chung Eui-yong, director of the South Korean National Security office, and published without the approval of the Japanese side.[175]

Effektlar

Moliyaviy bozorlar

The Japanese government decision to revoke preferred trade partner status for South Korea rattle global stock markets, aside from Trump tweet about tariffs on Chinese products, especially in Japan and South Korea.

On 2 August, days which occur the removal of South Korea from the list, Nikkei 225, Japanese main stock indices, fell 2.11% and South Korea's KOSPI down 0.95%, a 7-month low.[176] Two index then down sharply on 5 August, with Nikkei 225 down 1.74% to 20,720 and Kospi down 2.56% to close at lowest level since 2016 at 1,946.98. KOSDAQ, which consisted tech-heavy and small and middle-cap stocks, plunged more than 7 percent to trigger trading halt. For the first time this occurred since 24 June 2016.[177]

In the currency markets, Janubiy Koreya g'olib bo'ldi fell 9.50 won against AQSh dollari to closed at 1,198.00, lowest level since 9 January 2017.[178] Then the currency plunged to more than 3-year low against the Dollar at 1,215.35 won on 5 August, lowest level since 24 June 2016 and sharpest daily loss since August 2016.[179][180]

Meanwhile, many global financial markets plunge amid the decision and many stock markets take the selloff, with Nasdaq fell 1.32%, Dou Jons fell 0.37%, and S&P 500 down 0.73%. Also in other stock markets, for example, FTSE 100, DAX va CAC 40 plunged 2.34%, 3.11%, and 3.57% respectively.[iqtibos kerak ] On 5 August, the index took the one of largest daily loss in 2019, with Dow Jones down 767 points (2.98%), S&P 500 down nearly 3% and Nasdaq down 3.5%.[iqtibos kerak ] Dow Jones in particular, down as much as 961.63 points.

Iqtisodiyot

The trade dispute (along with the China–United States trade war) is predicted to have a negative impact on both Japan and South Korea's economy. Japan's growth percentage was lowered for the second quarter of 2019 and the trade dispute with South Korea is expected to exacerbate the slowdown.[181] Several financial services companies have lowered their forecast on South Korea's 2019 economic growth to around two percent or lower.[182][183][184] The Koreya banki has lowered South Korea's economic growth from 2.5% to 2.2%. In response to the economic forecast, they have also lowered interest rate from 1.75% to 1.5% on 18 July 2019.[185] It further cut its rates to 1.25% on 15 October.[186]

Moody's Investors Service, in a “Global Macro Outlook 2019-20” report released on 26 August, revised down forecast economic growth for both South Korea and Japan. For South Korea, the global ratings agency lowered economic growth forecast from 2.1% to 2.0% in 2019 and 2.1% in 2020 to reflect the fallout from trade dispute with Japan. the agency said the trade dispute “undermines Korea's near-term growth prospects”.[187] For Japan, the agency revised down economic growth forecast to 0.7% in 2019 and 0.4% in 2020. Moody's cites that Korea's boycott movement against Japanese goods and services may dent sales. But it saw trade in intermediate goods – including those covered by the export curbs and also more correlated to the global economic downturn – as “posing a larger threat to the Japanese economy.”[188]

Amid the trade dispute with Japan, South Korean consumer sentiment fall to 31-month low in August. According to data from Bank of Korea, the composite consumer sentiment index down 3.4 points to 92.5 from 95.9 in July.[189] It is the lowest level since January 2017, a month after then-president Park Geun-hye was impeached.[190] The July consumer sentiment index also down to 95.9, 1.6 points lower than in June, where it stood at 97.5.[191]

The World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2019, cuts the forecast of volume of merchandise trade growth to 1.2% in 2019 and 2.7% in 2020, down from previous forecasted of 2.6% and 3% respectively. WTO cites this trade dispute, along with the China–U.S trade war, Brexit, and others, pose "the biggest downside risk to the forecast".[192]

The Xalqaro valyuta fondi (IMF) downgraded the economic forecast for many Asian economies because deterioration of relationship between South Korea and Japan. Asian economy could grow 5% in 2019 and 5.1% in 2020. South Korean economic growth could fall to 2% in 2019 and 2.2% in 2020.[193]

Boycott on Japan

Logo of "NO, BOYCOTT JAPAN", indicate South Koreans boycott of Japanese goods and services, where red circle, representing Yaponiya bayrog'i, odatda sifatida tanilgan Xinomaru. The sentence translates to "Don't go, Don't buy!"

In South Korea, boycott movement on Japanese products and services was agitated and affected Japanese brands and tourism to Japan.

Yaponiya brendlari

A Uniqlo store in South Korea, 2015. Uniqlo is one of many Japanese brands affected by the South Korean boycott.

2019 yil 29-iyul kuni Koreyaning kredit kartalarini etkazib beruvchi kompaniya kredit kartalarini sotish to'g'risida xabar berdi Muji 33,4 foizga kamaydi, ABC Mart sotish 11,4% ga kamaydi va DHC korporatsiyasi 55,3 foizga pasaygan.[194] Xuddi shu tarzda, Yaponiyadagi Janubiy Koreyaliklarning kredit kartalari bo'yicha xarajatlari ham kamaydi.[iqtibos kerak ]

One of companies hardest-hit by boycott was Tez chakana savdo, companies that own Uniqlo. Uniqlo sales dropped by 40% and the company announced it close its Jongno 3-ga store in central Seoul.[195] Analyst such as Peter Boardman warns that despite Fast Retailing post record profits, but the company could see many uncertainty because sales in South Korea account for 8% of Uniqlo sales worldwide.[196]

Many Japanese automakers suffering steep fall in July and August. On September 4, according to data from Korea Automobile Importers & Distributors Association (KAIDA), the combined sales of Japanese cars stood at 1,398 units in August, more than halving from a year earlier. By brand, Toyota saw its August sales plunging 59.1 percent on-year to 542 units, while Honda suffered an 80.9 percent on-year sales drop to 138 units and Nissan 's car sales down 87.4 percent on-year to 57 units.[197] The Japanese-brand automakers also suffering slump in July, with Toyota sales down 32% from the year earlier and Honda car sales tumbled 33.5% year-on-year. Lexus, South Korea's third-most imported car brand after Mercedes-Benz and BMW, saw sales down 24.6% from the previous month, although that was still up 33% from the previous year, according to data from KAIDA on August 5.[198][199]

Preliminary data from Koreya bojxona xizmati in September said imports of Japanese beer for the month of August 2019 stood at US$223,000, down 97% from $7.57 million a year earlier.[200][201]

In May 2020, Nissan announced that it will withdraw from South Korea by the end of 2020.[202]

Turizm

South Korean tourists to Japan

The number of South Korean tourists visiting Japan fell 48% in August to 308,700, the lowest number since May 2016, according to Yaponiya milliy turizm tashkiloti (JNTO). However a total number of inbound visitors decreased slightly by 2.2% to 2,520,100 because visitors from other countries increased significantly.[203] Moreover, a surplus in the travel balance was an August record because the average spending increased as a result of the decrease of Korean visitors whose average spending per visitor is less than a half of other countries.[204][205][206] On 16 October, JNTO reported that the number of South Korean tourists visiting Japan fell 58% in September to 201,200. However a total number of inbound visitors increased 5.2% to 2,272,900.[203] The total spending of inbound visitors from July to September increased 9.0% despite the decrease of Korean visitors.[207]

Ba'zi Janubiy Koreyaning aviakompaniyalari parvozlarni kamaytirishi yoki Yaponiya va Janubiy Koreyaning yirik shaharlari o'rtasida to'g'ridan-to'g'ri yo'nalishlarni to'xtatishi haqida e'lon qildi.[208] Masalan, Korean Air, the South Korea's largest airline, suspended its Busan-Osaka route from 16 September, and routes between Jeju va Narita and between Jeju and Osaka-Kansay 1 noyabrdan. The airline also temporarily suspended some of its other routes: Incheon-Komatsu and Incheon-Kagoshima both were suspended from 29 September to 16 November, and Incheon-Asahikawa suspended from 26 September to 26 October.[209] Air Seul, an Asiana Airlines subsidiary, suspended flights from Incheon to Toyama on 16 September and from Incheon to Kumamoto va Ube 27 oktyabrdan.[210]

As the number of passengers travelling between the two countries is plummeting, Airfares from Japan to South Korea and elsewhere in many airlines dropped to less than $10. CNN reported that it costs as little as 10,000 won ($8.38) to fly one-way from Seoul to Fukuoka on Eastar Jet, and only 1,000 Japanese yen ($9.35) the other way.[211] If it include tax and fuel surcharges, the same route costs 7,590 yen ($71).[212]

GSOMIA termination intention and renewal announcement

As retaliation against Japan's decision to restrict export of high-tech materials and remove of South Korea from its export “white list,” South Korea decided on the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) is an agreement signed in November 2016 by South Korea and Japan to share sensitive information about threats from North Korea.[213] According to Article 21 of the agreement, the GSOMIA will automatically be renewed for a year unless one of two countries announce a termination notice 90 days prior to the extension of the agreement.

Deputy of Blue House national security office, Kim You-geun, announced on 22 August that South Korea decided to give Japan the required 90 day notice to terminate the military intelligence sharing pact.[214][215] According to South Korea, Japan did not meet Seoul's “national interests” to maintain the deal. They also stated that Tokyo has failed to communicate a clear explanation for placing controls on certain exports to South Korea.[216] The decisions were announced after hours-long debate in National Security Command (NSC).[217] On the other hand, South Korean Foreign Ministry added that the decision to terminate the military-sharing pact was due to trust issue between the two countries.[218] GSOMIA initially set to expire on 23 November 2019 but South Korea decide to reverse decision to continue the agreement on 22 November.[219]

Xavotirlar va qarama-qarshiliklar

Anti-Japanese banner in Jung-gu

On 6 August 2019, a 1,000 anti-Japan banners starting to put up at centre of Seoul, as local workers hanging the banners from the streets of Jung-gu. Days before, on 5 August the district office, which headed by Seo Yang-ho, announced the plan to set the banner ahead of National Liberation day 15 avgustda. But the banner was sparked widespread anger by South Koreans who felt uncomfortable with the banners, as there was a widespread consensus that the anti-Japan movement is to be done by the civilians, not by the government authorities as this action might harm the motivation of anti-Japan movements and undermine the negotiation capability of the government. Then, the district head apologized for the situations and reversed his decision.[220] A Cheong Wa Dae online petition website requesting to bring down the “No Japan” banners, had collected more than 20,000 signatures.[221]

Pro-Japanese praising video

On 7 August, Chairman of Kolmar Korea Yoon Dong-han played a video by far-right Youtuber named Leeseob TV praising Shinzo Abe and criticizing the Moon Jae-In administration. The video included vulgar language and comments such as “Abe is definitely a great leader and President Moon Jae-in should be thankful for not getting punched by Abe in the face”. This video sparked criticism against the chairman and prompt the company to issue the official statement regarding the video on 9 August.[222] But the online communities still anger and started to boycott the company's products. The backlash prompt the chairman to issue public apology on 11 August and the chairman was resign after he apologized to 700 employees of the company.[223] Shares of Kolmar Korea fell 6.2% after the official statement from the company.[224]

DHC TV anti-Korean broadcast

Starting on 10 August DHC Television, a subsidiary of the Japanese cosmetic manufacturer DHC korporatsiyasi, made inflammatory comments about Korea and its history. This sparked anger among South Koreans and prompted DHC Korea to issue an apology on 13 August. Korean consumers were urged to stop purchasing DHC's products.[225]

Shuningdek qarang

Izohlar

  1. ^ According to data from January to May 2019, South Korea imports 93.7% of Fluorinated polyimide, 91.9% of Photoresist and 43.9% of Hydrogen Fluoride from Japan. There was a significant decline in Hydrogen fluoride imports since 2010, at which point South Korea imported 72.2% from Japan. Despite Fluorinated polyimide and Photoresist also having a noticeable decline since 2010 at 97.7% and 95.5%, respectively, the dependency on Japanese industries for these materials are still high,[13] making South Korea still vulnerable to export restrictions from Japan.[tekshirib bo'lmadi ]
  2. ^ From August 2019, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry renamed the “Preferred Trade Partner List Countries" or ”Whitelist Countries" to Group A and non-whitelist countries divided into Group B, C, and D and re-categorized these countries to reflect their actual statuses against the Japanese export control system. Newly-renamed Group A includes 21 Yevropa Ittifoqi a'zo davlatlar, Avstraliya va Yangi Zelandiya, shu qatorda; shu bilan birga Argentina, Kanada va Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari.

Adabiyotlar

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